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I. INTRODUCTION
The job changes you, he said.
My mother told me I changed.
I used to be easygoing, now I'm violent all the time.
I get into fights.
I used to be an emotional person, now I can't feel anymore.
I see something bad and I can't feel anything.
I gave them my gun and told them I need help.
I lost my gentleness and I want it back'
Police officers who are in pain are ill-equipped to meet everyone
else's needs. Law enforcement is a soul-crunching, "alcohol-focused"
way of life.2 It is, in the words of one police psychologist, a profession
"high in psychic battering."3 When police officers become alcoholic,
they violate the social contract in countless subtle and insidious ways.
The chemically dependent law enforcement officer harms our social
structure each time she interacts with a member of the community.
But this damage is preventable. The officer who ends each shift with a
six-pack should be confronted and offered treatment. But the odds
are overwhelmingly against intervention taking place.
This Comment investigates the causative and confounding vari-
ables fueling police alcoholism and suggests that only responsible leg-
islation can break a deadly impasse. If communities are to be spared
the harm caused by alcoholism among those charged with public
safety, lawmakers must deal openly and realistically with the prob-
lem. The process begins with recognition of police officer vulnerabil-
ity. Police careers are more likely to end with a bottle than from a
bullet. Stress disorders are more likely to cause disability and death
than is a violent encounter. Yet many police officers still defuse at
the end of a shift--or during a shift-with their peers and a bottle.'
Police officers drink because they are members of both a drinking
society and a police subculture with internal mechanisms that enable
alcoholic behavior. 6 Of course, not all drinking cops become alco-
holic. But as casual drinking turns into problem drinking, police cul-
ture and the dynamics of alcoholism combine with potentially lethal
impact for the officer, her partner, and the public.
1. JILL FREEDMAN, STREET COPS 108 (1981), copyright © 1981, by Jill Freedman,
reprinted with permission of Jonathan Dolger Agency, N.Y., N.Y.
2. See discussion infra part II.
3. David F. Machell, The Recovering Alcoholic Police Officer and the Danger of
Professional Emotional Suppression, 6 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 85, 86 (1989).
4. See discussion infra part II.A.2.
5. See discussion infra part II.A.2.
6. See discussion infra part II.C.
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The focus of this Comment is on the period of years between the
rookie's first choirpractice 7 and the catastrophic, alcohol-induced
incident that leads to death, civil suit, or disciplinary action. This
period presents the optimum point for early intervention, but is fre-
quently ignored due to the confluence of contradictory cultural imper-
atives. Unraveling the problem requires, first, understanding why
police officers and police agencies do not confront drinkers. Next, we
need to expose the multidimensional impact of police alcoholism on
our social fabric. Finally, we must challenge the massive resistance to
dealing with alcoholism as a disease, a resistance institutionalized by
statute and case law.
While this Comment examines on a microlevel many of the vari-
ables fueling police alcoholism, the macro perspective should be kept
in focus: the public is at risk because the collusive system does too
little, too late.
Part II identifies the depth and breadth of the problem of alco-
holism among police officers. Sociological studies affirm what is well
known in the police community: an alarming percentage of officers
are problem drinkers whose dependency leads to drinking on the job
or to reporting for work with elevated blood alcohol levels.' When a
police officer starts shaking at the end of a shift because he needs a
drink, but has to respond to a call which holds him over for an extra
hour, someone is likely to be victimized by the "protector."
Part II also sets forth the "disease model of alcoholism" in lay-
7. "Choirpractice" is a term coined by Joseph Wambaugh in THE CHOIRBOYS (1975).
See infra note 55 and accompanying text. Choirpractice is police slang for an alcohol-fueled,
informal debriefing. Officers gather after a shift to drink and talk, sharing details of
particularly harrowing or unusual calls. Talking helps to defuse stress and alleviate
psychological tension caused by regular encounters with other human beings in crisis. But for
the alcoholic, the emphasis quickly shifts from sharing about distressing events to drinking
through the pain caused by those events.
Storytelling and the liberal use of police slang and descriptive poetry are not the
traditional or preferred support for legal writing. But see Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men
Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians
and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 516-30 (1992). But a logical, purely cognitive
examination of police alcoholism misses the mark. I believe that solving the problem of
alcoholism in policing requires a holistic approach-a non-traditional, sometimes visceral take
on an issue presently treated by the those in the system in traditionally reactive, rule-enforcing,
and punitive ways.
My perspective is colored by having served as a police officer, as a police training
administrator, and as a social worker specializing in police culture and dynamics. In each role,
I was privileged to hear the personal stories of police officers and their families. Their thoughts
and experiences appear throughout this comment, with anonymity preserved in accord with
the wishes of those men and women who wanted to share, but who were not convinced that the
public or their employers would accept police officers struggling with the human problem of
chemical dependency.
8. See discussion infra part II.A.2.
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man's terms. Central to this inquiry is an understanding of alcohol-
ism as a primary, progressive, chronic and deadly disease that takes
many years to develop.9 Treatment requires coming to terms with
both the officer's denial and her co-workers' enabling.10 Treatment
means breaking through both the officer's psychodynamic survival-
based need to feel invincible and a corresponding archetypal longing
for protectors who really are invincible.II
Police culture presents a nearly impermeable shield which must
be cast aside before we can confront police alcoholism head-on.
Police administrators and officers are resistant to either implementing
or using treatment programs.' 2 Systematic but unconsciously moti-
vated cover-ups are common. The police family acts like any family
of an alcoholic-it tries to keep alcoholism secret. It shelters margin-
ally manageable alcoholic officers from public view. When a disaster
finally occurs and official scrutiny cannot be avoided, it disowns the
alcoholic. The fraternity disgorges the betrayer, fully supported by
legislative enactments and judicial rulings which are only reactive and
punitive in nature.
Part III examines myths and assumptions propelling the system
along a path marked by fault-finding that ultimately leads to condem-
nation of the alcoholic officer. It reviews federal statutes to determine
why and how they fuel, rather than alleviate, the problem. All of us
are at risk because there is no statutory duty that compels police agen-
cies to identify and treat problem drinkers at early stages of the dis-
ease.13 Measures that formerly supported treatment for alcoholics
have been modified, restructured or superseded in ways that abdicate
responsibility for alcoholism generally, and for alcoholism in public
safety positions particularly. 4 Laws implemented to prevent discrim-
9. See discussion infra part I.B.
10. See discussion infra part II.C.
11. See discussion infra part II.C.2.
12. Some large, metropolitan police agencies have comprehensive employee assistance
programs with well-developed alcoholism treatment strategies. These progressive efforts are
the exception rather than the rule, however, and their existence does not signify the end of
institutionalized resistance to early intervention. See discussion infra part II.D.
13. Federal statutes that might create incentives to treat are discussed extensively because
many state, county and city police departments receive federal funds. Compliance with these
laws is a condition of continuing federal financial support. Consequently, the federal
government can exert pressure on a police agency to provide treatment to alcoholics. Federal
intervention is also appropriate because alcoholism in law enforcement is a national problem.
Few jurisdictions are capable of garnering support at the state level for alcoholism treatment.
See discussion infra part IV.B. for an attempt to effect change at the state level that failed.
14. This section reviews the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 to establish how an earlier




ination against the handicapped, including the alcoholic, no longer
impose a duty on federal employers to confront the alcoholic and offer
treatment if drinking has resulted in misconduct.15 The law supports
punishment, including discharge, of either federal or state level police
officers whose alcoholism leads to trouble. 16 These developments
ignore the debilitating nature of alcoholism. The statutes in question
have grand names and potentially vast scope which belie a hidden
agenda. Where the handicap is alcoholism, and the handicapped per-
son wears a gun, the rule of law brings recrimination rather than
rehabilitation.
Second, Part III examines the judicial response to alcohol-
induced police misconduct when construing current statutory lan-
guage. Where public safety is involved, the courts find that both alco-
holism and drug abuse' 7 are incompatible with the essential functions
of law enforcement, and therefore support punitive action against
offending officers.18 Decisions fail to carefully distinguish illegal from
legal drugs. The embedded assumption is that law enforcement goals
and effectiveness are undermined by retention and treatment of chem-
ically dependent police officers, and that if federal legislation errs, it
properly errs on the side of public safety. These decisions are punc-
tuated by discussion of police credibility, possible future risk, and
community expectations. 19 Underlying judicial censure are stereo-
types, myths, and ignorance about the dynamics of alcoholism gener-
ally, and about the police agency's complicity in the problem
specifically. Hardest to eradicate is the lingering punitive mentality
which is based in the conviction that alcoholism is born of weak char-
acter. "Willful misbehavior" is met with stringent and unyielding
punitive measures which do not correct, but condemn.20
Third, this part explores the connection between agency policy
and the collective bargaining process. 21 Unions in many larger juris-
dictions have secured contract provisions for comprehensive
employee assistance programs. Some of these contracts require police
departments to offer treatment for the alcoholic officer, either in con-
junction with or before disciplinary action. The decision to discharge
rather than suspend and treat a "first offender" whose misconduct is
inextricably related to his alcoholism implicates progressive discipline
15. See discussion infra part III.A. 1.
16. See discussion infra part III.A. 1.
17. See note 266 infra.
18. See discussion infra part III.B.
19. See discussion infra parts III.A.2, III.B.
20. See discussion infra part III.B.3.
21. See discussion infra part III.C.
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guidelines. The outcomes of police alcoholism cases that involve both
departmental procedures and contract provisions vary wildly.22 A
coherent rationale guiding resolution of these labor cases is difficult to
discern. In the end, it appears that the best predictor of discharge
rather than treatment is whether the media was attracted to the
underlying incident. 3 Most citizens believe they are protected from
harm because when a drinking cop kills, the morning paper reports
that he has been fired, prosecuted, and sued. 24 This belief is an illu-
sion. Before police alcoholism results in a well-publicized disaster,
daily contacts with impaired officers have cumulatively undermined
trust in the entire law enforcement system.
Part IV looks at recent failed attempts at both the federal and
state levels to implement treatment-oriented legislation. It appears
that, despite potentially vast gains to be realized by imposing an inter-
vention mentality on police agencies, those legislators courageous
enough to propose dramatic statutory changes are undermined by the
nature of the political process. 25 But politics are not the sole determi-
nate of change in the current impasse. Far more problematic is the
ever complicating impact of alcoholism itself on the process. How
does alcoholism among our lawmakers kill any hope of recovery for
our law enforcers?26 This Comment recommends strategies to over-
come the political and psychological impediments to change at the
legislative level.
Three underlying themes permeate this discussion but cannot be
fully addressed within the scope of this article. First, because alcohol
is not an illegal drug, a rationale guiding discharge of officers for ille-
gal drug use should not be blindly adopted when discussing alcohol
dependence. Paradoxically, alcohol is a lot like an illegal drug in both
its seductive allure and its impact. Treating alcoholism as distinct
from illegal drug addiction for the purposes of this inquiry is a fiction
indulged only because the larger problem-police officers using illegal
22. See discussion infra part III.C.2.
23. See discussion infra part III.C.2.b.
24. A Florida Highway patrol trooper who had stopped a woman while on duty in his
patrol car, then raped and strangled her, recently pled guilty to first degree murder. State v.
Harris, No. 90-335 (Fla. 17th Judicial Cir. Ct. Apr. 26, 1990). The decedent's family sued the
department, alleging negligent hiring and retention. Plaintiff alleged that the department knew
or should have known of the officer's instability because, among other factors, he was a
nondrinker who began abusing alcohol in the months preceding the murder. The officer had
also requested a transfer or leave of absence because he "was approaching the job in an unsafe
manner." Hendricks v. State of Fla., Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, No. 920111
(Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 10, 1992).
25. See discussion infra part IV.
26. See infra note 413.
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drugs--clouds the analysis, inhibits understanding, and trumps prob-
lem-solving strategies.27
Second, alcoholism is a handicapping disease.2" Tragically, it is
the only handicap that comes to mind in which the primary symptom
of the disease is misconduct. Employers' ideas about accommodation,
their willingness to work with and around a disability, and core atti-
tudes about impaired ability to perform are all reframed when the
employer's first awareness of the handicap is a DUI arrest. 29 Tension
exists between an employer's right to take disciplinary action in
response to misconduct, and the employee's right to have her handi-
cap recognized as such and accommodated. The employee's denial of
the role alcoholism plays in misconduct further obscures the nature of
the disease. Unlike blindness, physical impairment, or a measurable
cognitive deficiency, alcoholism is elusive. Its symptom is concrete.
Its symptom can be punished in a straightforward manner. But the
handicapping nature of the disease itself evades attention.
Finally, although courts and legislators most frequently treat
alcoholism with disdain, it touches all branches of government. Presi-
dent Clinton's well-publicized experiences with his stepfather's and
brother's addictions introduces an exciting new element to the equa-
tion. Will a President, not merely educated about alcoholism but with
a deep and abiding ability to forgive the disease's effect on those he
loves, add a touch of realism and humanity to a debate too often con-
ducted under the collusive shadows of politics and denial?
Alcoholic police officers should not be ignored until too late and
then fired. Alcoholism undermines effective policing and police/com-
munity relations and jeopardizes the lives of police officers them-
selves. The status quo heightens danger to both the public and the
officer. Healing requires a basic reconceptualization of the police
image. Law enforcers must admit their dependency and co-depen-
dency and embrace early intervention. Communities must allow their
protectors to be less than invincible. Legislators need the courage to
mandate intervention.
Police alcoholism presents an opportunity. The recovering3"
27. The same basic underlying patterns of substance abuse drive alcohol, marijuana,
cocaine and food addicts. Accordingly, rehabilitation specialists will properly challenge this
artificial separation of alcohol abuse from abuse of illegal drugs. The "drug of choice" is only
a symptom of the underlying disease. See infra note 435.
28. See discussion infra part II.B.
29. In reality, many early symptoms are observable in the alcoholic, but because of
institutionalized denial, the police employer is likely to ignore warning signals. See discussion
infra parts II.B-D and note 96.
30. The terms "in recovery" and "recovering alcoholic" are used throughout this
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alcoholic officer can become a role model and healer in a society
simultaneously devastated by chemical dependency problems and
alienated from its impersonal, over-idealized law enforcers. But this
is an opportunity that can be realized only if we are courageous
enough to face and embrace the humanity of our protectors.
II. BOOZE AND THE BADGE
So you try to protect yourself, to turn off.
But you carry the smell of a DOA around in your nostrils for a
week
Maybe you can't deal with it.
Then you get what they call a police-prone disease.
Alcoholism, ulcers, high blood pressure, heart condition, depres-
sion, divorce, suicide.
And when you retire, you're worn out.
You're dead. 31
How big is the problem of police alcoholism? Is it one that we
can afford to collectively deny? What are the chances that the next
on-duty police officer you see just finished a beer? Does alcoholism
among our lawmakers and judiciary affect decisions about hiring, fir-
ing and treatment of the drinking police officer? Is alcoholism a dis-
ease? If it is a weakness, is it one we can allow our protectors?
In order to frame the legal issues raised by alcoholism in police
departments, this part first examines the problem of alcoholism gener-
ally and then its link to policing. This part next reviews the disease
model, physiological and psychological dependence, symptoms of use
and withdrawal, and the historic perception of the drinker as weak-
willed and flawed. Next, it considers the psychodynamics associated
with alcoholism as an overlay to police culture. By protecting the
alcoholic, officers shield the police family from censure. Closing
ranks around the drinker perpetuates law enforcement's isolation
from the public. Keeping the secret also reinforces a collective self-
image integral to survival. This image is of super-human strength suf-
ficient to withstand the daily onslaught of sadness and violence.
Denying alcoholism helps everyone on the force keep his own frailties
at bay. Alcoholism serves many purposes in the police family.
Lastly, this part explores the impact of police alcoholism on the
police role in society. Defining the cost of police alcoholism is prob-
lematic. Does the administrator stop counting dollars with training
Comment rather than "recovered" or "rehabilitated". This is consistent with the disease
model's recognition of recovery as a lifelong process. See discussion infra part II.B. 1.
31. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 214.
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and development of the officer lost to the bottle, or should she include
the potential cost of a civil suit that may result if the alcoholic officer
hurts someone? How do we place a value on adverse publicity, siege
mentality, a2 and public perception that police are not to be trusted?
What is the price paid for regular unpleasant encounters between
alcohol dependent officers and citizens?
A. The Police/Alcohol Link
Social scientists agree that policing is conducive to drinking, and
that the percentage of alcoholic officers is higher than that of
alcoholics in the general population. An explanation may be found by
first reviewing the enormous role alcohol plays in our culture.
1. ALCOHOLISM'S IMPACT ON SOCIETY
It is estimated that 10.5 million American adults, or approxi-
mately 10% of the population, show some symptoms of alcoholism or
alcohol dependence, and that another 7.2 million abuse alcohol.33 By
1995, 11.2 million adults will be identifiably alcohol dependent. 34 The
costs of alcoholism in lost employment, reduced productivity, and
health care are expected to rise to $150 billion in 1995. 31 Health care
costs for untreated alcoholics are reportedly 100% higher than for
nonalcoholics, 36 and the families of alcoholics have higher health care
costs than those of nonalcoholics. 37 Twenty-three percent of those
32. "It's like being an occupation army in a foreign country... only your tour of duty is
not for a year or two; it's for many years." Anonymous police officer suffering from post-
traumatic stress syndrome, POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 1989, at 21.
33. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 7TH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S.
CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH at vii (1990) [hereinafter ALCOHOL & HEALTH]. The
Department of Health and Human Services categorizes problem drinking along two
dimensions: alcohol abuse and alcohol dependence. Alcohol abusers include those who
encounter both social and medical effects from "high risk" drinking, but who are not
physiologically or psychologically dependent. This group also is referred to as "nondependent
problem drinkers." Id. at 1. Those in the second category, alcohol dependents, have an
"impaired ability to control drinking behavior," which, along with physical and psychological
dependence, distinguishes them from alcohol abusers. Id. at 2. Labeling drinkers is
complicated because different drinking patterns emerge over a lifetime. Some become
dependent almost simultaneously with consumption of the first drink, while for others
addiction takes several years to develop. Id. at 2-3. It sometimes becomes difficult to
appreciate the nature of the disease when treatment specialists label dynamics in one way,
while governmental entities (and courts) use different descriptors. The resulting linguistic
confusion is often counterproductive from a treatment perspective. See discussion infra part
III.B.3 for the Supreme Court's interpretation of addiction terminologies.
34. Id. at vii.
35. Id. at 272.
36. Id. at 273.
37. Id. at 273-75.
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responding to a 1990 national survey reported that they "drink more
than they should, 3 8 with the same percentage reporting that drinking
has caused trouble in the family.39 Almost 5% of young adults report
daily alcohol use, with 34.3% admitting "consuming five or more
drinks in a row within the last two weeks." 4
Police officers' lives are alcohol-focused. During every shift, the
officer is likely to encounter an alcohol-related problem. In 1989,
37.2% of those drivers fatally injured in accidents were intoxicated.4
In the same year, police made over three million arrests for alcohol
related offenses, including 1.3 million for driving under the influ-
ence.42 Convicted inmates report being under the influence of alcohol
in 49.5 % of homicides, 21.1% of sexual assaults, 18.1% of robberies,
and 44.3% of assaults." Property crimes are similarly linked with
alcohol. Intoxication was involved in 17.9% of property crimes,
which include burglary, theft, auto theft, fraud, and other stolen prop-
erty offenses." Perhaps most frightening from the officer's perspec-
tive is the connection between weapons offenses and intoxication:
21.4% of those convicted on firearms charges reported being under
the influence at the time of the crime. 5 Nearly half of all violent
deaths for young men under the age of thirty-four are alcohol
related.46  Not surprisingly, researchers suggest an association
between alcohol problems and abusiveness towards children and
spouses. 47 Officers and intoxicated citizens meet in "non-criminal"
circumstances, as well. It is estimated that 20-45% of all homeless
people have alcohol related problems. 4 Among suicide victims, 20-
36% had a history of alcohol abuse or were drinking shortly before
killing themselves.49
The evidence is abundant. Policing is in large part a response to
38. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll Monthly, No. 303 (Princeton, N.J.: The Gallup
Poll, Dec. 1990), reprinted in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS- 1990, at 348 (Hindelang Criminal Justice
Research Ctr., Univ. at Albany ed., State Univ. of N.Y. 1990) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
39. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 38, at 349.
40. LLOYD D. JOHNSON ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L
INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE AMONG AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS, COLLEGE
STUDENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS 1975-1990 (1991), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 38,
at 333.
41. Id. at 350.
42. Id. at 451.
43. Id. at 595.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. ALCOHOL & HEALTH, supra note 33, at vii.
47. Id. at 272.
48. Id. at xxii.
49. Id. at xxvi.
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the impact of alcoholism on society. Why doesn't all this exposure to
the devastation caused by alcoholism lead law enforcers to absti-
nence? Why is there a 10-40% chance that the next police officer you
see is alcoholic?
2. POLICE ALCOHOLISM
All officers know the job is high-risk. But the risks are not those
suggested by television. Spectacular accidents, gunfights in the
streets, and ambushes occur infrequently. Of the 523,262 officers
employed in city, county and state police agencies in 1990, only sixty-
five officers were feloniously killed in the line of duty.50 Police know,
but deny or ignore, the maxim "it probably won't be the bullet that
will strike down an officer, but the effects of chronic stress."',
Lists of stressors affecting law enforcement personnel typically
include court rulings, administration, equipment, community rela-
tions, changing shifts, bad assignments, isolation, boredom, and low
pay.52 Research confirms the risks of heart disease, suicide, sleep dis-
orders, divorce, and a host of other symptoms arising from the stress-
ful lifestyle.5 3 Supervisors have become increasingly aware of their
responsibility in creating and managing their subordinates' stress.54
50. 1990 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. § V, at 237 [hereinafter UCR]. Officers react angrily
and defensively when it is suggested that statistics do not support the claim that policing is one
of the most dangerous professions. The pull exerted by police socialization is so strong that
even twelve years after turning in her badge, the author finds it hard to stomach use of the
word "only" in connection with any officer's death. See discussion infra part II.C regarding
police culture.
51. See Barbara Cappiello, Substance Abuse Programs: A Bridge Back to Society, LAW
ENFORCEMENT TECH., June 1990, at 28, 29 ("police officers live an average of 12 years less
than most people"); Danielle Hitz, Drunken Sailors and Others: Drinking Problems in Specific
Occupations, 34 Q. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 496-99 (1973) (police mortality rates for alcohol-
related cirrhosis of the liver were significantly higher than in the general population); Robin
Klein, Police Peer Counseling: Officers Helping Officers, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. Oct.
1989, at 1, 1 (1989). Being "stressed-out" has become, unfortunately, a symbol of success
among some law enforcers-worn as a kind of merit badge. JAMES L. LOCKARD, SURVIVAL
THINKING FOR POLICE AND CORRECTIONS OFFICERS 69 (1991).
52. WILLIAM KROES, SOCIETY'S VICTIM-THE POLICEMAN (1976); William H. Kroes et
al., Job Stress in Policemen, 2 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 145, 146-48 (1974); William H. Kroes
et al., Job Stress in Police Administrators, 2 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 381, 382-86 (1974); see
also ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, SAM HOUSTON STATE
UNIV., ALCOHOL AND DRUG PREVENTION STRATEGIES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 13-15
(1991) [hereinafter PREVENTION STRATEGIES]; Joseph J. Hurrell & William H. Kroes, Stress
Awareness, in NAT'L INST. OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, JOB STRESS AND THE
POLICE OFFICER 35 (William H. Kroes & Joseph J. Hurrell eds., 1975); John G. Stratton,
Police Stress: An Overview, POLICE CHIEF, Apr. 1978, at 58; John G. Stratton, Police Stress:
Considerations and Suggestions, POLICE CHIEF, May 1978, at 73; Leonard Territo & Harold J.
Vetter, Stress and Police Personnel, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 195, 196 (1981).
53. KROES, supra note 52, at 77-95; Territo & Vetter, supra note 52, at 196.
54. See Lee Colwell, Stress-A Major Enemy of Law Enforcement Professionals, 57 FBI L.
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Prior to the mid-1970s, however, commentary about police alco-
holism was largely anecdotal, often humorous, and tended to rein-
force the machismo image of cops who fought hard and played
harder. Joseph Wambaugh's writings introduced the term "choir-
practice" to the public." Naming the problem did not make it go
away-on one level, it legitimized and glorified what had been
secret.5 6 Starting in the mid-1970s, commentators began to write
about the darker side of police drinking. A 1976 article appearing in
The Police Chief started with the words "alcoholism is a disease" and
ended with the warning: "it is simply a matter of whether you live or
die."57 Nonetheless, research about police alcoholism was sparse for a
number of years. 58
Without suggesting the rate of alcoholism among law enforcers,
a 1979 article noted the probability that anecdotal reports are based in
reality and discussed the importance of confidential treatment and
supervisory intervention.5 9 In 1981, Leonard Territo and Harold J.
Vetter counted alcoholism in their listing of stress-related illnesses.'
Subsequent studies increasingly linked booze and the badge, rapidly
shattering illusions of invincibility that had fueled the police
mystique.
A study of suicides in the Chicago Police Department between
1977 and 1979 reported a strong correlation between alcoholism and
suicide.6 Of the twenty officers who killed themselves during the
focus years, alcoholism was documented in twelve instances.62 Toxi-
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Feb. 1988, at 11 (examining the part supervisors play in creating
unhealthy stress among staff).
55. See generally HARRY W. MORE, SPECIAL TOPICS ON POLICING 199 (1992); JOSEPH
WAMBAUGH, THE NEW CENTURIONS (1970); JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLUE KNIGHT
(1972); JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE CHOIRBOYS (1975); JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLACK
MARBLE (1978); JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE GLITTER DOME (1981).
56. I became a police officer in 1974, when the term "choirpractice" was everyday
vernacular and the midnight shift often ended with a six-pack in the station parking lot at 7:00
a.m. Incoming personnel and members of the public walked by while officers drank. The
mood was one of defiance and entitlement. No one challenged the drinking because the right
to choirpractice was assumed.
57. Leon Dishlacoff, The Drinking Cop, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1976, at 32, 39.
58. Charles M. Unkovic & William R. Brown, The Drunken Cop, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 230 (R.G. Iacovetta and Dae H. Chung eds., 1979). Unkovic and Brown
found only six journal articles and three books about alcoholic officers when they began their
compilation of anecdotal evidence of police drinking. Id. at 231.
59. John G. Stratton & Brian Wroe, Alcoholism and the Policeman, FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 1979, at 20, 22.
60. Territo & Vetter, supra note 52, at 196.
61. Marcia Wagner & Richard J. Brzeczek, Alcoholism and Suicide: A Fatal Connection,
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Aug. 1983, at 8 (1983).
62. Id. at 10-11.
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cology reports showed that nine of the officers had substantial quanti-
ties of alcohol in their systems at the time of death6 3 and that fifteen
had demonstrated behavioral problems indicative of alcohol depen-
dence. 64 A more recent study of officer suicide in the Los Angeles
Police Department profiled the victim: a white male patrol officer,
thirty-five, separated or divorced, experiencing a significant loss, and
abusing alcohol.65 Untreated alcoholic officers die prematurely.66
Tragically, death might be at their own hands, and with the very
weapons symbolizing officers' willingness to sacrifice life for preserva-
tion of the community.67
There is no agreement about the precise percentage of alcoholic
police officers. Research suggests that anywhere from 10-40% of law
enforcers may be alcoholic. One survey of 2200 officers in twenty-
nine police departments reported that 23% had serious drinking
problems.68 Forty percent of Chicago officers responding to a survey
reported drinking on-duty.69 Another study reported that 53% of
officers came to work with a hangover and that an "average" officer in
the study drank on-the-job about eight days in every six-month
period. 70  A police chief with twenty-seven years on the job com-
mented that of thirty-seven officers in his recruit class, 24% exper-
ienced drinking problems during their careers. 71  As these studies
demonstrate, figures on police alcoholism far exceed the 10% marker
consistently reported for alcoholism in the general population. Why?
Certain characteristics of the police task and environment are
particularly conducive to coping by drinking. Undercover assign-
ments place officers in bars or social settings where refusing to drink
would raise suspicions or where drinking is necessary to make the
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Rose Lee Josephson & Martin Reiser, Officer Suicide in the Los Angeles Police
Department: A Twelve Year Follow-up, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 227, 228 (1990). One
alcoholic officer in my department drove into the next county before blowing his brains out
with his service revolver. We speculated that he did not want his co-workers to be the first to
find his body.
66. See infra part I.B.
67. Wagner & Brzeczek, supra note 61, at 11 ("Eighty percent of the subjects took their
lives by gun-revolvers were used in all cases."). See infra note 182 regarding a lawsuit
brought by the widow of an officer who killed himself with his own service revolver despite
having received treatment for his alcoholism.
68. PREVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note 52, at 5.
69. Ronald C. Van Raalte, Alcohol as a Problem Among Officers, POLICE CHIEF, Feb.
1979, at 38.
70. PREVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note 52, at 6.
71. Howard Rudolph, Stress and Police Work.: Some Personal Reflections, POLICE CHIEF,
Feb. 1989, at 21-22.
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case.72 Vice and narcotics officers, typically conducting business
where drugs and alcohol are part of the transaction, have enough diffi-
culty trying to evade illegal drug use while retaining credibility.73
Refusing to drink is simply an impossibility. The officers know it,
their supervisors know it, and the public knows it.74 Still, the officer is
expected to be able to "handle it"-to drink, but not to become
dependent.
Higher alcohol consumption is not unexpected in a field that is
male-dominated 7 and that mirrors the military structurally and ideo-
logically.76 One study of 724 sworn and 198 non-sworn employees of
72. See Drink: An Occupational Hazard, 6 POLICE REV., Jan, 1984, at 16-18 (1984).
Reporting anecdotally on drinking habits of Metropolitan London police, the authors observed
that "drinking ... is an integral part of detectives' working lives .... [T]hey often end up
believing that regular hard drinking is the passport to acceptance by a whole world of villains
and informers .... A CID officer who did not drink with colleagues would be an oddball." Id.
at 16. Generalizations from these comments about London detectives to American police are
made cautiously, but the thoughts expressed mirror those of American officers reporting
anecdotally. See IPA News, PBA HEAT (Official Publication of the Dade County Police
Benevolent Ass'n, Miami, Fla.), Mar. 1993, at 17. Commenting on his visit with the Paris,
France police, the author noted that the station control officer's duties include running the bar
inside the police station where
(o]fficers frequently stop for a drink or two during their shift .... [T]here was no
limit to the amount they consumed but if an officer should drink too much he
would face suspension for the first time and termination the second. Too much
was described as slurring speech or staggering. I departed Paris with a new
respect for the French police.
Id. These comments raise a host of additional concerns: Is alcoholism recognized as a prob-
lem among French police officers? How is chemical dependency treated among French law
enforcement agencies? What about this strikingly different approach to police drinking war-
rants the respect of the visiting American police officer? Is not an elevated blood alcohol level,
while perhaps short of that inducing the lack of coordination associated with intoxication, of
concern to the robbery victim who must rely on the judgment of an officer whose thinking may
be impaired although she is still standing?
73. See generally DAVID L. CARTER & DARREL W. STEPHENS, DRUG ABUSE BY POLICE
OFFICERS (1988). For a fictionalized first person account, see KIM WOZENCRAFT, RUSH
(1990).
74. Drink: An Occupational Hazard, supra note 72, at 18 (describing pre-raid drinking
with senior officers). Nevada specifically exempts from disciplinary action a "peace officer who
possesses a controlled substance or consumes alcohol within the scope of his duties." NEV.
REV. STAT. § 284.4062(3)(b) (1991).
75. Walter B. Clark & Lorraine Midanik, Alcohol Use and Alcohol Problems Among US.
Adults: Results of the 1979 National Survey, in NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE &
ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ALCOHOL AND HEALTH
MONOGRAPH, ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND RELATED PROBLEMS (1982). In 1990, only
nine percent of all state, county, and municipal police officers were women. UCR, supra note
50, at 237.
76. See Michael Babin, Minimizing the Effects of Stress, ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED
POLICE GAZETTE, Dec. 1985, at 4, 5 (describing policing as "still a male-dominated, 'macho'
profession... [in which] drinking is informally expected of officers as a means of relaxing and
coping with tension."); Virginia E. Pendergrass & Nancy M. Ostrove, Correlates of Alcohol
Use by Police Personnel, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, at 489, 491
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a major police department, with a response rate of 49%, reported that
both male and female officers drank more than the general popula-
tion.77 The researchers found that officers on light-duty assignments
reported less drinking than those on full-duty," and hypothesized
that situational removal from the action corresponds to a break from
"after-shift parties, celebrations or other drinking occasions main-
tained by the work group."79 Officers changing shifts every few
weeks, whose sleep cycles are constantly disrupted, may be attracted
to alcohol's sedative effects."0 Male police officers were the heaviest
users of alcohol across all groups, at all ages."' Because alcohol con-
sumption did not decrease with age and rank, as might be expected,
the study suggests that "conditions support[ing] heavier use of alcohol
continue throughout the police career, and age and socioeconomic
status are not primary determinants."8 2 The phenomenon of aging
alcoholic officers in high ranking positions has implications for insti-
tutional resistance to treatment. The culture of drinking is pervasive
and sanctioned by command-level participants.8 3
Although there are multiple theories of causation 4 and statistics
(James T. Reese and Harvey A. Goldstein eds., 1986) [hereinafter PSYCH. SERVICES]; Philip S.
Trompetter, The Paradox of the Squad Room-Solitary Solidarity, in PSYCH. SERVICES, supra,
at 533.
77. Pendergrass & Ostrove, supra note 76, at 491.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 494; see also Drink- An Occupational Hazard, supra note 72, at 16 ("[O]fficers
often deliberately set out to get drunk. This is partly taken as a proof of masculinity.., many
of the ... trips organised are for men only.").
80. Pendergrass & Ostrove, supra note 76, at 494.
81. Id. at 491. Nonetheless, the researchers found that women entering sworn roles
"appear[ed] to be moving toward the heavier drinking patterns of sworn males." Id. at 493.
This development suggests that police culture exerts forces sufficient to overcome lifetime
socialization as a woman. See Sally Gross, Women Becoming Cops: Developmental Issues and
Solutions, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1984, at 32-35. Alternatively, drinking patterns typically
ascribed to women may not be the norm for those women choosing to enter law enforcement.
82. Pendergrass & Ostrove, supra note 76, at 493.
83. See In re Phillips, 569 A.2d 807 (N.J. 1990). In Phillips, the court upheld demotion of
a police chief to the rank of patrolman after his off-duty arrest on DUI charges. He admitted
to being an alcoholic, testifying that he "normally had three drinks in the evening at a local bar
and then drank at home until the early morning hours." Id. at 810. The patrol officers
responding to the chief's accident did not administer a breathalyzer test, id. at 809, which
suggests that the culture of enabling and cover-up operates in both directions in the chain-of-
command. Despite acquittal on the DUI charge, the chief's violations of departmental
regulations due to his intoxication justified demotion. In reaching this result, the court noted
that the Township Committee had previously confronted the chief about his drinking. Id. at
814; see also Police Captain is Charged with DUI, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 29, 1992, at B2.
84. See, e.g., Joseph F. Dietrich & Janette Smith, The Nonmedical Use of Drugs Including
Alcohol Among Police Personnel: A Critical Literature Review, 14 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN.
300 (1986) (relationship of occupational secrecy, cynicism, and deviance to alcoholism);
Machell, supra note 3 (protective emotional suppression creating susceptibility to alcohol
abuse); John M. Violanti et al., Stress, Coping and Alcohol Use: The Police Connection, 13 J.
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regarding use and drinking patterns vary, it is beyond question that
alcoholism is problematic for law enforcement agencies. Administra-
tors theorize that the self-destructive cycle is most easily broken at the
point just before new officers are pulled within its grasp. The acad-
emy is the logical starting point. Police academies are "psychological
crucibles in which occupational identities are forged."85 Training
presents an opportunity to forge a healthy professional identity in
which alcoholism is dissonant. Accordingly, trainees are taught
about the link between their duties and alcohol and about the risks
associated with drinking and policing. 6 Nonetheless, trainees
drink. 7 One explanation for failure to break the cycle of alcoholism
at the recruit level is that recruits learn early that there is no room for
"creative individualism" in a field whose effectiveness depends on
internalized norms.88 Where classroom instruction is so often punc-
tuated with war stories that assume mythical proportions, and where
those stories frequently glamorize drinking and esprit de corps, the
recruit who might personally reject choirpractice will not find his cre-
ative individualism rewarded.89  By the time he and his family are
locked in alcoholism's downward spiral, it will be too late for him to
utilize stress reduction techniques or to reach out for counseling
POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 106 (1985) (relationship of stress, emotional dissonance and cynicism
to alcoholism).
85. Charles Bahn, Police Socialization in the Eighties: Strains in the Forging of an
Occupational Identity, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 390, 392 (1984).
86. See, e.g., FLA. LAW ENFORCEMENT BASIC RECRUIT TRAINING PROGRAM COURSE
GUIDE (1992), FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
TRAINING COMM'N; FLA. STAT. ch. 943.12(4) (1992). All police trainees in Florida receive a
minimum of 21 hours of training in driving under the influence and 44 hours in human
behavior topics, including problems of alcohol and drug abuse, recognition of controlled
substances and commonly used drugs, crisis intervention, human behavior and needs, and
stress reduction for the officer. Training centers servicing large metropolitan police
departments typically add to the basic curriculum requirements. Graduates of the regional
law enforcement training facility for Dade County, Florida, receive an additional 42 hours of
human behavior related topics and 19 additional hours in DUI intervention. FLA. STAT. ch.
943.137 (1992); MIAMI-DADE SCHOOL OF JUSTICE & SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, BASIC LAW
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING 143 (1992).
87. The author was told about a recruit celebration where the training supervisor was
handcuffed and trainees poured alcohol down his throat, resulting in severe intoxication and
medical problems which persisted for several months. Another officer, now recovering,
reported active alcoholism throughout his academy training and recalled his disdain when
instructors explained the disease and failed to observe its effects in the classroom. The author
also remembers being told early in police training that "booze and broads" could be the
downfall of even the best in our midst (the presence of female trainees was obviously ignored!).
Anecdotes of this type, though scientifically unreliable, have value because of their place in
police lore.
88. Bahn, supra note 85, at 392.




But how does alcohol take over the lives of people whose careers
largely center on eradicating the effects of the substance on everyone
else? How can officers, knowing and seeing on a daily basis what
alcohol does to citizens in need and to criminals, continue to drink
knowing that alcohol is far more likely to kill them than a bullet? The
questions cannot be answered without looking at the dynamics and
etiology of the disease itself.
B. Alcoholism-The Disease
Alcoholism is a primary, progressive, chronic, and fatal disease.9'
The term "primary" means that the disease is recognized as an entity
in and of itself. The disease is not a symptom of psychological dys-
function,92 although one of its symptoms is dysfunctional behavior.
The disease blocks, or interferes with, treatment of any concurrent
physical or emotional problem.93 By saying alcoholism is "chronic,"
emphasis is placed on its on-going nature. Although progression of
the disease can be "arrested," the disease itself never goes away. It
just goes into a remission-like state.94 Because the disease is progres-
sive, it gets worse when untreated. The result is premature death.95
1. A FATAL SLIPPERY SLOPE
The disease can progress quickly, but more frequently moves
along slowly, through definable stages, culminating in either a treat-
ment-invoking crisis or in death. Sharon Wegscheider-Cruse, a pio-
neer in alcoholism treatment and family dynamics, describes the
progression in simple terms: "All drinking starts out as social drink-
90. Sally Gross-Farina, What's New in Stress: Training the Recruit to Seek Help, POLICE
CHIEF, Nov. 1986, at 41-63 (describing an in-house academy counseling program designed to
promote positive attitudes about therapy and alerting training personnel to the relationship
between the recruit's alcoholic family and his performance in training).
91. VERNON E. JOHNSON, I'LL QUIT TOMORROW 1 (1980); SHARON WEGSCHEIDER-
CRUSE, ANOTHER CHANCE 28 (2d ed. 1989); Rory Gilbert, A Coordinated Approach to
Alcoholism Treatment, in PSYCH. SERVICES, supra note 76, at 115.
92. Gilbert, supra note 91, at 115. Employers seize the symptom (misconduct) as a basis
for disciplinary action rather than recognizing it as a red-alert for progression of a deadly
disease.
93. JOHNSON, supra note 91, at 2.
94. See Gilbert, supra note 91, at 115.
95. My absolutist tone is intended. Treatment specialists have long recognized that,
despite the odds that nine out of ten alcoholics will die prematurely, every alcoholic will
gamble that he is the one who will beat the odds. My tone is adopted not because statistics are
dispositive on the issue of premature death, but because there is a chance that an alcoholic
police officer will recognize himself in these words and opt for treatment rather than taking the
risk.
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ing. "96 With continued drinking, increased tolerance is acquired.
The drinker needs to drink more to achieve the same sensation of
euphoria.97 Although increased tolerance might act as a warning, it is
typically ignored because of denial. Next, the drinker experiences
"chemically induced amnesia," or "blackouts. "9s
The emphasis shifts from "social drinking" to "social drinking,"
marking preoccupation with alcohol. 99 This shift is followed by the
drinker's loss of control, the "quantum plunge" into the disease."o°
The alcoholic begins to repress emotions, rationalize, project her own
guilt by blaming others, and experience illusions of grandiosity.' 0'
She must avoid those who question the drinking. The alcoholic feels
remorseful, tries abstinence, and becomes depressed. 10 2 The family,
which had previously protected the alcoholic from exposure and the
secret of a family alcoholic from the rest of the world, withdraws
physically and emotionally from the drinker. 103 The alcoholic is more
isolated and egocentric, and may be hospitalized for the first time.
Separation from alcohol during hospitalization (or during a self-
imposed attempt at abstinence) results in withdrawal.1°4 Physical
addiction is complete. When the blood alcohol level drops from its
constant state of elevation the alcoholic needs a drink to alleviate
physical discomfort.° 5 What happens when the alcoholic cannot take
that drink?
96. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 59; see PREVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note
52, at 17-18. Signs of alcohol abuse include discomfort in social situations where there is no
alcohol, memory lapses after drinking, and drinking to calm nerves. In the early phase, one
might see increased absences and tardiness, overreaction to criticism, lies and deceit, or decline
in job performance. In the middle phase, one might see attempts to avoid peers, repeated
minor injuries, or unreasonable resentment. In the late-middle phase, one might see aggression
or belligerence, frequent absences, or domestic or financial problems. In the late phase, one
might see drinking on duty, totally undependable behavior, or general incompetence on the
job.
97. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 61.
98. Id. During a blackout, the drinker talks and acts normally, stays conscious, may not
show any signs of intoxication, but has nothing "written on his memory" for that period. Id.
at 62; see Glenville v. Police Bd. of Chicago, 532 N.E.2d 490 (Ill. App. 1 Ct. 1988) (affirming
discharge of an officer arrested on felony charges who committed the crimes after consuming
several drinks; he testified that he had no memory of the events because they happened during
a blackout, but failed to present testimony establishing the effect of blackout and
demonstrating that his alcoholism caused the misconduct), appeal denied, 537 N.E.2d 809 (Ill.
1989).
99. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 62.
100. Id. at 63.
101. Id. at 66.
102. Id. at 66-67.
103. Id. at 67.
104. Id. at 67-68.
105. Id. at 68.
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The withdrawal symptoms as they occur within a drinking bout, in
the presence of loss of control, are tremors of the fingers and lips,
slight twitchings, some motor restlessness, and sometimes delusions
(not hallucinations). These symptoms are promptly relieved by
more alcohol, but the relief is of short duration and the symptoms
recur after a short interval, whereupon the drinker again takes
recourse to more alcohol. This process goes on and on until the
drinker either cannot ingest more alcohol, or the drinking is
stopped through extraneous circumstances .... In the bout with
loss of control the elements of jocularity and philosophizing are
absent and only anxiety, some degree of panic, the ebbs and tides of
withdrawal symptoms, and the demand for more alcohol are
conspicuous. I
0 6
The alcoholic police officer coming off a weekend of intoxication
and nearing the end of an eight hour shift might begin to twitch. Her
fingers might shake. She may have delusions. More than anything
else, she is anxious and wants to go home. This is the person who will
answer a domestic crisis call, or perhaps get cut off in traffic on her
way into the station. Overreactions and verbal, or even physical, abu-
siveness are not surprising. The only truly shocking aspect of this
scenario is the ability of the police agency to ignore and coverup the
officer's transgressions. 0 7 The question is repeated, perhaps more
insistently: "Why doesn't the officer just stop drinking?"
2. RELIGION, GENETICS AND THE SWAT CALL-OUT
The "disease model" of alcoholism is not new,10 8 but it is
strongly resisted. Strong undertones of moral and religious reproba-
tion affect our understanding of police alcoholism. It is still com-
monly believed that alcoholism is attributable to a character defect
and can be overcome by a strong will.' 09 Territo and Vetter report
that police agencies typically embrace this "character flaw" theory of
alcoholism, which dictates that the offending officer must be removed
before his problem reflects negatively on the agency as a whole."10
106. E.M. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 145-46 (1960);
WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 63-65. Jellinek distinguishes delusions from
hallucinations. Generally, delusions reflect a belief system held even when a person is
confronted with proof of the belief's falsity, while hallucinations are sensory experiences of
things that are not actually occurring but that seem real. MONA WASOW, COPING WITH
SCHIZOPHRENIA 26 (1982).
107. See discussion infra parts II.C-D.
108. Benjamin Rush, An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits upon the Human Body
and Mind (1814), reprinted in YANDELL HENDERSON, A NEW DEAL IN LIQUOR: A PLEA
FOR DILUTION 185 (1934).
109. ALCOHOL & HEALTH, supra note 33, at 3.
110. Territo & Vetter, supra note 52, at 198; see also Stratton & Wroe, supra note 59, at 20
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This attitude is not surprising. Prohibition's moralism pitted police
officers against bootleggers and the underworld. Elliott Ness and his
men had the moral fiber to resist drink (or at least to handle their
liquor). Why can't today's officers, who are educated, disciplined,
motivated, iron-willed, and sometimes unyielding, conquer social
drinking that has become social drinking? Perhaps because by the
time the term "choirpractice" was coined, officers were encouraged to
get drunk but expected never to become drunks. Drunks were people
lying in gutters, beating their wives, getting arrested, and vomiting in
the back of the police unit. Officers, on the other hand, simply partied
and drove home.
We now know that complex genetic, environmental, and
psychosocial factors influence individual drinking patterns and reac-
tions to the substance."' Group norms, expectancy about alcohol's
effects, age-related drinking patterns, generational predisposition, and
deficits in frontal-midbrain functioning have all been implicated." 2
Scientists report "genetically transmitted vulnerability" and "inher-
ited susceptibility" to alcoholism." 3 Personality traits such as "nov-
elty seeking, harm avoidance, and reward dependence" are implicated
in subgroups of alcohol dependence. 14 Still, the ubiquitous belief
remains. Drinking is a problem of weak character, and anyone who
wants to stop can do so.
If "arresting alcoholism" was an assignment given to a SWAT
unit, they would be exquisitely prepared for the call-out, in top physi-
cal and mental condition, armed with the finest weapons and most
sophisticated equipment. The BOLO' might read: Loaded with
self-hatred which is repressed and unconscious, and often projected
onto other people." 6 Use caution. Violent events take place in the
psyche. 1 '7 Busting alcoholism is a dangerous assignment with a psy-
chologically fragile target. The response team would include a negoti-
ator, trained in psychological dynamics and communication skills.
SWAT would have emergency medical rescue on standby, a helicopter
waiting to airlift the wounded, and a police dog ready to be released.
They would assess the danger, assign primary and backup duties, sur-
("[T]he victim is regarded with contempt rather than understanding. He is considered a moral
weakling, lacking in willpower.")
111. ALCOHOL & HEALTH, supra note 33, at 6-8.
112. Id. at 6-9.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at 7.
115. "Be-on-the-Lookout," also referred to as an "A.P.B." or "All-Points-Bulletin," used in
radio transmissions.
116. JOHNSON, supra note 91, at 4.
117. Id. at 16.
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round the target, lock and load, and then try to reach a peaceful reso-
lution through negotiation. As a last resort, they'd descend on the
target from all angles. "Arresting alcoholism" is a tough assignment.
It is not as simple as telling the alcoholic to shape up. He won't "sur-
render" because he can't.
Wegscheider-Cruse, using a gentler metaphor, suggests that alco-
holism is comprised of spiritual, emotional, social, mental, physical
and volitional elements.' 18 It is a multidimensional disease. The alco-
holic officer cannot simply chose to stop drinking and maintain sobri-
ety without corresponding changes in the intertwining domains.' 19
Abstinence in law enforcement involves far more than merely avoid-
ing alcohol. 120  In law enforcement, it means not socializing with
one's peers. It means being alone at midnight when the shift ends, the
squad is in a bar, and the family is asleep. It means a loss of camara-
derie. It means withdrawal, depression, and a void unpleasantly fill-
ing with dissonant self-images. The message is clear: "either you
drink or you don't belong."'12'
C. Alcoholism-Dynamics and Police Culture
Encased in metal, steel, and body armor,
Equipped with radios, shotguns, and bad coffee, my partner and I
go into the street in disjointed wholeness.
Two sets of eyes trying to cover four directions
Two minds whirling apart and then together
Four arms, ten fingers, two batons for writing, driving, wrestling,
and restraining
Four hands unsnapping holsters, loading, pointing, holding fingers
steady on the trigger.
Four legs waiting to run,
Two hearts pumping as one, now fast, now slow, now out of
control
A creature of many parts
breathing fire through the streets
trying to stay cool, windows down, a/c blasting.
Eight hours a day finding strength in each other.
Biding time and staying safe 'til we check out of service.
118. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUsE, supra note 91, at 32-43.
119. See discussion infra part I.D.
120. "Abstinence is not contra-indicative of alcoholism. Alcoholics not in a recovery
program who abstain from drinking for extended periods of time are considered to be actively
alcoholic because their whole lives revolve around their abstinence." Gilbert, supra note 91, at
118.
121. Dietrich & Smith, supra note 84, at 303.
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Sometimes there's nothing left to give
(to my wife, the public, the kids).
They don't understand the part of us that dies
Each time a partner is killed or maimed
the part that isn't in the fight but feels each blow
the part that isn't in the foot chase, but feels shaking tired legs
the part that isn't the voice on the radio, but becomes
the trembling voice praying silently for your safety.
The part of us that's not for outsiders. 122
Police culture is the least understood, most mysterious, and pos-
sibly the most change-resistant aspect of the problem. Much mythol-
ogized, policing intrigues both police officers and the public. Police
work is fun. Grown-ups are paid to play cops and robbers, carry
guns, drive fast, and risk their lives. The excitement can be addic-
tive. 123 Police officers sense, rightly or wrongly, that their fingers rest
on the pulse of humanity. Police officers love each other, or at least
love the idea of loving each other. 124 Internal strife, personal animosi-
ties, even racial biases are forgotten with two words coming over the
radio: "Officer down" unites the police family. These aspects of
policing can be disclosed to the public.'25
Despite this new era of openness about police operations, there is
another policing experience that is not shared. Still hidden from pub-
lic view is the fact of police alcoholism. Police believe that drinking,
on or off the job, is a private matter. Because alcohol is legal, the
public has no basis upon which to question drinking. At a deeper
level, many police believe that choirpractice is one's right, spawned
from service in the urban battlefield. Rather than viewing alcoholics
as the casualties of choirpractice, officers often see their drinking
peers as casualties of policing. The alcoholic has won the right to be
shielded from public inquiry. For many reasons then, the police fam-
ily conspires to keep its secret.
122. Anonymous police officer.
123. Trompetter, supra note 76, at 534 ("It is hard to withdraw once one has become an
'adrenaline junkie.' ").
124. Trompetter, supra note 76, at 534 ("Whatever one's view of his work and department,
most officers experience an almost inexplicable but noticeable rush when entering the squad
room with their colleagues present. It is then that they become one of the group again. The
sense of belonging can become so powerful for most that the need to talk about one's real
feelings seems pale in comparison to being part of the group.").
125. The recent popularity of "at the scene" police television programs reflects this new
opennes. See infra note 150. What remains for analysis is the impact of law enforcers'
uncensored words and actions on the public. Is the police image changing, and for better or
for worse, as a result of live coverage of drug busts and domestic violence calls?
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1. THE SQUAD'S DISEASE
Once again turning to Wegscheider-Cruse's insightful analysis,
we find that alcoholic families function in predictable ways, with fam-
ily members following the rules and assuming key roles in their per-
sonal melodrama. Alcoholics, "blind and unknowing, . . . take a
whole cast of supporting characters down to disaster with them." 1
26
The disease is both personal and systemic. Nothing touching one
member of the system goes unnoticed by the interconnecting parts. 127
As "[m]aintaining a full-blown addiction becomes a full-time job,"'1 21
codependence assumes a role of major proportions. As the family
struggles to accommodate alcoholism, rules of conduct emerge which
assure, at minimum, an appearance of stability. These rules include:
1. The Dependent's use of alcohol is the most important thing in
the family's life.
2. Alcohol is not the cause of the family's problem.
3. Someone or something else caused the alcoholic's dependency.
4. The status quo must be maintained at all cost.
5. Everyone in the family must be an "enabler."
6. No one may discuss what is really going on in the family,
either with one another or with outsiders.
7. No one may say what [s]he is really feeling. 129
If there was ever a professional system ready-made to adopt these
rules, it is policing. Squads of patrol officers sometimes work together
for years. They spend a minimum of eight hours daily concentrating
on each other's safety. 3 ' Too frequently unthanked by citizens who
believe "cops are never around when needed" but are "always around
when I'm speeding," officers rely more and more on each other and
split themselves off from the community.' 3 ' A pervasive sense of "us
126. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 76.
127. Id. at 80.
128. Id. at 69. Stages of the disease are described differently by other commentators.
Vernon E. Johnson refers to Phase 1 as learning the mood swing from normal to euphoric and
back to normal, Phase 2 as seeking the mood swing, Phase 3 as harmful dependence, where the
drinker slips from euphoria back past normal towards depression and pain, and Phase 4 as
drinking to feel normal. JOHNSON, supra note 91, at 9-29.
129. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 80-83.
130. Officers quickly learn that they'll spend more time with their peers than with their
families. The police divorce rate is at least partially impacted by non-police spouses'
perception of being shut out. The officer shares what really counts with his partner.
131. "Experience teaches police that they are a breed apart and can depend only upon
themselves for safety. The authority inherent in their work wins them few friends. They
become imprisoned by the projections society lays upon them and they, in turn, imprison
themselves with a culturally and frequently stereotypically derived occupational persona. The
police persona is a tool." Ellen Kirschman, The Psychology of Organizational Development, in
POLICE MANAGERIAL USE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGISTS 97 (Harry W. More and
Peter C. Unsinger eds., 1987) (emphasis added).
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against them" reinforces the siege mentality. 32 Like combat troops,
squads begin to develop secret ways to communicate, complete with
their own codes, rules of conduct, and unit identity.1 33 Squad norms
develop. Competition between squads is reinforced by the administra-
tion.134 Uniformed police officers have a tremendous amount of free-
dom during a shift. They are typically assigned to specific patrol
zones, but all officers know how to slip outside to run personal
errands. That's the kind of thing that can be done only with coopera-
tion and knowledge of squad members, and often of supervisors.'35
Squads work together, play together, and stay together.136 Stay-
ing together means you can count on a back-up without even having
to ask for one. Staying together means overlooking behavior that
stretches the rules because, at one time or another, you will need help.
Accordingly, as a member of the squad sinks into alcoholism, his fam-
ily has a vested interest in keeping it quiet. They close ranks and
choose roles. 13  The rules of conduct are rewritten in police lingo:
132. This splitting occurs at the organizational as well as intrapsychic level. Kirschman,
supra note 131, at 97-98.
133. Squad members recognize each other's voices on the radio and know from slight
variations in tenor exactly when help would be appreciated. They recognize special addresses
as signals to meet for coffee, go to the bathroom, or to be left undisturbed. Advising over the
air that a "red Pontiac is westbound on 127" may signal a married squad member that his
lover is en route to meet him. Going "out of service" (making oneself unavailable to respond
to calls) at a shopping mall may mean a long lunch break. The list is endless and highly
personalized.
134. Bolstering squad competitiveness assures "higher stats." Some departments give "unit
commendations" for outstanding work, most frequently defined by the number of felony
arrests made. Recognition for superior performance is, of course, an important piece of
supervision. It is mentioned here only to draw attention to a danger inherent in promoting
squad cohesiveness and pride.
135. Detective units experience the same unity. The difference is that detectives have
complete freedom. Investigations mean long and unusual hours, often spent in social settings.
Supervisors have a vested interest in looking the other way. They look good when their
personnel perform by clearing cases or making arrests. Accordingly, when the squad acts out,
the supervisor is likely to chuckle bemusedly, comment that they're only blowing off steam,
and ignore clear warning signs of lost control.
136. Drinking together is a test of "loyalty, trustworthiness, and masculinity, to symbolize
and reinforce the links between members. However... this camaraderie may often preclude
... informing on an officer with a drinking problem." Dietrich & Smith, supra note 84, at 302.
137. Wegscheider-Cruse offers a fascinating analysis of specific roles played out in the
alcoholic family, labelled the dependent, the enabler, the hero, the scapegoat, the lost child,
and the mascot. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 80-149. Full development of these
roles is beyond the scope of this article, but brief descriptions are pertinent to the present
inquiry. The dependent, as the drinker, is the identified patient; everyone else constructs an
identity in the service of the dependent. The enabler's chief function is to assist (all the while
protesting) in the continuation of the disease. This is done by calling in sick for the dependent
when he is too hung over to go to work, making excuses to the children when he forgets a
baseball game, driving home from every party, and abstaining so that someone is always sober.
The Hero, usually the first child, counterbalances his shame and confusion by excelling.
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1. The alcoholic's drinking is the most important thing in the
squad's life: if he comes in hungover, he'll have to ride a "two-
man" unit; if he gets a late call, someone else will take it
because everyone knows he'll get in trouble if the first beer is
delayed; if he does a bar check, chances are he'll have one; if a
supervisor stops by a call, another officer will do the talking;
carry breath mints.
2. Alcohol is not the cause of the squad's problem: it's poor
equipment; cuts in overtime; an unsympathetic and ungrateful
community; the state attorney's failure to prosecute; spineless
judges; crooked lawyers; the liberal media; the brass. There's
plenty to bitch about, nothing that can be done, and nothing
that's our fault.
3. Someone or something else caused his alcoholism-he is not
responsible: ex-wife number one wants more child support;
ex-wife number two is sleeping with his former lieutenant; his
son got busted with dope; he's in debt; his third wife won't let
him do anything with us; he got passed over on the promo-
tional exam because of minority quotas.
4. The status quo must be maintained at all costs: if the brass
finds out, he'll be fired; he can't afford counseling; if we con-
front him, he'll never forgive us; if we confront him, will he fire
back? What about the hour I spent at my girlfriend's house
during the last midnight shift? What about the time I dented
Heroes grow up to become leaders. They are recognizable by their achievements. Community
focus is on the "star" child as he garners awards. As long as the light is on him, he is
reasonably well-assured that it will not be cast on the darkness of the family secret and that his
parent's drinking will not be exposed. President Bill Clinton, the stepson of an alcoholic who
never knew his own father and spent his formative years in the household of a drinker, is in
many respects the ultimate hero. He has reached a height so great that even full disclosure of
the alcoholism and of the role drugs played in the life of his brother, Roger, cannot threaten
the family's integrity. (A worthwhile study would be to contrast the Clinton, Ford, and Carter
families in their responses to chemical dependency and forthrightness about the problem.) The
Scapegoat, often the next child to be born, sharply contrasts with the Hero. Perhaps because
the light on the first-born achiever is too great to overcome, the scapegoat falls towards the
darkness of addiction, arrest, misconduct and trouble. Her behavior further assures that when
strangers talk about the family, they won't ever reach gossip about the alcoholic because Child
#2 is acting up. The Lost Child stumbles into a confusing world best handled by isolation.
When overwhelmed with the mounting lies and family mythology, this child may retreat into a
book, a corner of the room, a treehouse. Solitude brings relief. Naturally, social contacts are
avoided, often delaying or retarding development. Finally, the family needs a Mascot.
Usually the youngest child, this tyke provides diversion. He learns early that tension (by now
a constant current in the home) can be briefly interrupted by a joke, crawling into a lap, or
even spilling milk on the carpet.
This oversimplification of chemically dependent family dynamics cannot do justice to
Wegscheider-Cruse's pioneering work. For these purposes, it is worthwhile to note that squad
members often slip into these roles quite comfortably. See infra note 175 and accompanying
text.
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the unit and he got me to his garage before the shift ended for
repair work? If I betray him, will he betray me?
5. Everyone in the squad must be an enabler: 138 together, we can
handle this problem. Apart, we fail, the squad gets disbanded,
no one else will ever trust us. Just keep quiet; let him sleep it
off. Never forget the time he backed you up when you were
getting your butt kicked. If you stop a drunk cop, call some-
one to drive him home. It's a professional courtesy. You'd
want the same done for you.
6. No one may discuss what is really going on in the squad, either
with one another or with outsiders: we don't have a problem;
this squad is squared away; we take care of our own; we aren't
a bunch of hand-ups.
1 39
7. No one may say what he is really feeling: everyone else on the
squad says there's no problem; maybe I am taking this too
seriously. '4
Enabling the alcoholic goes beyond squad parties. Entire shifts
socialize, 141 and police unions sometimes sponsor or manage police
bars where officers can share war stories and get drunk without run-
ning into members of the public, arrestees, or the media. 142 When the
138. Enabling involves covering for the alcoholic. Its effect is promotion of the disease.
Stopping enabling requires naming what is occurring and taking a position of non-
involvement. In police work, it requires refusing to ride with an officer too hung-over to
function, reporting a co-worker who reports for duty with alcohol on his breath, or arresting a
fellow officer who is caught driving drunk.
139. The ultimate slur by one officer about another is to call him a "hand-up." Hand-ups
are officers who report their peers' misconduct. In the present context, handing-up is
synonymous with "stopping enabling." See In re City of Milwaukee, 78 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 89, 99 (1982) (Yaffe, Arb.) (Arbitrator reinstated a probationary police officer who
should have known, but did not report, that his training officer bought a six-pack of beer,
stored it on the floor of the squad car, and drank throughout the shift. "H[e] was a trainee
under [the officer's] direction and control. In that capacity, it is understandable that he would
be reluctant to question an experienced officer's judgment and conduct."). This commentary
avoids the underlying issue. Rookies are cautious about questioning police procedures
followed by their senior officers. But respect for a training officer's experience does not by
inference excuse a failure to report on-duty drinking in clear violation of departmental policy.
Only within the context of the alcoholic family is such behavior acceptable. But cf Dyer v.
City of Oakdale, 542 So. 2d 1138 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding discharge of a probationary
police officer who gave his car keys to an off-duty police officer with knowledge that the other
officer had been drinking), writ denied, (La. 1989).
140. Trompetter, supra note 76, at 533 (discussing squadroom solidarity, evolution of group
norms, and the concept of "pluralistic ignorance," a "condition in which the members of a
group incorrectly believe that 'everyone else' " in the group holds a certain attitude, whereas
they, themselves, do not").
141. See discussion infra part III.C.2.c regarding a shift party resulting in tragedy when a
drunk officer was in an accident while driving home.
142. The Dade County (Florida) Police Benevolent Association has its own bar and lounge,
open round-the-clock and available for special celebrations and retirement parties. In
Orlando, Florida, a sheriff's deputy owns a bar with over five hundred members-all police
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organizational structure does not promote effective stress-reduction
techniques, alcohol becomes the most convenient and accepted coping
mechanism.
Administrators are guilty of complicity in the coverup. Police
officers who drink are permitted to do so by an organizational struc-
ture that supports drinking, 143 but not early intervention. Why? One
clue is that drunk cops don't retire, they move up the ranks. 144 At the
administrative level, squad-like, enabling behavior is equally norma-
tive. Police agencies may" 'hide' problem drinkers in positions where
they will not adversely affect police operations."' 145  Administrators
participate in organizational denial, but when the crisis occurs, they
rapidly line up on the side of public safety, express appropriate out-
rage, and institute disciplinary measures.'46 Their reaction is not
unlike that of the alcoholic's wife who reacts with anger when a final
drunken act shatters all bonds of loyalty to the alcoholic. Anger
comes from having "known" all along and having been powerless to
make the drinker stop. Anger is also a projection of internal discom-
fort caused when one recognizes complicity in the disease.
The family dynamics common to all alcoholic families play out
in the police environment. Unless the system works together-like a
SWAT team-to confront the problem, any attempt at resolution will
fail.
2. WARRIORS AND WEAKNESS
In conjunction with dynamics common to all alcoholic families,
the police family is susceptible to another set of psychological mecha-
nisms that compel officers to hide their weaknesses from public view.
The archetypal 147 image of the warrior lies within the psyche of both
officers or firefighters. The bar is called "Choir Practice." Fred Grimm, End of the Line,
MIAMI HERALD, July 7, 1992, at 6B. For departmentally sanctioned on-duty drinking, see
supra note 72.
143. Capt. Anonymous, Battling the Bottle, 6 POLICE PRODUCT NEWS, June 1982, at 20-
23.
144. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
145. Violanti et al., supra note 84, at 106.
146. See discussion infra part II.C.
147. The concept of the archetype.., is derived from the repeated observation that
... the myths and fairytales of world literature contain definite motifs which crop
up everywhere. We meet these same motifs in the fantasies, dreams, deliria, and
delusions of individuals living today. These typical images and associations are
what I call archetypal ideas. The more vivid they are, the more they will be
coloured by particularly strong feeling-tones .... They impress, influence, and
fascinate us. They have their origin in the archetype, which in itself is an
irrepresentable, unconscious, pre-existent form that seems to be part of the
inherited structure of the psyche.
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the officer and the public.'48 We long for invincible saviors. 14 9 We
know we will be disappointed. The burglar won't be caught. None-
theless, as a society we are attracted to heroic feats, to superhuman
rescues, to the soldier who lays down his life to save another.' 50 In
our society, only police are expected to fulfill those roles. Men and
women who become police officers bring with them an internalized
belief in dragon-slaying, illuminated by the societal desire for dragon-
slayers.
Socialization into law enforcement occurs over many months of
training. During this period, recruits don a transitional uniform and
persona.'' They learn rules, procedures, law, communication skills,
first aid, weaponry, fitness, self-defense, pursuit driving, ethics, and
pride. They experience belonging. 15 2  They are purposefully con-
vinced they are elite. And somewhere along the way, they adopt a
"warrior-of-the-street" mentality. 153  When the police uniform is
finally put on, it is truly a suit of armor, a persona serving both indi-
vidual and collective needs.' 54 "Image armor" allows the officer to
C.J. JUNG, MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS 392 (Aniela Jaffe ed. & Richard & Clara Win-
ston trans., rev. ed. 1965).
148. See generally EDWARD E. BARTHELL, JR., GODS AND GODDESSES OF ANCIENT
GREECE 27-28 (1971) (discussing Ares, the Greek god of war, his companion, Enyo, the
murderous goddess of war, and their Roman counterparts, Mars and Bellona, respectively);
JEAN SHINODA BOLEN, GODDESSES IN EVERY WOMAN 76 (1984) (discussing Athena, the
Greek warrior goddess who "sprang out of Zeus' head as a full-grown woman, wearing
flashing gold armor, with a spear in one hand, emitting a mighty war cry,"); ROBERT L.
MOORE & DOUGLAS GILETTE, KING WARRIOR MAGICIAN LOVER: REDISCOVERING THE
ARCHTYPES OF THE MATURE MASCULINE 75-79 (1990) (discussing origins of the great
warrior traditions in ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, Persia, Sparta and Japan); Estella
Lauter, Visual Images by Women, in FEMINIST ARCHETYPAL THEORY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
RE-VISIONS OF JUNGIAN THOUGHT (Estella Lauter & Carol Schreir Rupprecht eds., 1985)
citing TONI WOLFF, STRUCTURAL FORMS OF THE FEMIMINE PSYCHE, 8-10 (1956))
(describing archetypes of the feminine, including the positive and negative aspects of the
Amazon warrior).
149. See Steven D. Stark, Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett. The History of Lawyers and
the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 234 (1987) (discussing television's
transformation of the police into heroes). Note also the popularity of RoBocoP (Orion 1987).
The fragile human cop was ninety percent blown away, making room for evolution to a
technologically superior hero-ninety percent machine, but driven by human spirit. (Of
course, the machine longed to recapture its humanness.) Truly godlike, Robocop survived a
sequel, ROBOCOP II (Orion 1990), and mass commercialization, see e.g., Robocop the toy
(Kenner 1988).
150. The current popularity of television shows such as Rescue 911 (CBS), American
Detective (ABC), Top Cops (CBS), Cops (Fox), and Code 3 (Fox) demonstrate this cultural
longing.
151. Bahn, supra note 85, at 390-96; Trompetter, supra note 76, at 533.
152. Trompetter, supra note 76, at 534.
153. Id.
154. The persona ... is the individual's system of adaptation to, or the manner he
assumes in dealing with the world. Every calling or profession ... has its own
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"always look in control, to always be the authority, to repress emo-
tions, to never admit mistakes, to 'take charge,' and, consequently, to
repress true emotions." 155
Police officers aren't fooling themselves. They know they can die.
But only from bullets. Being shot is honorable. Dying alone, drunk,
evokes shame. There is no grand funeral or police procession for the
officer who blows off his own head in a drunken depression. Those
funerals are not well-attended and never publicized. This quiet and
shameful death does not square with the police persona or the image
of the warrior. Accordingly, the alcoholic will be denied, hidden, and
when finally exposed, cast out and abandoned.
Even so, the alcoholic officer meets a psychological need of other
officers. Other officers' suppressed weaknesses are disowned, pro-
jected onto the alcoholic, observable, and therefore non-threatening,
because they exist outside of the self-in the alcoholic. This process
of projecting unacceptable aspects of the self is a coping mecha-
nism. 156 In layman's terms, when the drunk staggers out of the bar,
his squadmates can shake their heads, confident of their own strength
because they didn't become the drunk. The weakness is contained in
the body of the other. It is a "shadow" of the self.157 For the trained
warrior, threats that can be seen can be managed. By measuring one-
self against the visible illness of the other, an officer is reassured of his
own health. With health, it is possible to leap tall buildings in a single
bound and run faster than speeding bullets. It is possible to go back
on-duty the next day.
characteristic persona . . . .Only, the danger is that [people] become identical
with their personas .... [T]he persona is that which in reality one is not, but
which oneself as well as others think one is.
JUNG, supra note 147, at 397.
155. On the Front Lines: Police Stress and Family Well-Being: Hearings Before the Select
Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1991) [hereinafter Front
Lines] (statement of James T. Reese).
156. "Projection is the process of unloading self-hatred onto others .... The more hateful
alcoholics unconsciously see themselves to be, the more they will come to see themselves as
surrounded by hateful people." JOHNSON, supra note 91, at 31. With projection, "we
experience an inner harm as an outer one: we endow significant people with the evil which
actually is in us." ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD & SOCIETY 249 (2d ed. 1963).
157. A "shadow" is the "sum of all personal and collective psychic elements which,
because of their incompatibility with the chosen conscious attitude, are denied
expression in life and therefore coalesce into a relatively autonomous 'splinter
personality' with contrary tendencies in the unconscious . . . .The shadow
personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself ....
[T]he shadow [is] that hidden, repressed .. .personality ....
JUNG, supra note 147, at 398.
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D. Treatment, Confrontation, and the Dead-end
A handful of progressive police departments acknowledge the
problem of alcoholism and the need for treatment. New York City
implemented an alcohol treatment program for its officers in the
1960's.158 Since that time, many large metropolitan departments have
established in-house employee assistance programs.159 Still, only one
hundred police agencies in the country offered psychological services
to their officers by 1990.160 And in 1990, only two alcoholism recov-
ery programs designed specifically for police officers were operating,
one in New York, the other in South Florida. 161 Within these peer
groups, led by former officers in recovery, alcoholic officers have the
opportunity to exercise volition (stop drinking) while learning health-
ier spiritual, social, emotional, and physical life patterns. 62  Of
course, knowing their counselors are former police officers sends a
powerful, negative message to alcoholics. Clearly, they cannot be
forthright about their dependency and hope to share a patrol car with
a nonalcoholic peer. Until recovering police officers, in uniform,
wearing a badge and a gun, can stand up in front of an alcoholic
officer on the brink of recovery and say, "I did it. I still have a job.
So can you.", we will never be able to convince the drinker that
recovery and policing can coexist. Despite this impediment to recov-
ery, police-focused treatment centers nurture dependent officers back
to health in an atmosphere of camaraderie not unlike the squad
room. 163
If a minimum of one in ten police officers is alcoholic,"6M and
there are half a million officers in this country, then recovery pro-
grams are needed for fifty thousand officers. One would think the
handful of recovery programs specializing in police alcoholism would
be full, with lengthy waiting lists and expansion centers across the
158. Klein, supra note 51, at 2.
159. Id. at 1-2.
160. Christine Bryant, Law Enforcement Stress: "I Need Help," NAT'L FOP J., Spring
1990, at 10, 11. Police officers with advanced degrees in the behavioral sciences, or who have
completed peer counseling training, frequently staff these units. Id.; see also Cappiello, supra
note 51; Klein, supra note 51; discussion infra part IV.A (regarding a recent attempt to
provide federal funding for police employee assistance programs.)
161. Cappiello, supra note 51, at 28-29. The Florida program, Seafield 911, is modeled after
a program developed by Ed Donovan. Id. at 29. Donovan is a retired officer and recovering
alcoholic who has lectured widely to police groups about intervention. He was one of the first
officers to speak openly about addiction. He headed the Boston Police Department stress
management program, which was instituted in 1974. Bryant, supra note 160, at 11.
162. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
163. The recovering alcoholic police officer group is unlike the squad in one important
respect. Those in recovery learn to talk about their feelings. Cappiello, supra note 51, at 29.
164. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
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country. They are not.165 Where, then, are the thousands of alcoholic
officers? They must be in patrol cars on the streets of every city,
town, and village in America. They must be waiting to answer calls
for help. 166
Why aren't rehabilitation programs being used? The supervisor
of an alcoholic employee knows she should intervene but is reluctant
to do so because the drinker will launch a manipulative counterattack
by projecting, avoiding, bluffing, rationalizing, or minimizing the
problem. 167 Any attempt to present evidence of dependency will be
rejected as meddling. 16  The sergeant will begin to feel she must be
imagining-that things really aren't deteriorating as she had thought.
She'll be further discouraged from confronting the alcoholic by other
supervisors who tell her to tough it out or by a hope that the problem
will just disappear. 169 Policies regarding abuse may be unclear. If she
confronts the drinker, a grievance or complaint may be filed against
her, and she risks ending the officer's career (in exchange for saving
his life).'7 " She shares this uncertain path with any individual mem-
ber of an alcoholic family who wants to confront the drinker. Alone,
no one is strong enough to confront the alcoholic and break through
his denial. The family disease must be battled by the unified family
unit.
Assuming the sergeant can convince the officer's co-workers,
superiors, spouse, and children to participate in a group intervention
led by a mental health practitioner, when and how should it be done?
It is not necessary to wait until the alcoholic "hits bottom." By then,
the officer may well have killed himself or a bystander. It is possible
to "create a crisis." The crisis which breaks through denial is that
experienced by the alcoholic when faced with a planned and carefully
165. Seafield 911 treated approximately 250 police and 250 corrections officers between
September 1990 and February 1993. Clients came from across the United States, Canada, and
the Virgin Islands. Fifteen percent were female. Telephone Interview with David Fawcett,
Clinical Director, Seafield 911 (Feb. 23, 1993).
166. It is probable that some alcoholic police officers are going to general membership
(versus police-only) A.A. groups or treatment programs. Proof of this supposition is elusive,
but the author knows that at least a handful of officers in the Miami, Florida area have
completed in-house treatment in general population facilities. Conversely, the fear most
frequently expressed by alcoholic police officers about attending A.A. meetings is the risk of
exposure to the public. With so much of the police officer's job arising from alcohol-induced
lawbreaking, see supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text, the likelihood that an officer in a
meeting will run into someone he has arrested, or who might attempt to blackmail him or
sabotage his recovery, is real.
167. PREVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note 52, at 25.
168. JOHNSON, supra note 91, at 5.
169. Stratton & Wroe, supra note 59, at 20 ("supervisors ... choose to ignore the problem,
hoping it will pass or the individual will eventually retire or resign").
170. PREVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note 52, at 25.
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orchestrated intervention. The officer will be called into an office
where his peers and family have gathered. Each participant is
assigned to speak clearly and directly to him about the evidence and
effect of his drinking, such as exploding with anger on a call, sleeping
it off during the shift, being unable to write a report because of shak-
ing hands, smelling like booze at 8:00 a.m., crashing the police car,
missing seven court appearances in six months, stealing sample bottles
on a robbery call at a liquor store, or having a drink with the grieving
family at a death notification. The alcoholic's spouse and children
will speak as well. This is a controlled intervention. 17 1 Confronting
the alcoholic requires careful planning, joint action, and an after-
action plan. 172 It is a dramatic and gut-wrenching experience for eve-
ryone involved.
Intervention by an organized confrontation is difficult, but possi-
ble. What, then, further complicates conducting an intervention? In
the squad qua family, everyone must be treated. 173 Without changing
squad members' enabling behaviors and educating them about alco-
holism, the officer who completes a treatment program will return,
like the drug addict released from prison, back to the street, to an
environment with overwhelming stimuli sucking him back into the
bottle.
The intervention and treatment model requires every partici-
pant's ownership in the problem. The alcoholic's squadmates and
supervisors will have to first confront their collusive actions. If a
hypothetical squad has ten members, one of whom is alcoholic, it is
statistically probable that at least one squad member also comes from
an alcoholic family of origin. 174 It is likely that several are "heroes"
from alcoholic families who were drawn to policing precisely because
they were raised to save and protect the weak. 75 It gets more compli-
cated. If the supervisor plans an intervention, she is likely to meet
171. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 151-57.
172. Id.; Peter Marno, Confronting the Alcoholic Officer, 20 POLICE, Oct. 1987, at 30.
173. WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note 91, at 158.
174. See discussion supra part II.A. Just as adult children of alcoholics find their
counterparts in marriage, squad members unconsciously act out the roles they learned as
children of alcoholics when in the company of an alcoholic peer.
175. Wegscheider-Cruse's description of the hero, usually the eldest child in an alcoholic
family, should be required reading for police officers. See WEGSCHEIDER-CRUSE, supra note
91, at 104-115. The hero learns young to be a star, to achieve, to draw attention away from the
shameful secret of an alcoholic parent. The hero becomes trapped in low self-worth overcome
by compulsive accomplishment, in overextending himself physically and emotionally, in
rigidity and perfectionism, and inability to be intimate because intimacy requires truth. A
highly structured value system develops, with inner controls increasingly projecting outward
into social and professional realms. Heroes have learned to protect others, but not themselves.
They are drawn to the caretaking professions and are prone to burnout. Id. at 115. Policing, a
1110
CHOIRPRACTICE
resistance because the confrontation will evoke strong emotion from
those officers who have not yet come to terms with the illness in their
own families. The alcoholic's partner may have an alcoholic spouse,
child, or parent. A series of projections and identifications is set up.
Working through these intra-psychic tensions, helping each squad
member become conscious of his own psychodynamics, integrating
diverse interests, and then maintaining healthy interactions is a gar-
gantuan task.
Employee assistance programs "look good" 17 6 for law enforce-
ment, and in fact serve important, often life-saving purposes where
marital difficulties, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other symp-
toms of stress debilitate officers. Police chiefs who truly embrace
involvement of psychological service units contribute immensely to
the health of their officers and to their reunification with the commu-
nity. Employee assistance programs save money. 7 7 Early interven-
tion with the alcoholic can minimize accidents and unnecessary
expenditures on health benefits. '7  An enlightened chief will
encourage recovering officers to participate in the community as role
models.'79 But alcoholism seems to impose insurmountable barriers
to the majority of law enforcement agencies. The task seems too
immense, the alcoholic's need for alcohol too great, the squad's need
for the alcoholic too insidious, the exposure of perceived weakness too
harmful. Interventions on alcoholics are not being done.
E. The Cost of Alcoholism in Law Enforcement
What price is paid by law enforcement agencies when alcoholism
is institutionalized? The dollars are easy to count. A large metropoli-
career which rewards an orderly, perfectionistic, highly structured personality, and expects
self-sacrifice, is a perfect match for the hero. See discussion supra part II.C.2.
176. Basic training for law enforcement is not unlike that in the military, where inductees
are taught early to "Look Good! Fake it if you must, but look good!" The ability to "look
good" for the public is inculcated early. Both policing and the armed services are
characterized by the need to instill public confidence. The military accomplishes this with
parades and airshows. In policing, it most frequently is seen in media coverage of police
academy graduations and police funerals. Paradoxically, critical job functions in both fields
involve dangerous operations that are largely hidden from public review. The actions of both
military and police personnel evoke strong community sentiment, even though the actual
conduct in question may be observed by no one outside of the operation. The advent of home
video has changed forever the police officer's sense of being hidden while at work. The Rodney
King videotape awoke a nation to the excesses of a handful of officers. "Looking good" has
new meaning on the streets of our cities.
177. PREVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note 52, at 31 ("In the long run, EAPs save the
department money (estimates range from a 14 to 1 to a 3 to 1 saving)").
178. ALCOHOL & HEALTH, supra note 33, at 273.
179. See Dishlacoff, supra note 57, at 39.
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tan police department may spend up to $1000 dollars processing an
applicant, conducting the background investigation, giving psycho-
logical and medical tests, and training.' 80 That process, from start to
finish, may take up to a year, followed by another year in probation-
ary status. Most agencies conduct regular in-service training and
many invest in specialized courses throughout an officer's career. If
an officer resigns after ten years of service, a personnel manager can
tally the dollars and report how much money has been lost.
Less concrete costs mount up long before the alcoholic officer
quits, dies, or is fired. How is the police image affected when a teen-
ager pulled over for a traffic violation notices alcohol on the breath of
the officer writing the ticket? How does an officer's perception of her-
self as separate from the community served become accentuated when
depression and paranoia are aggravated by withdrawal? What hap-
pens to police/community relations when an alcoholic officer over-
reacts on a late-call, is verbally abusive, a complaint is filed, and
nothing is done? What do citizens think when a drunk driver is pul-
led over at a DUI checkpoint, a badge is displayed with a driver's
license, and that driver gets a ride home? How do people react when
an argument in a bar turns into a fight, the police are called, and they
leave arm-in-arm with their co-workers who were the aggressors?181
If the alcoholic officer leaves the department as a result of alco-
hol-related misconduct, the loss is magnified immeasurably. There
may be a civil suit against the agency, with enormous expenses arising
from the litigation itself. The police agency, plaintiffs and community
will be embroiled in a controversy going to the very heart of the police
role in society and the ability of the agency to police itself."8 2 The
180. Telephone Interview with Detective Reba Miller, Human Resource Unit, Metro-Dade
Police Department, Miami, Fla. (Oct. 7, 1992).
181. In one study, six off-duty shootings by police officers which resulted in death or serious
injury involved officers who were legally drunk. Van Raalte, supra note 69, at 39.
182. See Hendricks v. State of Fla., Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, No. 92011
(Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 10, 1992). Hendricks is a pending negligence suit brought by the
family of a woman who was raped and strangled by an on-duty trooper. The officer had
requested a leave of absence because he was approaching the job in an unsafe manner, and
reportedly began abusing alcohol in the months preceding the murder. See also Cygan v. City
of New York, 566 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), appeal denied, 573 N.Y.S.2d 645
(N.Y. 1991). In Cygan, the court reversed a verdict for the widow of a police officer who sued
the police department after his suicide. She alleged that her husband's suicide was foreseeable
and preventable because he'd been treated by the department for paranoid delusions, evaluated
by an alcoholism counselor, and relieved of his gun. Id. His weapon was returned to him and
he shot himself with it while legally drunk. Id. at 234. He was caught drinking on duty just
one or two days after his gun was returned. Id. at 236. The jury found the department 66%
liable and awarded just under a million dollars. The appellate court found there was not "one
scintilla of evidence ... that decedent was suicidal or that the department should somehow
have anticipated that he was." Id. at 238. On the specific allegation that the Department
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incident is likely to result in media coverage highlighting the officer's
intoxication. 18 3 Over a period of time, repeated incidents of this sort
placed a weapon in the hands of a "periodically alcoholic officer," the court reasoned there was
no foreseeability because he had completed the alcohol education program, the department did
not consider him to be an alcoholic, he was never disciplined for alcohol use, and he was
drinking moderately or not at all preceding the suicide. Id. at 239. But cf Bonsignore v. City
of New York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming jury verdict for the wife of a police officer
who shot her in the head then killed himself; alcohol was not implicated).
See also Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1232, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) (The court
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant police department and police officers in civil
rights litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One of the officers involved in arresting
plaintiffs' decedent had been evaluated for alcohol abuse, and his retention was contingent on
complete abstinence. Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding a policy or
custom of deliberately ignoring the dangers presented by alcoholic officers. The chief's
proactive decision to send the officer for evaluation and informal monitoring of his condition
relieved the city of liability for inadequate supervision under section 1983.); Marusa v. District
of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Court held that plaintiff stated a cause of action
against the city regarding negligent hiring, training, and supervision of an off-duty drunk
officer who killed decedent with his service revolver that was being carried in accord with
departmental policy.); Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 799 P.2d 15, 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(Parents of a teenager killed by a police officer brought a negligence action against the officer,
city, and police chief asserting that the officer's drug and alcohol abuse prior to the shooting
supported claims for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Affirming judgment for
defendants, the court held that evidence of the officer's prior drug use and arrests were
properly excluded from trial because there was no evidence that the officer was under the
influence at the time of the incident.); Gray v. Department of Police, 543 So. 2d 525, 526-27
(La. Ct. App. 1989) (Gray was a police officer who killed a child in an off-duty traffic accident.
His blood alcohol level was measured at .257 and .22 within an hour of the accident. When
the case was heard on appeal from his termination, the lower court held that Gray was to be
reinstated because the Civil Service Commission erroneously utilized a statutory presumption
of intoxication rather than hearing an expert's conclusion that Gray was drunk, based on
results of the blood tests. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Civil
Service Commission because of the evidentiary error.), reversed and remanded, 545 So. 2d 537
(La. 1989); Corridon v. City of Bayonne, 324 A.2d 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (An
off-duty officer, drunk in a bar, shot and killed plaintiff's decedent without provocation. The
court held that the case should go to the jury because the city knew or should have known of
the officer's drinking problem.); Wayering v. County of St. Lawrence, 546 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989) (The court upheld termination of an officer who had purchased alcohol for an
underage boy. Later that evening, the teenager was involved in a fight and was severely
injured. The officer's record showed other alcohol-related complaints). Compare Davis, 869
F.2d 1230 with Hill v. Mitchell, 653 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (denying defendant
police department's motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim based on allegations that it should have
foreseen the shooting of a citizen by officers known to be violent and to have drinking
problems).
A particularly unsettling response of the police and legal systems to police alcoholism was
discussed in Peter Cheney, Women Irate at Trial Stalled to Let Policeman Get Pension,
TORONTO STAR, Sept. 26, 1990, at A26. The article describes the outrage of women's groups
when a police officer who was charged with drugging and sexually assaulting a nineteen-year-
old police cadet did not plead guilty for more than two years after the assault. The delay,
engineered by the officer's attorney, effectively permitted the officer to collect $130,000 in
pension benefits that he would have been unable to collect had the case been resolved earlier.
The court gave the officer a suspended sentence, placed him on probation, and ordered him to
abstain from alcohol and prescription drugs. Id.
183. See discussion infra part III.C.2.b.
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may well erode confidence in the police. But a loss of confidence is
not the most significant harm. Loss of trust is far more insidious.
When citizens cannot rely upon the stability of their protectors, they
have been let down at a fundamental level. A primal bargain-sacri-
fice of individualism and autonomy for membership in the clan and
the protections afforded by belonging-has been broken. 1 4 Once bro-
ken, the parameters of the social contract can rapidly disintegrate. In
the last twelve years, incidents of police violence have led to well-
publicized riots in Miami and, most recently, in Los Angeles. I do
not know if alcoholism played any part in the beating of Rodney
King. I do remember the aftermath of rioting in Miami in 1980,
where some officers on riot patrol started the shift shaking from alco-
hol withdrawal and filled with rage. The sense of alienation and
betrayal experienced by both the police and the community was
surely multifaceted. But if any part of the underlying tension was
caused by the actions of an alcoholic officer, then the cost could have
been reduced.
Society is paying a very high price for not treating police officers
while their alcoholism is at an early point in its progression. Victims
litter the roadway: the alcoholic officer, her family, her squad, the
chain-of-command, each citizen bruised in an interaction during the
years the disease developed, the identified victim who was shot or
maimed by the alcoholic, the victim's family and friends, and perhaps
most importantly, the community losing faith. This examination of
police alcoholism exposed the nature and depth of the problem and
presented dynamics which institutionalize denial and perpetuate high
rates of alcoholism among those upon whom we must rely for social
order. This part begs the question: If law enforcement agencies are
unable or unwilling to police themselves on the issue of alcoholism,
who will intervene? What is being done by the legislative and judicial
branches to stop this downward spiral? Why do police agencies and
unions work against each other rather than uniting in an all out war
against alcoholism?
III. STATUTES, COURTS, AGENCIES AND UNIONS
Cops are always seeing people at their worst.
184. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 18 (Willmoore Kendall trans.,
1954) ("[E]ach individual immediately resumes his primitive rights .. when any violation of
the social pact occurs."); John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End
of Civil Government (1690) ("The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
property; to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting."), reprinted in THE




Lacking in compassion, decency, honor.
Disrespecting themselves, savaging others.
Insults, betrayals, victims.
This is what wears cops down.
Not the cops and robbers, that's the fun.
But the little everyday meanness.
The gratuitous cruelty.
The brutality, the suffering, the hurt.
It eats at them.
They can't articulate it.
Some try to work it out, jogging, yoga, calisthenics.
But they can't work it out, so they bust up a table in the day
room,
or beat hell out of the walls going upstairs to change,
or stay up drinking together.
Talking about what went down with the only ones who
understand.
Trying to unwind.
"You ask yourself," Artie said, "how can I be humane with all
this inhumanity?
It's the quality of life that's rotten.
Somebody has to say, 'This is n=t acceptable.'
So you do the best you can.
We have warts, we fuck up.
We use excessive force, we make wrong collars.
We make mistakes.
We're human. 185
How does the system respond when the "human" police officer
becomes handicapped by alcoholism? This part first examines statu-
tory enactments that might have provided incentives to police agen-
cies to behave proactively regarding alcoholism, but that have in fact
undermined that end. Second, it reviews cases interpreting relevant
statutes, confirming that judges avoid the underlying issues in favor of
bright line rules when alcoholism and law enforcement collide.
Finally, it considers the impact of a collective bargaining agreement
that provides for treatment in light of the willingness, in many cases,
of arbitrators and courts to ignore the contract, as well as the costs
associated with establishing the contract provision.
A. The Statutes
Two pieces of federal legislation are central to this analysis: The
185. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 138.
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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 86 and the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act").18 7 Both sought to elim-
inate discrimination against the handicapped.' 88 Two questions
initially arise. First, is the alcoholic handicapped within the current
meaning of the statutes and therefore entitled to protection against
discrimination by federal legislation? Second, may employers of alco-
holic police officers invoke statutory defenses if the officer alleges dis-
crimination following discharge or disciplinary action? Because both
acts generally exclude alcoholics from their protective reach while
extending protection to employers acting against alcoholic police
officers, neither statute supports early intervention. Either directly or
through judicial construction, both statutes provide employers with
defenses that act as disincentives to police agencies considering early
confrontation and treatment. 8 9
1. ARE ALCOHOLIC POLICE OFFICERS PROTECTED BY THE
STATUTES?
The ADA "provide[s] a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities."' 90 Congress created the ADA because the Rehabilitation
Act's limited reach left many handicapped people unprotected from a
wide range of discriminatory activities.' 9' The ADA imposes on pri-
vate employers a series of antidiscriminatory measures affecting
employment, public services, and public accommodations.' 92
Employees discriminated against on the basis of a disability can bring
private suit against the employer, with all the powers, remedies, and
procedures afforded by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' State and
local political subdivisions must comply with the ADA's provi-
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988).
187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 70142; U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
189. See discussion infra parts III.A.2, III.B.1-2.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l). The ADA became effective in January 1992, with
implementation of various provisions staggered over the next two years. Title I-Employment
became effective on July 26, 1992. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12213.
191. Bonnie P. Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act After Ten Years of
Enforcement: The Past and the Future, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 850, 910, 915-16 (1989)
[hereinafter Rehabilitation Act]; Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An
Overview, 4 U. ILL. L. REv. 923 (1989) [hereinafter ADA].
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). "[E]mployer" includes anyone engaged in an industry affecting
commerce. For the first two years of its existence, only those employers of more than 25
people must comply with ADA provisions. After 1994, employers of more than 15 people
must meet its mandates.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
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sions.' 94 As of 1994, at least six thousand city, county and state
police agencies will be affected by the ADA.195
The ADA defines disability as: "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of... [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."1 96 Unquestiona-
bly, alcoholism is a disease that can substantially limit one or more
major life activities. 197 The case for the ADA's protection of
alcoholics should be open and closed. But the ADA's language con-
cerning alcoholism is puzzling, 98 and there is already a hint that
amendments may be necessary in order to avoid confusion. 99 Ambi-
guities lie within both title I (Employment)2" and title V (Miscella-
neous Provisions),20 which amended the Rehabilitation Act.
a. ADA Title I-Employment
Looking solely at the language addressing treatment for chemical
dependency, the most obvious inconsistency found in the ADA is the
omission of alcoholics from the statutory protection afforded to reha-
bilitated users of illegal drugs. Specifically, section 104 of the ADA
states:
For purposes of this title, the term "qualified individual with a dis-
ability" shall not include any employee or applicant who is cur-
rently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity
acts on the basis of such use.
(b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in subsection (a)
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12202.
195. UCR, supra note 50, at 244-303 (based on the 1994 definition of employer. See supra
note 192.).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a)-(c).
197. See supra part II.B.
198. Reese John Henderson, Jr., Note, Addiction As Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics
and Drug Addicts Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 VAND. L. REV. 713,
737 (1991) ("[S]ection 104 is somewhat ambiguous with regard to current and former
alcoholics .... [I]t is not clear from the face of the statute which standard Congress intended
to apply to alcoholics bringing claims under Title I of the ADA.); see also Albert S. Miles et.
al., The Reasonable Accommodations Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 69
EDUC. L. REP., Oct. 1991, at 1,1 ("[A]lthough . . . ADA is less clear over the status of
alcoholics.., it appears as though the protections afforded rehabilitated drug users extend to
recovering alcoholics."). See generally Henderson, supra, for a comprehensive analysis of the
intertwining nature of the provisions of ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
199. Henderson, supra note 198, at 737.
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Title I, which became effective on July 26, 1992, see supra
note 190, provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual with regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
201. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
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... shall be construed to exclude as a qualified individual with a
disability an individual who-
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilita-
tion program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of
drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is
no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program
and is no longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is
not engaging in such use;...
A literal reading demands the conclusion that an employer can-
not discriminate against a cocaine addict who is rehabilitated, who is
in treatment, or who is erroneously believed to be using drugs, as long
as that person is not currently using drugs. Section 104(b) is silent
about alcoholics who are not currently drinking and are in or have
completed treatment.
While it omits the rehabilitating alcoholic from its protections,
the section does protect the employer who disciplines the alcoholic.
The employer may:
[h]old an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is
an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or
job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employ-
ees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to
the drug use or alcoholism of such employee.2 °3
Read as a whole, section 104 indicates that alcoholics in recovery will
receive no protection against discrimination, and that neither alcohol-
ism nor drug addiction will excuse unsatisfactory performance. One
looks to the Rehabilitation Act for satisfactory explanaiton of this odd
result,2 "4 but finds that its treatment of alcoholics and abusers of ille-
gal drugs is a source of confusion as well.
b. ADA Title V-Revisions to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
A brief review of the Rehabilitation Act is necessary to under-
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (emphasis added). The statute also allows employers to
require a drug-free work environment, 42 U.S.C. § 12114(C)(1)-(3), and opens the door to
drug testing as a method of assuring compliance, 42 U.S.C. 12114. See Henderson, supra note
198, at 735-36 ("Congress acted to enable employers to implement 'zero tolerance' policies
regarding alcohol and drug abuse without fear of liability under the ADA.") (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). These clauses highlight the paradox posed by the nature of alcoholism.
Misconduct is the symptom of the handicap, but the symptom precludes accommodation.
204. Henderson, supra note 198, at 739 ("Although it excludes current drug addicts from
the protections of Title I, section 104 otherwise should provide the same level of protection to
addicts provided by 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."); Tucker, ADA, supra note 191, at 925
("[S]ection 504 case law on these issues will be applicable to cases arising under ADA").
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stand the ADA's impact on its predecessor. Section 501 of the Reha-
bilitation Act imposes upon federal employers antidiscrimination
standards designed to ensure accommodation of handicapped persons
in the workplace.2 °0 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act imposes
similar antidiscriminatory standards upon private and public employ-
ers accepting federal funds.2"6 In fiscal year 1991, over two thousand
police agencies received federal funds from the Department of Justice,
thereby entitling their employees to raise section 504 claims.20 7
In 1977, the United States Attorney General wrote that Congress
expressly intended to include addicts within the definition of those
considered handicapped and therefore covered by the Rehabilitation
Act.208 Court decisions of that period reflect judicial recognition of
the intended protections for both alcoholics and illegal drug users.2° 9
An apparent discrepancy, however, existed between the standards
imposed on federal and non-federal employers. Federal employers
had an affirmative duty to make reasonable accommodations for cur-
rent drug users unless such accommodation would impose undue
205. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 794 provides, in pertinent part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped
individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 793 imposes similar restrictions on employers working under
federal contracts.
207. Letter from John L. Machado, Office of Congressional & Public Affairs, Office of
Justice Programs, U.S. Dep't of Justice (March 29, 1993) (on file with the University of Miami
Law Review) (Subgrant awards were made by the states to 2156 law enforcement agencies. In
fiscal year 1992, 1372 city, county, state or indian tribe law enforcement agencies received
subgrants from their states.) Employees of these agencies theoretically are covered by both the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
In order to prevail under a section 504 claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that she is a
"handicapped individual" under the act; (2) that she is "otherwise qualified" for the position
sought; (3) that she was excluded from the position solely by reason of her handicap, and (4)
that the program or activity in question receives federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982); see Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1148 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961,
966 (La. 1991).
208. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973-Coverage of Alcoholics and Drug Addicts, 43 Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 12, at 2-7 (Apr. 1977).
209. See e.g., Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd without opinion,
790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("alcoholism is a handicapping condition for purposes of the
handicap discrimination protections of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973"); Davis v. Bucher, 451
F. Supp. 791, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that automatically rejecting all job applicants solely
on the basis of a history of drug use violates the Act); Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461
F. Supp. 99, 106 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("alcoholics and drug addicts are protected by the Act's
provisions").
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hardship.2"' Private employers sought clarification of whether the
Rehabilitation Act meant that they, too, had to accommodate current
drug or alcohol users.21" '
The 1978 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act explained that
current abusers of alcohol or drugs, whose addiction affected their job
performance and who were employed by private or local entities, were
not protected:
For purposes of sections 503 and 504 [29 USCS §§ 793-794] ["indi-
vidual with handicaps"] does not include any individual who is an
alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs pre-
vents such individual from performing the duties of the job in ques-
tion, or whose employment, by reasons of such current alcohol or
drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the
safety of others.21 2
This amendment clarified that a non-federal employee who is depen-
dent on either alcohol or drugs must either be rehabilitated or in reha-
bilitation to claim protection under section 504.213 Congress chose
not to impose a "duty to accommodate" on state, local, or private
employers.21 4  This freedom from duty effectively eliminated what
might have been a statutory incentive to treat. Furthermore, the Reha-
bilitation Act assured employers that they did not have to excuse mis-
conduct attributable to chemical dependency. Where an addict's
misconduct was itself sufficient to justify dismissal, the fact that
addiction contributed to the behavior would not protect the employee
from discharge.21 5 Such was the state of the Rehabilitation Act prior
to the ADA's enactment.
Because the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are designed to
complement each other,21 6 the Rehabilitation Act again was amended
210. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1973); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1985); see Whitlock, 598 F. Supp.
at 130; Jennifer L. Adams, At Work While "Under the Influence": The Employer's Response to
a Hazardous Condition, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 88, 109 (1986); Richard F. Richards, Handicap
Discrimination in Employment. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 39 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
This duty has been undermined by recent decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board.
See discussion infra part III.B.2.
211. 135 CONG. REC. S10,775 (1989) (statement of Sen. Helms); id. at S10,777 (statement
of Sen. Harkin); Henderson, supra note 198, at 735-37.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1978) (emphasis added).
213. See Whitlock, 598 F. Supp at 129 n.3.; Henderson, supra note 198, at 736;
214. See Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 129 n.3.
215. Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1149 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding dismissal of a police officer who
sold and used drugs because he was not "otherwise qualified" for the position), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Richardson v. United States Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1216
(D.D.C. 1985) (rejecting an alcoholic postal employee's action for reinstatement when he was
discharged for attempting to kill his wife).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). The ADA specifically calls for coordination between agencies
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in 1990 by title V, section 512 of the ADA. 217 The new Rehabilitation
Act rule is that current illegal drug users are not protected by the Act;
rehabilitated illegal drug users are protected by the Act; but neither
current nor rehabilitated alcohol users are protected by the Act.218
Considering the two Acts in conjunction, under both the revised
Rehabilitation Act and the newly enacted ADA, a current alcohol
abuser will receive no protection against discrimination by a non-fed-
eral employer if the drinking prevents job performance or constitutes
a direct threat.21 9 The rehabilitated illegal drug abuser is protected
under both Acts. The rehabilitated alcoholic is not afforded this same
protection.
Given the relative status of drugs and alcohol, the reverse might
be expected and more easily explained. The implausibility of this
result demands examination of congressional intent. The ADA's leg-
islative history shows a slow erosion of its protections for alcoholics.
As the ADA was narrowed, so was the Rehabilitation Act.
c. Did the Legislative Branch Intend this Result?
The Senate passed the first version of the ADA, which created
sections 104 and 512, on September 7, 1989.220 Although the final
wording of ADA section 104(b) refers solely to recovery from illegal
drug addiction, proponents of the bill told other senators debating its
enforcing the two Acts in order to avoid duplication of effort and inconsistent or conflicting
standards. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 12117. The amended version of section 706 of the Rehabilitation Act
provides in relevant part:
(C)(i) The term "individual with handicaps" does not include an individual
who is currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs, when a covered entity acts on
the basis of such use.
(ii) Nothing in clause (i) shall be construed to exclude as an individual
with handicaps an individual who-
(I) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation
program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has
otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such
use;
(II) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in such use; or
(III) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not
engaging in such use.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (emphasis added). This language tracks § 104 of the ADA.
218. For purposes of sections 503 and 504 as such sections relate to employment, the term
"individual with handicaps" does not include any individual who is an alcoholic and whose
current use of alcohol prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question, or whose employment, by reasons of such current alcohol abuse, would constitute a
direct threat to property or to the safety of others. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(v) (1991).
219. Id.
220. 135 CONG. REC. S10,803 (1989).
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impact in 1989 that it would protect recovering alcoholics as well.221
Proponents reassured the senators, however, that where drinking shed
negative light on the workplace, the employer using even off-duty
behavior as a basis of adverse personnel action was protected.222
Believing that the ADA prohibited discrimination against both recov-
ering alcoholics and illegal drug users, but still allowed employers to
take action against current users of either substance, the Senate passed
the amendment.
Nine months after Senate approval, a House report entitled
"Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about [the ADA]" dis-
claimed any protection within the ADA for alcoholics.223 Similarly,
the House Committee on Education and Labor considered section 104
protections exclusively in the context of rehabilitated illegal drug
addicts.224 The Senate approved the ADA's final form incorporating
the House's revisions, effectively eliminating protections for
alcoholics 225 while preserving employer defenses to punitive actions
221. Senator Coats specifically asked if rehabilitated drug or alcohol abusers could be fired
and was told by Senator Harkin that the amendment provided protections against discharge
for both. Id. at S10,777.
222. Senator Harkin assured Senator Armstrong that an employer making personnel
decisions might consider behavior of "a person who abuses alcohol regularly, even flagrantly,
[who] even publicly night after night is seen out in public making a fool of himself, staggering,
but somehow manag[es] to come to work sober the next day." Id. at S10,782.
Senator Helms cited the Reagan Administration's support for the amendment:
[Flormer Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard... stated clearly that the
Reagan Justice Department agreed with the language of this amendment because
of the propensity of some courts to adopt an overly broad reading of the
Rehabilitation Act, requiring repeated offers of rehabilitation before allowing the
Government to take action against the drug addict who cannot do his job. It is
wiser policy for the Government to discipline the addict."
Id. at S10,775 (emphasis added).
223. 136 CONG. REC. H1920 (1990) ("Q. Must an employer hire or continue to employ a
worker who is in a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program? [A.] The ADA would require an
employer to hire or continue to employ a qualified individual if that individual is not using
illegal drugs .... Such protection is not provided for alcoholics.") (emphasis added).
224. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 77 (1990).
225. The matter of a duty to treat either alcoholics or illegal drug abusers was disposed of in
the Senate during colloquy. 135 CONG. REC. S10,777 (1989) ("Mr. Coats: Is the employer
under a legal obligation under the act to provide rehabilitation for an employee who is using
illegal drugs or alcohol? Mr. Harkin. No; there is no such legal obligation.")
The House committee disavowed any duty to treat drug addicts and omitted reference to
alcoholics entirely in its discussion. H.R. REP. No. 485, at 80.
[T]his title does not require that a covered entity provide a rehabilitation
program or an opportunity for rehabilitation for current users of illegal drugs
(because current users of illegal drugs are not covered under the Act), employers
have often found it more cost effective to rehabilitate qualified employees than to
terminate them and hire new employees. The Committee . . . encourages
employers to continue to offer or to initiate such rehabilitation programs rather
than to terminate qualified employees with a current drug problem.
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against alcoholics.226 Because the Senate approved provisions that
treat recovering alcoholics more harshly than recovering drug abus-
ers, alcoholics generally, and police officers specifically, 227 will find no
support for their recovery and continued law enforcement employ-
ment under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. These Acts
were the sole pieces of federal legislation that might have provided
incentives to state and local police agencies to treat and accommodate
alcoholic officers rather than wait for a tragedy and then fire them.228
This inquiry turns, then, to the question of whether employers who
take punitive action against alcoholic police officers are protected by
the Acts.229
2. ARE EMPLOYERS WHO DISCIPLINE OR DISCHARGE ALCOHOLIC
POLICE OFFICERS PROTECTED BY STATUTORY DEFENSES?
It is clearly unreasonable for police agencies to send officers who
are drunk or high on illegal drugs on calls for help. The ADA's treat-
ment of drug testing supports the national goal of establishing drug-
free workplaces,230 and it coincides with the view that the nation's
" 'front-line soldiers' charged on a day-to-day basis with the onerous
and dangerous duty of drug interdiction within their jurisdiction" 231
Id. (emphasis added).
226. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1990).
227. See discussion infra part III.A.2.a.
228. Efforts to enact treatment-focused statutes at the state level have been similarly
thwarted. See discussion infra part IV.B.
229. If this analysis and those of other early commentators is correct, and the ADA does
not apply to alcoholics, then employers firing alcoholics will not look to the Act for defenses to
wrongful termination law suits. Nevertheless, the ADA's coverage is still unclear, and
Rehabilitation Act employer defenses match those of the ADA. Accordingly, the next section
assumes that employers of alcoholics may look to the language of either act to answer charges
of discrimination.
230. For purposes of this inquiry, three sections of the ADA are relevant. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12114(b) provides "that it shall not be a violation of this Act for a covered entity to adopt or
administer reasonable policies or procedures ... to ensure that an individual [with a disability]
is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs" (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)
provides, "[a] covered entity... may require that employees shall not be under the influence of
alcohol or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace" (emphasis added). 42
U.S.C. § 12114(d) provides, "[for purposes of this title, a test to determine the illegal use of
drugs shall not be considered a medical examination. . . .Nothing in this title shall be
construed to encourage, prohibit, or authorize the conducting of drug testing for the illegal use
of drugs by job applicants or employees or making employment decisions based on such test
results." (emphasis added).
231. City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 400, 565 A.2d 672,
681 (Md. 1989). Police employee drug testing programs have mushroomed in recent years.
Although drug testing is unquestionably a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, its reasonableness is defacto where legitimate government interests outweigh the
intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989) (routine testing of all customs agents applying for positions directly
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cannot use illegal drugs. But the ADA goes further. By excluding
recovering alcoholics from its protections, and by adopting the Reha-
bilitation Act's "direct threat" and "essential function" language, the
legislature granted police employers a license to discharge rather than
treat alcoholics, and provided them with defenses against challenges
of discrimination.232
a. The Direct Threat Defense
Under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, employers
may discharge individuals who pose a direct threat to the safety of
others.233 The Rehabilitation Act analyzes safety threats along two
involved in drug interdiction or required to carry firearms); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (railway employees tested as part of a post-accident
investigation). These Supreme Court decisions affirmed the constitutionality of many then-
existing police testing policies and led to further widespread development of drug testing for
law enforcement personnel. Courts uphold both suspicionless random testing and/or testing
based on reasonable individualized suspicion.
Cases upholding suspicionless random drug testing for police include Guiney v. Roache,
873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 963 (1989); Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n
of N.J. v. Township of Wash., 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989);
Weicks v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 706 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. La. 1988); City ofAnnapolis, 565
A.2d 672; Caruso v. Ward, 530 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1988).
Cases upholding police drug testing based on the presence of reasonable suspicion include
Jackson v. Gates, No. 90-55728, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 31201 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 1992); Ford
v. Dowd, 931 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1991); Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868
F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F.Supp. 727 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F.Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Casados v. City and Co. of
Denver, 832 P.2d 1048 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of
Newark, 524 A.2d 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
See generally Stephen M. Fogel et al., Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 553 (1988); Melissa Skidmore Cowan, Note, Workers, Drinks, and Drugs:
Can Employers Test?, 55 CINN. L. REV. 127 (1986); Robert G. Remis, Note, Drug-Impaired
Police Officers/Fire Fighters and the Reasonable Suspicion Standard: Whose Turn is it to Give
Condolences to the Innocent Victim's Family?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 677, 678 (1989) ("Once a
child is dead, all courts would probably agree that a reasonable suspicion exists. Presently,
society merely gives its condolences to the dead child's family because the courts are unwilling
to ensure that police officers are drug-free before any tragic event occurs."); see also infra part
III.B for additional cases construing the Rehabilitation Act and illegal drug use by police
officers.
232. Is it possible that a recovering alcoholic officer who was discharged will bring suit
based on disparate treatment between himself and the recovering illegal drug addicted police
officer? The scenario is unlikely in law enforcement because policy justifications support
discharge of the recovering police officer whose dependency is on an illegal drug. See CARTER
& STEPHENS, supra note 73; supra note 231; infra note 266. It is exactly this issue, however,
that is likely to face a court when a recovering alcoholic non-law enforcement worker, whose
job function cannot possibly pose a direct threat, is fired and her recovering illegal drug abuser
co-worker is retained.
233. "'Direct threat' means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). The ADA also provides
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dimensions: the current threat and the potential future risk.234
Courts using this analysis seek the appropriate balance between hon-
oring legislative intent to limit employment discrimination against the
handicapped, and the desire of employers to protect themselves, the
workplace, and the public from future risk posed by the handicapped
worker.23 5 Courts engage in a case-by-case analysis when confronted
with the problem of future risk.236 Central to that analysis is the
meaning of "reasonable probability of substantial harm. '237
Where the handicap is alcoholism, determining whether the
threat is "immediate" or "future," and whether harm is likely to be
substantial, ignores the very nature of the disease.23 There may be no
present threat, but there is, by definition, always a future risk. Alco-
holism is a chronic disease that reactivates, with its inherent risk to
the drinker and to bystanders, as soon as the recoverer takes a drink.
But an officer may be in recovery, functioning at full capacity for
years following the decision to stop drinking. 23 9 The future risk test
does not realistically address the lifelong process of recovery from
that handicapped employees should not "pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace." 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). This implies that an officer injured as a
proximate cause of the alcoholic partner's acts may have standing under the ADA to sue the
employer. See Tucker, ADA, supra note 191, at 928.
The Rehabilitation Act excludes those who "by reason of such current alcohol... abuse,
would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others" from those handicapped
for the purposes of employment protections. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(v) (1991).
234. Richard A. Perras & Walter C. Hunter, Handicap Discrimination in Employment: The
Employer Defense of Future Safety Risk, 6 J.L. &. COM. 377 (1986).
235. Id. at 394 (discussing E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1253 (D. Haw. 1980) and Sterling Transit Co. v. FEPC, 28 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1352
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
236. See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985). The Mantolete
court considered a claim of discrimination by an epileptic rejected from the Postal Service on
the basis of elevated risk and possible future injury. The court held that "in order to exclude
such individuals, there must be a showing of reasonable probability of substantial harm ....
The question is whether, in light of the individual's work history and medical history,
employment of that individual would pose a reasonable probability of substantial harm." Id.
at 1422. The court described a two-part process in which the employer must first consider if
the applicant could perform essential functions without a reasonable probability of substantial
harm to self or others, and if not, then engage in consideration of reasonable accommodation.
Id. at 1423. The case was remanded for application of this test. Id. at 1425.
237. Id. at 1422.
238. See supra part II.B.
239. In Dade County, Florida, a recovering alcoholic officer with over ten years of sobriety
was instrumental in reconceptualizing and humanizing police basic training. He also assists in
interventions on other alcoholic officers and teaches supervisors about signs and symptoms of
the disease. His situation is especially interesting because his drinking never led to arrest or
adverse publicity for the department. The teaching point is not that he was never caught. By
his own admission, he drove drunk repeatedly and on at least one occasion was stopped and let
go by fellow officers. See supra part II.C regarding enabling. The message is that wellness and
recovery most certainly are compatible with police functions.
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alcoholism. It penalizes the sober yet still recovering officer. More
problematical, it gives no incentive to the employer to intervene in the
greater and more immediate danger posed by those officers not yet
identified as alcoholic but who are far more likely to pose a risk than
their recovering and sober squad mates.2 °
b. The Essential Functions Defense and the Meaning of
"Reasonable Accommodation"
Ambiguous language in each of the relevant acts provides justifi-
cation for punitive action against the alcoholic officer. Under the
ADA, a current alcohol abuser is not an "otherwise qualified" '241 indi-
vidual capable of performing "essential functions" 242 of the job with
or without "reasonable accommodation. ' 243  These terms are easily
240. See Shields v, City of Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961, 967-73 (La. 1991) (discussed infra
notes 269-83 and accompanying text) (Dennis, J., dissenting); Van Raalte, supra note 69.
241. 42 USC § 12112(b)(5)(A) provides that " 'discrimination' includes ... not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability ... unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of "otherwise qualified" as construed under the
Rehabilitation Act and determined that an employee is "otherwise qualified" where: (1)
notwithstanding the handicap, she can perform the essential duties of the job; (2) she is capable
of performing those duties with reasonable accommodation, as long as that accommodation
does not impose an undue hardship on the employer; and (3) she does not pose a direct threat
to health or safety of either herself or others. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 491
U.S. 273, 287, n. 17 (1987); see also Michael S. Cecere & Philip B. Rosen, Legal Implications of
Substance Abuse Testing in the Workplace, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 869 (1987) ("The
behavioral manifestation of the addiction prevented the officer's successful performance on the
job. This finding was entirely consistent with, if not mandated by, the 1978 amendment to the
Rehabilitation Act.") (citations omitted) (discussing Heron v. McGuire, 802 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1986)).
242. Section 101(8) of the ADA provides that "'qualified individual with a disability'
means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the ... position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
This language was borrowed from 29 CFR 1613.702(0 (1991), which established the
guidelines utilized to interpret the Rehabilitation Act.
Section 103 of the ADA provides,
[i]t may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this Act that an alleged
application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a
disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity,
and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as
required under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (emphasis added). The term "business necessity" is not defined in the
Act.
"Essential function" terminology comes from the Rehabilitation Act at § 706(8)(C)(v),
which limits qualified individuals with handicaps to those who can "perform the duties of the
job in question."
243. Although the ADA does not define "reasonable accommodation," it provides
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manipulable. Essential functions are those that are fundamental or
critical to the position, based on case-by-case analysis. 2 " "Reason-
able accommodation" is that which can be accomplished without pos-
ing "undue hardship" on the operation of the employer. 245 Factors to
be considered in determining undue hardship include: (1) overall size
of the employer's operation; (2) function and type of agency opera-
tion; (3) structure of the agency's workforce; and (4) nature and cost
of the accommodation.246 Reasonable accommodation may be
accomplished by job restructuring, part-time or modified work sched-
uling, or reassignment to a vacant position.247
How does this play out in the law enforcement arena? Accom-
modation, often accomplished in other work settings by transfer, is
considered incompatible with the police agency mission.248  Reluc-
tance to accommodate the alcoholic officer is rooted in the assump-
tion that all police officers are ready for enforcement action at all
times. In the world of policing, all officers can, theoretically, respond
at any time to dangerous situations which may force them to drive at
high speeds or to shoot a weapon. In fact, most agencies require their
officers to carry a weapon off-duty and to be "ready to respond" to
emergencies on a moment's notice. 249 Policing is a twenty-four-hour-
a-day job.25° Many departments allow their officers to take home
marked patrol cars, theorizing that visibility helps deter crime, and
examples of how it may be accomplished, including facility modification, job restructuring,
reassignment, and training. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)(B).
244. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Henderson, supra note 198,
at 718-19.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B); 29 CFR 1613.704(c) (1991).
247. Id. at § 12111(9)(B).
248. See Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 976 (1982). An officer, diagnosed as a paraplegic after being shot on duty, brought an
action under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the department that refused to
accommodate his handicap and terminated him. On remand to determine if the department's
position was based on legitimate and necessary job requirements, the district court held, and
the Eighth Circuit affirmed, that the police department's mandate that all officers should be
able to conduct a forcible arrest and to transfer to any position in the department was
reasonable. Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 563 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d
1082 (8th Cir. 1984). This was despite evidence that the department had at least two other
officers who could not make forcible arrests and that the transfer policy was not applied to four
percent of the force. Id. at 78.
249. City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 400, 565 A.2d 672,
682 (Md. 1989) (noting that the nature of police work involves emergencies and thus justifies
suspicionless drug testing of police officers).
250. Bahn, supra note 85, at 391 ("The officer has duty responsibilities 24 hours a day.
[The] aim is to have the police officer, technically off duty, returning home alone at night in
civilian clothes, from a social event or recreation, respond as an officer to anything that might
be encountered .... ").
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that the officer can respond immediately to any chance encounter
with criminal activity. Both the department and the public are inter-
ested in keeping officers on "full alert" at all times. Sound public
policy therefore demands that police remain drug-free around the
clock. 25 1 Logically, officers should be absolutely prohibited from
using any chemical, including alcohol. Of course, police culture could
not tolerate such a constraint on drinking.252 Furthermore, prohibit-
ing alcohol use entirely may be an unreasonable restriction on off-
duty conduct.253 Despite agencies' inability to limit alcohol consump-
tion, both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act allow police adminis-
trators confronted with alcohol-induced misconduct to fire the
rehabilitating officer. 2 4 Accommodating a recovering alcoholic by
transferring him temporarily to a desk job simply does not square
with the image citizens, legislators, and other officers have of polic-
ing.'" But discharge (rather than appropriate discipline for the mis-
conduct and treatment for the disease) makes sense only in the
narrow context of current stereotypes and misinformation about the
nature of alcoholism and the practice of policing.
c. What's Wrong with the Background Assumptions?
The beliefs supporting use of these statutory defenses by employ-
ers who discharge alcoholic officers are outdated and ill-conceived.
Any vision of law enforcement that presumes that all officers in a
given department are ready to report for action on a moment's notice
is plain wrong. It simply ignores police departments' accommodation
of many temporarily "disabled" officers. Injured, ill, and pregnant
personnel are routinely placed on "light duty" for weeks or months at
a time. No one would think of firing the officer recovering from a
heart attack (stress-induced, no doubt) whose doctor prohibits patrol
activities for a number of weeks. Nor would an agency dare discharge
the pregnant officer who is typically removed from patrol functions as
soon as the pregnancy is disclosed.2 56 Accommodating the pregnant
251. See supra note 231; infra note 266.
252. See supra part II.C.
253. Kneip v. Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 502 N.E.2d 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (The
court held that a rule requiring police officers to carry weapons at all times but not to drink
while in possession of a weapon except in their own homes was unwarranted and unreasonable.
The chief acknowledged that the rule's effect was to prohibit officers from drinking within city
boundaries unless in their homes.).
254. See supra part II.C.2. The officer's dilemma is how to get drunk, but not become a
drunk.
255. See supra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
256. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (1988), protects
against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726
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officer means reassignment for eight to nine months, assuming she
returns to work shortly after birth. Even in the midst of civil unrest,
agencies staff headquarters and communications sections, and typi-
cally, pregnant officers or those on injured status are used in these
essential but non-confrontational positions.
Furthermore, all but the very smallest police departments have
senior officers who have not seen the inside of a patrol car for years.
Insiders know that officers nearing retirement "look for a home" in an
assignment which keeps them out of the action, often shuffling papers
at a desk.257 The officer whose donut habit has mushroomed to 300
pounds is obviously incapable of chasing down a thief. He is disabled
by fat, yet the department willingly accommodates his size.
If police departments can accommodate injury, illness, preg-
nancy, obesity, and "nearing retirement," no valid reason exists as to
why they cannot reassign the recovering alcoholic officer or allow her
to take sick leave for the period of withdrawal, stabilization and treat-
ment.258 The sober officer should then return to full duty, armed and
in uniform.259 All that prevents such accommodation is stereotype,
denial, and reluctance of police agencies to deal with their biases.26" I
am not aware of any police agency that prohibits officers from drink-
ing alcohol off-duty. 261 Booze isn't illegal for the class of people wear-
ing guns and badges. There are no restrictions on how much off-duty
officers can drink or time parameters intended to allow officers to
sober up before the shift begins. Drinking behavior is entirely discre-
tionary as long as officers show up for work. Why have legislators
failed to focus on the police culture's enabling behaviors that protect
the active drinker? Are lawmakers unaware that patrol officers allow
F.2d 1543 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (affirming lower court's ruling that employer violated the [Act] by
firing employee from her position as an x-ray technician immediately upon learning of her
pregnancy), reh'g. denied, 732 F.2d 944 (1lth Cir. 1984).
257. Large agencies accomplish this with assignment to "court services," "administrative
assistance," or "civilian assistance" units. "Finding a home" is an acceptable practice in police
culture. The job is a reward. Perhaps agencies' resistance to accommodating alcoholics stems
from recognition of the limited numbers of these positions. If a recovering alcoholic occupies
the spot for a month, where does the officer nearing retirement go?
258. In-house treatment programs typically last 28 days.
259. One police psychologist discussed the importance of allowing the recovering officer to
retain his badge and gun. "Don't take their guns away .... It's like a status symbol to them.
Even more so, it's a tool of the trade. It's as if you took a stethoscope from a doctor."
Cappiello, supra note 51, at 29. But see supra note 182 (regarding suits by the families of
alcoholic officers who have committed suicide or murder with service revolvers).
260. Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n., 565 N.E.2d 579, 581
(Ohio 1991) (A police chief who refused to hire an applicant with two years of sobriety
following treatment explained that the applicant was "a drunk" and "once a drunk, always a
drunk.")
261. See supra note 253.
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intoxicated or hung-over partners to "sleep it off" in an empty hold-
ing cell at the station?262 If this sort of "reasonable accommodation"
is voluntarily made to officers who are temporarily unable to perform
their "essential functions," then any rule which would sacrifice a
recovering alcoholic because she may "someday" pose a direct threat
is unjustifiable.
3. THE RESULT-INSTITUTIONALIZED AVOIDANCE AND DENIAL
The rules found in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are
counterintuitive. By commingling provisions governing addiction to
illegal drugs and addiction to alcohol, the statutes justify discrimina-
tion by the police employer whose own misinformation and biases fuel
her reluctance to accommodate the alcoholic. Statutory defenses
ignore both the nature of alcoholism and the corrosive impact that a
technically sober officer has on every civilian he meets when he is
desperately anticipating the end of the shift and a "cold one." The
rule ignores the narc who drinks a six-pack on the scene of a drug
bust, then goes out to complete another undercover buy.263 The stat-
utes institutionalize cultural denial and reward administrators who
ignore vivid indicators of impending disaster. The police chief is stat-
utorily authorized to take action against the officer who could not live
up to the higher standard expected of law enforcers.2 6 Ultimately,
we all suffer because there are no statutory incentives to police depart-
ments to treat or to accommodate alcoholic police officers. Alcoholic
officers are on-duty right now. No one is doing anything about the
alcoholic careening out of control. But we are reassured: Alcoholics
can be fired if they hurt someone.
B. The Judicial Response
This section examines cases brought under the Rehabilitation
262. Personal account, anonymous former police officer, now recovering.
263. Personal account, anonymous narcotics officer.
264. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 284.884 (1992). The Code sets standards for
unacceptable alcohol levels when a public employee appears to be intoxicated on the job.
Police officers are in violation of the standard if their blood alcohol level measures 0.01. The
standard for personnel who transport others on a daily basis or who work in the driver's
license division is 0.04. An alcohol level of 0.1 is the break point for charges of driving under
the influence in Nevada. A curious tension exists between these administrative code provisions
and Nevada's statutory scheme governing alcohol and drug use by on duty employees. While
employees under the influence of alcohol on duty may be disciplined, NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 284.4062(1)(a) (1991), there is an exception for peace officers who consume alcohol within the
scope of their duties, NEV. REV. STAT. § 284.4062(3)(b). What happens if an employee
consumes alcohol in the line of duty, reaches a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.01, and then
engages in misconduct that would ordinarily subject her to disciplinary action? See infra note
302 and accompanying text regarding "higher standards."
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Act 265 in which alcoholic officers (at various stages of recovery) have
alleged discriminatory personnel action by the employer. This section
is not about cases involving addiction to illegal drugs, but, as will be
demonstrated, themes underlying discharge of officers for illegal drug
use recur in cases about alcoholism.266 The judicial trend is clear:
where personnel in public safety positions are involved, administrative
agencies and the courts will generally support discharge of recovering
alcoholics even though their misconduct was inextricably related to
the disease. Courts and review boards believe that alcoholism and
policing are incompatible. Their rationale is fuzzy.
It is helpful to consider decisions involving state police officers
invoking the protections of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act sepa-
rately from those involving federal law enforcement personnel and
section 501, keeping in mind that the Rehabilitation Act's provisions
regarding drug and alcohol abuse have been and will probably con-
tinue to be confusing.2 67
265. As of this writing, no cases have been reported construing the ADA and alcoholic
officers. Because the language of the relevant provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA is now identical, Rehabilitation Act decisions are instructive.
266. Judicial consensus is that police officers who use illegal drugs are not protected by any
provision of the Rehabilitation Act because illegal drug use is inconsistent with the
departmental mission. See Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't., 840 F.2d 1139, 1149 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989):
Accommodating a drug user within the ranks of the police department would
constitute a "substantial modification" of the essential functions of the police
department and would cast doubt upon the integrity of the police force. No
rehabilitation program can alter the fact that a police officer violates the laws he
is sworn to enforce'by the very act of using illegal drugs.
See also Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a heroin-addicted
police officer is not handicapped within the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
because "dependence required him to break the laws he was sworn to enforce, and he was
impaired in his ability to respond to emergency and life-threatening situations"); Desper v.
Montgomery County, 727 F. Supp. 959, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that an undercover
narcotics officer who became addicted to cocaine was not otherwise qualified under the Reha-
bilitation Act because an officer who violates the laws he is sworn to uphold is not qualified to
serve as a narcotics officer.); Lavery v. Dep't of Highway Safety, 523 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1988) (affirming the dismissal of an alcoholic trooper who was discharged for cocaine
use, finding that he was not protected by the Rehabilitation Act because cocaine use consti-
tuted a serious criminal violation of the laws he was sworn to uphold).
Other cases involving police officers who were discharged following illegal drug use, but
who did not assert protection of the Rehabilitation Act, include City of Minneapolis v. Moe,
450 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (Court affirmed discharge of a previously exem-
plary officer who was arrested with cocaine (but was rehabilitating) because "his efforts to
rehabilitate are irrelevant to the issue of good cause to discharge. The issue here is the integ-
rity of the police department .... ); In re Copeland, 455 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (affirming discharge of a cocaine-addicted officer whose misconduct was directly related
to his chemical dependency which included alcohol abuse).
267. See Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[Clourts have had to
grapple with nebulous statutory history and to cuff carelessly drafted matter into shape.").
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1. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
Since the ADA's revisions to the Rehabilitation Act, only one
court has applied the new and ambiguous language to issues involving
alcoholic police officers.26  In Shields v. City of Shreveport,26 9 a
sharply divided Louisiana Supreme Court held that alcoholic police
officers who were discharged for specific acts of misconduct were not
"individuals with handicaps otherwise protected" by the newly
revised Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs were assigned to an off-duty
job where they drank alcoholic beverages in uniform. One officer
served a drink to a party guest, and the other fell asleep while on-
duty. Following this incident, the police chief ordered both officers to
submit to an alcohol abuse evaluation, which found both to be alco-
holic. 270  The coordinator of Shreveport's employee assistance pro-
gram informed the chief that he believed that the officers had stopped
drinking and that they posed no current threat to public safety.271
Nonetheless, the chief fired the plaintiffs for violation of numerous
departmental directives.272
Plaintiffs first invoked section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as a
defense on appeal of the personnel board's actions upholding their
discharge.273 The court analyzed the ADA's revisions to the Rehabil-
itation Act and held that plaintiffs had no remedy because "[i]t
appears from the plain language of the statute that only alcoholics...
whose problems are under control are protected from discriminatory
treatment. ' 274 Relying on the "direct threat" language of the revised
Rehabilitation Act,275 the majority determined that the plaintiffs were
not "individuals with handicaps" and were not protected by the
Act.
276
Justice Dennis, in dissent, not only disagreed on the meaning of
268. Under an earlier version of the Rehabilitation Act, a New York County Court upheld
termination where a probationary police officer alleged that he was discriminatorily discharged
because of prior, but not current, alcohol abuse. Smith v. Ortiz, 517 N.Y.S.2d 352, 353 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987). The evidence supported a conclusion that he was actually an alcoholic in
denial, who had been treated for the disease but who was likely to resume drinking and whose
alcoholism would impact negatively on his duties. Id.
269. 579 So. 2d 961 (La. 1991).
270. The evaluations were conducted by both the departmental employee assistance
program and an independent chemical dependency service. Id. at 963.
271. Id. at 970 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 963.
273. See supra note 207 for the elements of a section 504 claim.
274. Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961, 966 (La. 1991) (quoting Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 592 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
275. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(v); see supra note 233.
276. Shields, 579 So. 2d at 967; see supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
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the facts, but more critically, on the meaning of the terms "current"
and "direct threat" as used in the Act.277 Based on the counselor's
report to the chief, Justice Dennis suggested that the officers were not
current users, and were therefore entitled to the protections of the
Act.278 Finding no support in the facts for the majority's conclusion
that the officers posed a danger to the public, Justice Dennis remarked
that "there was no evidence whatsoever as to what degree, if any, a
past history of alcoholism causes a controlled, rehabilitating alcoholic
to be a greater safety risk than other employees in general.- 279
The judge's observations about the nature of alcoholism and
recovery showed a more thorough understanding of the disease model
than that of his peers.28 0 Although the majority and the chief penal-
ized the officers for not getting treatment before the incident, the dis-
senting judge recognized that the incident was a precipitating crisis of
the type which commonly breaks through the alcoholic denial. 28 ' He
also chastised the police chief for acting in bad faith by using the
officers' evaluations, given in confidence, to support their discharge.282
Justice Dennis' perceptivity and willingness to evaluate the case based
on its own facts and circumstances exemplifies the type of judicial
277. Justice Dennis felt that the officers were discharged because of their handicapping
alcoholism, not because of their conduct. Shields, 579 So. 2d at 967.
278. Id. at 970.
279. Id. at 972.
280. Other Louisiana cases arising under disciplinary process appeals reach inconsistent
results. Compare LaBorde v. Alexandria Mun. Fire & Police Bd., 566 So. 2d 426 (La. Ct.
App. 1990) (reinstating a patrolman assigned to the DWI task force who was himself arrested
for DWI, because the department failed to establish a real and substantial relationship between
his conduct and the orderly and efficient operation of the police department; the officer was off
duty, in his own car), writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1990) with Dyer v. City of Oakdale,
542 So. 2d 1138 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding discharge of a probationary police officer who
gave his car keys to an off-duty police officer whom he knew had been drinking), writ denied,
(La. 1989); Gerhold v. New Orleans Police Dep't., 503 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
(affirming dismissal of an officer for drinking during the Mardi Gras parade and refusing to
obey a direct order).
Oddly, the Louisiana Supreme Court is strikingly sympathetic to treatment programs for
alcoholic attorneys. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Dumaine, 550 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1989).
Although it suspended an alcoholic attorney indefinitely, the court was alert to the disease
model.
[T]here is now convincing evidence that chemical dependency is so widespread
among the legal profession that it cannot be deterred or even coped with by the
normal enforcement of the disciplinary rules. Instead, it is clear that the evil has
become ascendant and, if it is to be curbed, must be addressed openly, vigorously
and holistically by the entire organized bar.
Id. at 1203. One wonders why an "open, vigorous and holistic" approach is not similarly
suitable for the law enforcement profession. See infra part II.C.2 regarding the mythology of
the warrior.
281. See supra part II.D.
282. Shields, 579 So. 2d at 968.
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reasoning needed to resolve these sensitive issues in a coherent man-
ner. Unfortunately, the dissenting judge's analysis relied heavily on
cases involving federal employees and earlier versions of the Rehabili-
tation Act.28 3
2. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
A broader understanding of the judicial response to alcoholic
police officers requires looking beyond the few decisions involving
municipal or state officers to analogous cases concerning federal law
enforcement personnel. These cases apply both sections 501284 and
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
In Butler v. Thornburgh, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the discharge
of a "currently dysfunctional" alcoholic FBI agent. 2 5 The plaintiff
had been an agent for fourteen years, and had completed three sepa-
rate courses of treatment prior to his discharge. 2 6 Applying section
501(b)'s "essential function" language,28 7 the court decided that the
plaintiff's status was incompatible with "the safekeeping of either
property or lives."' 28 The result in this case seems reasonable in light
of the agency's years of accommodation; however, the court's analysis
is imprecise. The court relied on Copeland v. Philadelphia Police
283. Justice Dennis cited Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) and Whitlock
v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984) aff'd without opinion, 790 F.2d 964 (1984).
Whitlock construed section 501 as imposing affirmative duties on federal employers.
Moreover, recent interpretations of the Act by other courts undermine this conclusion. See
Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871, 874 n.l (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 555
(1990); inra part III.B.2.
284. Under this section, federal employers are obliged to develop "an affirmative action
program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of [handicapped] individuals ......
29 U.S.C. § 79 1(b). The 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act created protections and a
private right of action in favor of federal employee claimants which is similar to that available
under section 504 for employees of agencies receiving federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Federal employees can now pursue handicap discrimination claims under both sections 501
and 504. Butler, 900 F.2d at 874; Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 304 (5th
Cir. 1981).
Addi tionally, some federal employees who are "prior" alcohol or illegal drug abusers may
invoke protections of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention,
Treatment and Rehabilitation (Hughes) Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-l(b) (1991).
However, the statute excludes FBI, CIA, and National Security Agency personnel from these
protections. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-l(b)(2).
285. Butler, 900 F.2d at 874, 877.
286. From 1978 to 1987, the plaintiff was disciplined for picking a fight with a civilian,
wrecking a Bureau vehicle while driving drunk, and finally misplacing his agency vehicle in a
drunken stupor. He entered treatment after each incident and enjoyed sobriety for periods of
four to live years between each incident. He was discharged nine months after the last
incident, during which time he had abstained from drinking. Id. at 872-73.
287. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
288. Butler, 900 F.2d at 876.
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Department.289 That case is inapposite and its rationale misleading
because it involved illegal drug use.29°
The real reason for Butler's discharge is unclear. Was it because:
(1) he was "currently dysfunctional" and therefore not "otherwise
qualified" to be a law enforcement agent; (2) because alcoholism
impacts the police mission as negatively as does illegal drug use; or (3)
because he was an officer who might jeopardize public safety? The
decision provides little guidance to other courts. Furthermore, the
court ignored what may be the most sensitive issues: Where were
Butler's supervisors when he was getting drunk and then driving an
agency vehicle? Was no one aware that after four years of sobriety
the agent was experiencing difficulties and that relapse was
possible?29'
The Butler court further clouded the issue by relying on a Merit
Systems Protection Board292 precedent for the proposition that "alco-
holism is arguably a handicapping condition" for purposes of the
Rehabilitation Act.293 The court cited Ruzek v. General Services
Administration,294 which firmly established the importance of accom-
modation and treatment for alcoholic federal employees, including
those whose positions require firearms use. 295 Those principles had
289. 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1988). In affirming
discharge of an officer who tested positive for marijuana, the court held that even if the officer
was handicapped for the purposes of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, he was not
otherwise qualified because accommodating drug users in a police department would
substantially modify essential functions of the job and "cast doubt on the integrity of the police
force." Id. at 1149.
290. The Copeland court distinguished alcoholism and alcohol-induced law violations from
illegal drug use because "the consumption of alcohol ... is not per se unlawful." Id. at 1147.
291. The probability of relapse highlights the need for education about alcoholism as a
mandatory component of supervisory preparation. See supra parts II.C-D; infra part IV.C.
292. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) is an "independent, quasi-judicial
federal administrative agency established under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.
1201." PETER B. BROIDA, A GUIDE TO THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD LAW &
PRACTICE 1979-1990, at 6 (1990). It is the federal agency charged with "ensur[ing] that all
Federal government agencies follow Federal merit systems practices. The Board does this by
adjudicating Federal employee appeals of agency personnel actions ...... 5 C.F.R. § 1200.1
(1991). The Board reviews cases arising under sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
when those cases involve federal or Postal Agency handicapped employees. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 2301(b)(2), 2302(2)(b)(1)(D), 7702(B)(iii) (1990). MSPB guidelines to enforce
nondiscrimination on the basis of handicaps are found in 5 C.F.R. § 1207 (1991) and 29
C.F.R. § 1613.701-709 (1991).
293. Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1990).
294. 7 M.S.P.R. 437 (1981) (holding that federal employers must offer the alcoholic
treatment before initiating disciplinary action and must reasonably accommodate the handicap
while giving the employee another chance).
295. Accord Velie v. Dep't of Treasury, 26 M.S.P.R. 376 (1985) (reinstating alcoholic
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms officer who had participated in treatment and had an excellent
prognosis); Marren v. Dep't of Justice, 29 M.S.P.R. 118 (1985) (reinstating an alcoholic
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been, however, dramatically modified and partially overruled by the
Board in Hougens v. United States Postal Service.296  Hougens
involved an alcoholic, off-duty postal inspector 297 who violated
departmental firearms policy and endangered others by recklessly dis-
playing his firearm and threatening unarmed men with it as he left a
bar.298 The post office wanted to fire him, but the presiding official
determined, consistent with Ruzek, that demotion to a nonenforce-
ment position was a reasonable accommodation of his alcoholism.2 99
The BoaLrd reversed, allowing the agency to discharge Hougens.30°
This holding signified a reversal in direction. The Board determined
that, for the purposes of both sections 504 and 501 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, "there are certain acts of misconduct which, when commit-
ted by an employee who is an alcoholic or drug addict, take that
employee outside the scope of protecting legislation because the mis-
conduct renders that person not a 'qualified' handicapped individ-
ual."'30  The Board further established that moral qualifications were
properly considered in cases involving armed law enforcement offi-
cials who are "held to a high degree of sound judgment and a higher
standard of conduct. 30 2
Announcing this new "Get Tough on Alcoholics" policy, 30 3 the
Border Patrol Agent who had been granted sick leave to attend alcohol abuse counseling and
had an excellent prognosis); Friel v. Dep't of Navy, 29 M.S.P.R. 216 (1985) (reinstating
alcoholic postal inspector to his former [armed] position because he had not been given an
opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of his rehabilitation). Velie's and Friel's
misconduct involved misuse of their firearms. The Board rejected the agency's contentions
that the nature of the job function and concerns for public safety automatically justified
removal of the employees from qualified status for purposes of Rehabilitation Act protection.
Velie, 26 M.S.P.R. at 377; Friel, 29 M.S.P.R. at 218.
296. 38 M.S.P.R. 135 (1988), overruling Green v. Dep't of the Air Force, 31 M.S.P.R. 152
(1986); Friel, 29 M.S.P.R. 216 (1985); Marren, 29 M.S.P.R. 118 (1985); Velie, 26 M.S.P.R. 376
(1985); and Ruzek, 7 M.S.P.R. 437 (1981); see ROBERT G. VAUGHN, MERIT SYSTEMS
PROTECTION BOARD: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 199-200 (1992 Supp.).
297. Postal inspectors are law enforcement personnel. They are authorized to carry
weapons and make arrests.
298. Hougens, 38 M.S.P.R. at 139.
299. Id.
300. Id
301. Id. at 142. The Board cited Richardson v. United States Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp.
1213 (D.D.C. 1985) (federal employee, who was a non-law enforcement postal worker, was
discharged because of his criminal conduct, not because of alcoholism or poor job performance
due to alcohol) and Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
302. Hougens, 38 M.S.P.R. at 149 (citing Quander v. Dep't of Justice, 22 M.S.P.R. 419
(1984) aff'd, 770 F.2d 180 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see VAUGHN, supra note 296, at 200; supra part
II.C.2.
303. Hougens, 38 M.S.P.R. at 148-49. The ADA legislative history reflects political
interest in, the war on drugs. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10,774 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989)
(statemeni: of Sen. Helms) ("I think there is no better time than now to start this bipartisan
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Board distinguished more liberal district court decisions on the
grounds that those cases did not involve serious misconduct.3a° The
Board then decided other cases involving law enforcement person-
nel,30 5 adhering to its new philosophy even where the employer knew
of the employee's lengthy drinking history and supervisors had
observed the drinking, 3° and where the misconduct did not culminate
in arrest.3a 7 It justified discharge or demotion because the behavior
created adverse publicity for the agency 308 and conflicted with the
essence of the law enforcement mission.3°9
It is apparent that courts and administrative agencies dealing
with alcoholic police officers construe "essential function" and "direct
threat" in such a way that police employers discharging drinkers,
whose alcoholism resulted in misconduct but who are recovering, will
be well protected. This is true even when the record shows that
supervisory personnel knew or should have known of the drinking
problem but did nothing to intervene. With these defensive measures
at their disposal, police administrators can seemingly afford institu-
tionalized denial of the disease. 10
Before leaving this discussion of judicial reactions to alcoholism,
battle for the very soul of our Nation. It is time to put our rhetoric into action. We can start
by getting tough and smart with drug addicts."); id. at S10,775 (statement of Sen. Coats) ("I
believe that there should be a clear and unequivocal statement in the [ADA] that a person who
uses illegal drugs and alcohol is not entitled to any protection .. and that illegal drug use
should not be considered a disability ...."); id. at S10,777 (statement of Sen. Humphrey)
("the loophole creates benefits for drug addicts, of all classes of people, at a time when we are
trying to deal effectively with the scourge of drug use in our society.").
304. Hougens, 38 M.S.P.R. at 147 n.15 (distinguishing Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp.
126 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986) and Walker v.
Weinberger, 600 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1985)).
305. Alex v. United States Postal Serv., 38 M.S.P.R. 605 (1988) (Board remanded for
further analysis of employee's discrimination claim even though the employee participated in
alcoholism rehabilitation after assaulting his girlfriend. There was insufficient evidence in the
record to establish that alcoholism caused his misconduct. In the absence of a direct
connection between misconduct charges and alcoholism, the employee's handicap need not be
accommodated.); Wilber v. Dep't of Treasury, 42 M.S.P.R. 582, 589 (1989) (affirming
discharge of an Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms officer because his misconduct struck at the
very "core of the agency's mission and his duties as a law enforcement officer.").
306. Wilber, 42 M.S.P.R. at 588.
307. Alex, 38 M.S.P.R. at 607.
308. Wilber, 42 M.S.P.R. at 589; see infra part III.C.2.b.
309. Id.; Alex, 38 M.S.P.R. at 610; see also Loveland v. Dep't of Air Force, 37 M.S.P.R.
554, 559 (1988) (alcoholic mechanic at a nuclear plant was not a "qualified handicapped
person" because her drinking created a "significant risk to public safety"). Compare Wilber,
42 M.S.P.R. 582 with Calton v. Dep't of Army, 44 M.S.P.R. 477, 479 (1990) (holding that
where the alcoholism has not resulted in egregious misconduct which disqualifies the employee
as a qualified handicapped individual, the federal employer must provide the employee with a
"firm choice" between treatment and termination) (emphasis added).
310. See supra parts II.C-E.
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it is helpful to jump from the Merit Systems Protection Board up to
the United States Supreme Court for its major pronouncement about
the disease.
3. THE SUPREME COURT'S PERSPECTIVE ON ALCOHOLISM
In Traynor v. Turnage3 1 the Court claimed not to have decided
"whether alcoholism is a disease whose course its victims cannot con-
trol. 13 2 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's resolution of this case
made clear that, in its view, seventy to eighty percent of all alcoholics
are guilty of "willful misconduct. '31 3
The Traynor decision arose when two honorably discharged vet-
erans failed to use their educational assistance benefits within the pre-
scribed ten-year period allowed by statute. 3 4  They sought an
extension because their alcoholism during those years made them
temporarily incapable of pursuing an education.31 5  The plaintiffs
were confronted with a Veterans' Administration (VA) regulation
defining "primary" alcoholism as "willful misconduct" which could
not be considered a physical or mental disorder sufficient to warrant
an exception. 3 6 The regulation defined willful alcoholism:
The simple drinking of alcoholic beverage is not of itself willful
misconduct. The deliberate drinking of a known poisonous sub-
stance or under conditions which would raise a presumption to that
effect will be considered willful misconduct. If, in the drinking of a
beverage to enjoy its intoxicating effects, intoxication results proxi-
mately and immediately in disability or death, the disability or
death will be considered the result of the person's willful miscon-
duct. Organic diseases and disabilities which are a secondary
result of the chronic use of alcohol as a beverage, whether out of
compulsion or otherwise, will not be considered of willful miscon-
duct origin. 3
17
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that this definition
could not be squared with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified individ-
ual solely on the basis of his handicap.3"' The Court reframed the
311. 48:5 U.S. 535 (1988).
312. Id. at 552; cf. ALCOHOL & HEALTH, supra note 33, at 8 ("[T]o be classified as a disease
a disorder has an identifiable cluster of symptoms that predicts a course and outcome ....
[A]lcohol dependence is not different from other biologically based diseases.").
313. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 550.
314. Id. at 538.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2) (1987) (emphasis added).
318. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 548.
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issue, requiring plaintiffs to show that the 1978 amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act implicitly repealed the VA alcoholism provision or
prohibited the VA from classifying alcoholism as willful miscon-
duct.31 9 Plaintiffs could not demonstrate either condition. The Court
found that the VA regulation and the Rehabilitation Act could coexist
as written:
First, the "willful misconduct" provision does not undermine the
central purpose of § 504, which is to assure that handicapped indi-
viduals receive "evenhanded treatment" in relation to nonhandi-
capped individuals. This litigation does not involve a program or
activity that is alleged to treat handicapped persons less favorably
than nonhandicapped persons .... [The provision] merely pro-
vides a special benefit to disabled veterans who bear no responsibil-
ity for their disabilities that is not provided to other disabled
veterans or to any able-bodied veterans.32°
By converting a hard-won entitlement into a benefit for those
who meet the additional qualification of "freedom from self-induced
disability," the Court reinforced historic punitive attitudes about alco-
holism. The veterans, recovering from alcoholism and ready to pur-
sue an education, were instead punished for their sin.321 The Traynor
decision is particularly relevant to this inquiry because of the links
between the military and policing.322 Both structurally and atti-
tudinally, both fields place unrealistic demands on their members.
The police officer and the soldier are warriors.323 Weakness in body
or spirit may subvert the mission. Weakness must be exposed, pun-
ished, and eradicated. 324
The disease model 325 contrasts sharply with stereotypes underly-
ing the Traynor decision. They are polarities whose coexistence
aggravates tackling the problem of alcoholism in policing. Decisions
from the Supreme Court and from administrative agencies ignore the
true nature of the disease and of recovery. The urge to punish is
strong.
4. THE RESULT-RETRIBUTION TRUMPS REHABILITATION
Recovery status is apparently immaterial when courts consider
319. Id. at 549-50.
320. Id. at 548 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
321. See Pendergrass & Ostrove, supra note 76, at 489.
322. See supra part II.A.2.
323. See supra part II.C.2.
324. See supra parts II.B.2, II.C.2.
325. See supra part II.B.1.
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misconduct arising from alcoholism.326 Law enforcement personnel
in the federal service cannot expect the courts to support treatment
rather than discharge when alcoholism leads to misconduct. Simi-
larly, municipal or county police officers working in agencies of over
fifteen employees, 327 or which accept federal funds,328 who are dis-
charged as a result of alcohol-induced misconduct, must find alterna-
tives to federal legislation if they hope to challenge the personnel
action, get treatment, and return to work. Courts and administrative
agencies called upon to analyze the handicap of alcoholism punish the
diseased rather than acknowledge the illness. Once again, the public
deserves a wake up call: courts construe federal statutes in accord-
ance with prevailing attitudes about alcoholism and in keeping with
misinformation about the nature of policing. Officers who have not
yet attracted public attention to themselves by getting arrested or
driving drunk and killing a pedestrian will go untreated. Unfortu-
nately, the first act of misconduct may be the last.329
C. Agencies and Unions
The alcoholic officer who is arrested, treated, and then fired, has
options. She can claim discrimination under the ADA or the Rehabil-
itation Act, or she can look to a collective bargaining agreement for
protection. The majority of cases in which alcoholic state or local
police officers challenge personnel action implicate collective bargain-
ing agreements and departmental standards for disciplinary proce-
dure rather than federal law. There are at least three possible reasons.
First, alcoholic officers do not consider themselves "handicapped"
and psychologically resist using the statutes.33 ° Second, attorneys
representing the officers are aware that getting a court to extend the
Rehabilitation Act's protections to an alcoholic officer is highly
improbable. 33' Third, officers and the attorneys who represent them
prefer using the applicable collective bargaining agreement because it
may support a grievance under several distinct provisions providing
greater chance for success. This review of cases interpreting union
agreements or disciplinary policies demonstrates that the alcoholic in
326. Bur see supra part III.C (regarding a different result where department policy rather
than the Rehabilitation Act formed the basis of an appeal).
327. See supra note 192.
328. Set, supra note 206.
329. On November 19, 1986, two New York State troopers were killed in an accident. The
trooper who was driving had alcohol in his system. The body of his passenger, another
trooper, te:ited positive for cocaine. N. Y May Test Troopers for Drugs and Alcohol, 24 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 18 (January 6, 1986).
330. See supra parts II.C-D.
331. See supra part III.B.
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recovery, who is lucky enough to work under a contract or policy
providing for treatment, has at least a fighting chance of keeping her
job. But that chance is slim given countervailing pressures.
1. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
The officer facing discipline looks to the same documents for
relief as does the police administrator wanting to discipline her.
There may be a clause in the collective bargaining agreement that pro-
hibits the specific behavior in question or the agency may have unilat-
erally imposed a work rule that was broken.a32 Conversely, the
contract probably requires progressive discipline and provides a griev-
ance mechanism for appeals to disciplinary action. Tension between
the employers' and employees' competing interests is built into the
contract.
For example, when an officer is disciplined for off-duty miscon-
duct (not necessarily alcohol-related), the arbitrator must:
Determine whether the off-duty behavior has a detrimental effect
on the police agency in question; determine whether the supervi-
sor's attempt to impose disciplinary action for off-duty behavior
constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into the personal lives of
these employees; and, finally, when both of these effects are pres-
ent, balance the negative impact to the police agency against the
infringement on the workers' personal rights.333
Arbitrators also reconcile conflicting contractual provisions that
simultaneously assure officers of progressive discipline and permit the
332. Police are among the most highly regulated of all workers. See, e.g., Policeman's
Benevolent Ass'n of N.J. v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133, 138-141 (3d Cir. 1988)
(listing policies governing police officers' standard of conduct, duty responsibilities, debts,
soliciting, associating with persons of bad reputation, withholding information, reporting
violations of law, alcoholic beverages and drugs, physical fitness, loitering, smoking on duty,
uniforms, manner of dress on duty, carrying a badge, wearing a name badge, carrying a
weapon off duty, manner of civilian dress, personal appearance, use of derogatory terms,
conduct toward the public, impartial attitude, disparaging on the basis of race, commercial
testimonials, and public appearance requests), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Shields v.
City of Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961, 963-64 (La. 1991) (listing seven articles from departmental
rules and regulations which the plaintiffs were said to have violated). But see Fraternal Order
of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d 430, 434 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1987)
(distinguishing "highly regulated industries" from those like law enforcement that are subject
to "a variety of statutory and administrative controls").
In addition to contract provisions and work rules, there may be statutory prohibitions
that preclude the officer's continued employment because of the nature of the misconduct.
Michael Marmo, Public Employees: On-the-Job Disciplinefor Off-the-Job Behavior, 40 ARB. J.
3, 18 (1985). States may control police officer certification and decertification, specifically
setting forth conduct which will result in discharge. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 943.13(4),
943.1395(5) (1984).
333. Michael Marmo, Off-Duty Behavior by Police. Arbitrators Determine if On-the-Job
Discipline is Appropriate, 14 J. POLICE SC. & ADMIN. 102, 103 (1986).
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agency to terminate for cause. 334 In one study of off-duty misconduct
and arbitral results, three-quarters of the police or fire personnel cases
reviewed were based on specific contractual regulations rather than a
"just-cause" clause.335 Typically, the regulatory clauses prohibit any
conduct which might discredit the officer or the agency.336 Employ-
ers may discharge when a strong nexus exits between the off-duty mis-
conduct and its negative impact on the agency's effectiveness or
mission.137 This is especially likely to occur in the field of public
safety, where arbitrators "uniformly accept" the argument that police
must be held to higher standards than other employees.338
2. THE SEARCH FOR RELIABLE PREDICTORS OF DISCIPLINE FOR
ALCOHOL-RELATED MISCONDUCT
When alcoholic police officers complain of personnel actions aris-
ing from alcohol-induced misconduct, the results vary wildly. This
section reviews four types of cases that illustrate the difficulties
encountered when courts, hearing officers, police agencies, and police
officers struggle with the meaning of alcoholism and attempt to bal-
ance their competing interests as reflected in collective bargaining
agreements.
a. Where Departmental Policy Requires Treatment
Unlike the city police officers in Shields,339 and the FBI agent in
Butler,3"0 the alcoholic officer discharged in Stabner v. New York City
334. "Cause" for discharge has been judicially defined in the law enforcement context as
"some substantial shortcoming which renders the employee's continuance in office in some
way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law and sound
public opinion recognize as good cause for his dismissal." Rispoli v. Police Bd. of City of
Chicago, 544 N.E.2d 1063, 1074 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); accord Glenville v. Police Bd. of City of
Chicago, 532 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 537 N.E.2d 809 (Il. 1989);
see also Johnson v. City of Welch, 388 S.E.2d 284, 287 (W.Va. 1989) ("[Clause ... specially
relates to and affects the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interest of the public. An officer should not
be removed from office for matters which are trivial, inconsequential, or hypothetical, or for
mere technical violations of statute or official duty without wrongful intention." (quoting 67
C.J.S. Offic.ers § 120b (1936)).
335. Marmo, supra note 332, at 19; Marno, supra note 333, at 110.
336. Marmo, supra note 332, at 19; see, e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d at 138;
Shields, 579 So. 2d at 963-64.
337. Marmo, supra note 335, at 5.
338. Id at 15; Marvin Hill, Jr. & Donald Dawson, Discharge for Off-Duty Misconduct in
the Private and Public Sectors, 40 ARB. J. 24, 35 (1985); see supra note 302 and accompanying
text.
339. Se-e supra part III.B. I.
340. Set supra part III.B.2.
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Housing Authority 34' was reinstated. Although the court did not dis-
cuss the underlying union agreement, it vacated the discharge because
it was inconsistent with discipline normally given in analogous
offenses and ignored the department's stated policy of encouraging
treatment.342
The department discharged Stabner for misconduct arising from
an acute alcohol reaction. 343 It is not clear whether he was on- or off-
duty, but the misconduct did occur in the police station. Before he
became ill and punched a wall, Stabner handed his weapon over to
another officer.34" He subsequently acknowledged his alcoholism and
realized that he was prone to alcoholic binges and blackouts.345
Despite a hearing officer's recommendation that Stabner be suspended
for forty-four days, the department fired the officer.346 The court
decided that, although there was evidence supporting all but one of
the departmental violations with which Stabner was charged, dis-
charge was an improper result.347
The court was particularly disturbed that Stabner was fired "on
the basis of this single incident after five years of exemplary service
during which he received innumerable commendations and
awards. ' 348 There was no reason to believe Stabner used illegal drugs,
and agency policy encouraged rehabilitation and return to full
duty.349 While acknowledging the importance of strict standards for
the police, the court could not reconcile firing Stabner when officers
who had assaulted citizens,35 and officers who had allowed critical
information to fall into the hands of those who might harm their
coworkers,35' were merely suspended.352 Finally, the court noted that
Stabner's behavior did not involve injury to anyone else and "was
clearly the direct result of his alcoholism, a disease for which he has
sought treatment. 3' 3
341. 560 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
342. Id. at 286.
343. Id. at 285.
344. Id. at 284.
345. Id. at 285.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 286.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See Flowers v. Ward, 525 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
351. See Tuzzio v. Ward, 554 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
352. Stabner v. New York Hous. Auth., 560 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
353. Id. The sequence is crucial to this court's analysis. Stabner sought treatment
subsequent to the incident, and started rehabilitation prior to the court's decision. Stabner
represents the pure case of an officer who remains in denial until he's in trouble, then begins
recovery. By the time the court heard the case, it had before it a sober, recovering, and, no
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Stabner presents the fundamental distinction between those cases
arising under the Rehabilitation Act and those brought on the basis of
inconsistent or improper personnel action where treatment is officially
sanctioned. "Egregious" misconduct inextricably related to alcohol-
ism supports discharge under the Rehabilitation Act,3 5 4 but it was the
relation:;hip between the disease and the behavior which precluded
discharge in Stabner. In Stabner, absent any consideration of the
Rehabilitation Act, the court demanded that the police agency follow
its own procedure by treating the disease and adhering to standards of
fair and consistent discipline.3 55
The Stabner result is remarkable in the context of cases previ-
ously reviewed 3 6 but it is not an unusual result for the particular
jurisdiction. The New York City Police Department has one of the
most highly developed treatment programs in the country for alco-
holic officers.357 In Stabner, the agency apparently sidestepped its
own rehabilitation-oriented directives, and the court refused to
endorse this inconsistency. Although the agency's public commit-
ment to intervention and recovery is a praiseworthy model for other
jurisdictions35  enlightenment did not come easily,359 and resistance
doubt, remorseful officer who wanted to go back to work. In contrast, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reasuhed the opposite result under an identical factual sequence. See supra notes 269-83
and accompanying text.
354. See supra part III.A.
355. In light of numerous articles written by police and mental health workers about job
stress and its link to alcoholism, it is becoming apparent that some professionals within the law
enforcement and treatment systems are more willing than are legislators and courts to embrace
the disease model and the concept of treatment. See supra parts II.A, II.D. New York City
police were among the first to admit the existence of police alcoholism and set up treatment
programs. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The likelihood of a Stabner result
appears questionable where the agency is less progressive.
356. See supra part III.B.
357. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
358. An Ounce of Prevention..., NEWSDAY (City Edition), May 14, 1991, at 44. The New
York City Police Department utilizes sixty-six full- and part-time civilian and sworn workers
in four separate departmental units to locate and "defuse its timebombs." Id. The Counseling
Services Unit deals with problem drinkers, and has one of the highest caseloads of the four
units charged with psychological intervention on troubled officers. Id. Focusing on early
intervention and education of police personnel has shifted the source of referrals. Whereas
two-thirds of those using the services were referred by a supervisor fourteen years ago, 43% of
the officers in counseling are now self-referred. Id.
359. The department was among the first subjected to a civil suit based on the off-duty
actions cf its alcoholic officers. See Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 151 N.E.2d 862, 866
(N.Y. 1958) (foreseeability that an off-duty, armed and intoxicated police officer would harm
the taxicab driver in whose cab he was placed by on-duty officers was a question for the jury
where the drunk officer used his service revolver to shoot the driver in the knee); McCrink v.
City of New York, 71 N.E.2d 419, 422 (N.Y. 1947) (question of foreseeability for the jury
where an officer previously disciplined three times for intoxication but still required to carry
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is still pervasive. Stabner must also be distinguished from labor
arbitration cases arising in departments that mandate tratment, but
that involve arrest or adverse publicity for the department.
b. Where the Media Gets Involved
Three cases involving Ohio State Highway Patrol officers illus-
trate the potential value of a collective bargaining agreement that gov-
erns progressive discipline and treatment.3 61 These provisions are not
dispositive, however, when arbitrators consider adverse publicity
about the misconduct giving rise to discharge.
In all three cases, troopers were arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and were terminated by the agency. All three
cases were governed by the same collective bargaining agreement
which provided for treatment.362 In all three cases, the agency failed
to follow progressive discipline as mandated by the bargaining agree-
ment. Rather than focusing on this procedural flaw as grounds for
reinstatement, each arbitrator instead concentrated on the incompati-
bility of a DUI arrest with the essential functions of the law enforce-
ment position. Still, there were disparate results.
The arbitrator in Ohio Labor Council, 1990, upheld the officer's
discharge. But the arbitrators in Ohio Labor Council, 1991, and Ohio
Labor Council, 1988, reinstated the officers. What distinguishes the
outcomes? Surely driving under the influence is equally incompatible
with policing for each of the officers belonging to the same depart-
ment? Closer analysis of the major variables that might have influ-
enced the arbitrators is less than illuminating:
1. adjudication of guilt (Ohio Labor Council, 1990 and Ohio
his weapon off-duty, subsequently killed one man and wounded another while off-duty and
drunk).
360. See infra part IV.B.
361. In re Ohio State Highway Patrol and Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council
Inc., 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 613 (1991) (Bittel, Arb.) [hereinafter "Ohio Labor Council,
1991"]; In re State of Ohio and Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc., Unit 1, 94
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 533 (1990) (Sharpe, Arb.) [hereinafter "Ohio Labor Council, 1990"]; In
re State of Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining State Highway Patrol and Fraternal Order of
Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc., OCB Grievance No. 87-2748, 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb.
(Apr. 7, 1988) (LEXIS 4840) (Leach, Arb.) [hereinafter "Ohio Labor Council, 1988"].
362. Alcoholism, drug abuse, family or marital distress, social and relationship
problems, mental or emotional illness, legal problems, financial problems, and
related environmental conditions are illnesses or problems that can often be
successfully treated or resolved. All employees with these problems or illnesses
will receive assistance in locating treatment for these problems, or illnesses.
Ohio Labor Council, 1991 at 613; Ohio Labor Council, 1990 at 534; Ohio Labor Council, 1988
at 6. The same contract affecting the three cases also provided for sick leave during treatment,
formal and informal referral, expenses for treatment, and disciplinary procedures.
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Labor Council, 1991 - yes; the officers took breathalyzer tests
and pled no lo contendre; Ohio Labor Council, 1988 - no;
acquitted because the officer refused to take a breathalyzer test
and the state could not present adequate evidence of guilt);
2. the department knew or should have known of the officers'
drinking problems (Ohio Labor Council, 1990 and Ohio Labor
Council, 1991 - no; Ohio Labor Council, 1988 - yes);
3. other officers' negative reactions or doubt about the alcoholic's
ability to be effective following treatment (Ohio Labor Council,
1990 and Ohio Labor Council, 1991 - yes; Ohio Labor Coun-
cil, 1988 - not discussed);
4. the officer's attitude about treatment (Ohio Labor Council, 1991
- officer proactively committed himself to a treatment plan;
Ohio Labor Council, 1990 - no discussion of treatment; Ohio
Labor Council, 1988 - officer had been in treatment off and
on and had also refused treatment);
5. involved an accident (Ohio Labor Council, 1991 and Ohio
Labor Council, 1988 - no; Ohio Labor Council, 1990 - yes;
involving only the trooper's personal vehicle and no injury to
anyone);
6. publicity (Ohio Labor Council, 1991 and Ohio Labor Council,
1988 - none or minimal; Ohio Labor Council, 1990 -
extensive).
Nc easily recognizable pattern explains the results. One might
expect that the trooper who refused to take the breathalyzer test (Ohio
Labor Council, 1988) might be treated more harshly than officers who
complied and pled no contest, especially since she had previously been
treated for alcoholism, her condition was known to her supervisor,
and she had refused treatment at least once.a6 a However, the case of
the officer whose termination was upheld (Ohio Labor Council, 1990)
was marked by extensive adverse publicity and other officers' negative
reactions to his alcoholism. These seem to have been the dispositive
factors. 361 The arbitrator clarified the impact of adverse publicity in
the discussion of the "off-duty misconduct nexus," in which he bal-
anced "employee conduct and the employer's legitimate interests in
363. Ohio Labor Council, 1988 at 4.
364. "Fhe Grievant's arrest and conviction were followed by a rash of articles and
comments in the Ohio area media." Ohio Labor Council, 1990 at 536. But see In re
Metropolitan Police Dep't Wash., D.C., 84 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 105, 107 (1985) (Kaplan,
Arb.) (The arbitrator upheld a fine of $2500 against an officer who had two accidents within a
month, both while driving drunk. The officer left the scene of the first accident and was
convicted of DUI. The arbitrator discounted the importance of publicity: "[T]he arbitrator
does not b3elieve that such incidents need to be made public before the ... [d]epartment can
successfully argue that its mission will be severely affected."). See generally, Marmo, supra
note 333, at 107.
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an effective business operation. '365 Applying the nexus, the arbitrator
found that: "[T]he Highway Patrol's reputation was harmed, the
Grievant's ability to perform his job was diminished, and the Griev-
ant's relationship with his co-workers was jeopardized .... The Arbi-
trator finds that the proper nexus exists. ' 366 Upholding discharge, the
arbitrator also made reference to a deterrent effect which the decision
might have on other employees.367
Things get "curiouser and curiouser" 368 when one reviews other
labor arbitration cases in search of the rationale guiding the decisions.
c. When the Agency Knows or Should Know: Shift Parties,
Girlfriends, and Swastikas
When agency personnel know or should know of the alcoholism
but fail to act to prevent harm and then discipline the officer for mis-
conduct, the officer is likely to be reinstated if an arbitrator is
involved.
In one case, a department disciplined an officer who had previ-
ously been suspended for driving under the influence after a second
incident. 369 The second incident arose when he attended his shift's
monthly bash, had six beers, and was charged with driving under the
influence after being rear-ended on the way home. 370 The arbitrator
determined that no discipline was appropriate, and struck the entire
incident from the officer's record. 371 Although the City's failure to
provide substantial evidence of the alleged rule violations warranted
this result, the Union raised the more interesting argument: "[lilt is
ironic that he should be suspended for being intoxicated while at a
City, and indeed, Police Department function. That function was
attended not only by his Unit Commander but by a number of senior
and other officers of the Department and it was a regular occurrance
[sic]." ' 3 72 Clearly, the department knew of the officer's drinking prob-
lem and other officers observed his drinking on the night in question,
365. Ohio Labor Council, 1990 at 537; see Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a
Theory of "Just Cause" In Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 611-12; Marmo,
supra note 332, at 3.
366. Ohio Labor Council, 1990, at 537.
367. Id. at 539. The arbitrator's comment ignores the nature of alcoholism, see supra part
II.B, and the denial that permeates police culture, see supra parts II.C-D.
368. LEwis CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 13 (William Heinemunn
Ltd. ed., 1956).
369. In re City of Chicago Dep't of Police, BNA 1988 Unp. Lab. Arb. (Jan. 22, 1988)
(LEXIS 4654) (Lieberman, Arb.).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 7.
372. Id. at 4; see supra parts II.C-D.
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and still the officer made it to his car and drove until the accident took
place. It is unfortunate that the arbitrator did not find it necessary to
specifically adopt these underlying facts as part of his rationale.
In another case, a department fired an officer for breaking into
his girlfiiend's apartment while intoxicated and beating her up.373 A
jury, however, acquitted him of criminal charges arising from the con-
duct.374 A Michigan arbitrator determined that, although the collec-
tive bargaining agreement provided for discharge or discipline based
on just cause, no nexus existed between the off-duty misconduct and
the department's mission.375 As a result, the arbitrator ordered the
police department to reinstate the officer.376 Interestingly, although
the police chief knew of the officer's drinking problem before the inci-
dent and had documented several instances of misconduct, there was
no discussion of treatment in the officer's records or in the arbitrator's
report. 377
In contrast, a Florida arbitrator squarely addressed the issue of
departmental knowledge and failure to follow up on alcoholism treat-
ment. 378 The department fired the officer after he allowed a swastika
to be tattooed on his arm while he was drunk.379 The officer had been
previously arrested for driving under the influence and referred for
treatment. 380 The agency had knowledge that the counseling was not
373. In re City of Muskegon Heights (Mich.) Police Dep't, 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 675,
676 (1987) (Girolama, Arb.).
374. Id. at 676.
375. Id. at 679.
376. Id. at 680. One cannot avoid a suspicion that beating a woman was for some reason
not sufficiently egregious to support disciplinary action. See Trompetter, supra note 76, at 533
("[o]ne of :he group norms within the squad room is the expectation of 'manly' behavior...
with statements like F- the bitch .... Dump her .... I wouldn't put up with that shit.").
377. Muskegon Heights, 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 676. Every indicator pointed to the
officer's drinking problem, but treatment was not provided and the inevitable arrest occurred.
The assault on the girlfriend was preventable. The department knew of the officer's instability
but failed -o direct him into treatment. This is what is known in police officer lingo as "an
accident [lurglary, drug deal, robbery, assault] looking for a place to happen." See also In re
Los Angeles Police Dep't and Los Angeles Police Protective League, 89 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1091 (1987) (Koven, Arb.) An officer grieved his transfer which followed personnel
complaints based on his use of alcohol and rumors of an affair with a probationary officer. The
officer claimed these reasons were pretextual and that the real reason for transfer was his
alleged racial prejudice. The arbitrator upheld the transfer, finding that the department had
not acted arbitrarily, capriciously or discriminatorily. Notably, LAPD had extended an offer
of treatment and censured the officer's refusal by suspending her. This is consistent with
intervention strategies appropriate for the disease. See supra parts II.B-D.
378. Judy A. Plunkett, Boynton Beach Officer with Swastika Tattoo Reinstated, THE MIAMI





helpful, but failed to follow up on the officer's problem.38 ' The arbi-
trator noted: "Given this history, the city must share some of the
blame for the fact that a problem associated with the grievant's alco-
holism surfaced once again, albeit in a different form, in 1991. "1382
The officer was reinstated.38 3
These cases suggest that whether the arbitrator clearly names the
underlying rationale or not, disciplinary action may not stand where
the department knows of the alcoholism and fails to intervene, and
where grievance procedures are available to the officer.
d. The Last Chance Agreement
In contrast to the cases previously discussed, where the officer
and his agency have entered into a "last chance agreement" and the
agency has precisely followed progressive discipline as per the con-
tract, the arbitrator most likely will uphold the discharge. In one
case, the officer showed up for roll call intoxicated after having been
twice arrested and disciplined for driving under the influence.38 4 The
issue of treatment was not addressed by the arbitrator, who upheld
termination based solely on violation of the last chance agreement. 385
Similarly, an arbitrator affirmed the discharge of an alcoholic Georgia
Bureau of Investigation agent who had been warned that any further
misconduct involving alcohol and use of a state vehicle would result
in termination. 386  Although this warning was not clearly a last
chance contractual agreement, the arbitrator upheld discharge when
several years after the warning, the agent got drunk, hit another auto-
mobile while driving his GBI vehicle, urinated in public on the scene
of the accident, falsely identified himself to investigating officers, used
state funds to post bail, and lied about that, too. 387 Few reported
cases, however, specifically point to a last chance agreement as the
basis for upholding discharge.388
It is difficult to extract guiding principles from the bulk of
reported cases.3 9 Even where a collective bargaining agreement
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. After being discharged, the officer had the swastika altered to resemble a phoenix. Id.
384. In re R B, Police Service Officer and City of Gardena, 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb.
(Sept. 19. 1988) (LEXIS 4687) (Gentile, Arb.).
385. Id. at 6.
386. Golden v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 400 S.E.2d 668, 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
387. Id. at 669.
388. It is possible that last chance agreements are utilized with some regularity, and that
because they are internally sound, grievances based on violation of these agreements are
unlikely to reach an arbitrator. Support for this explanation is not available.
389. Compare Massingale v. Police Bd. of City of Chicago, 488 N.E.2d 1289 (Ill. App. Ct.
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exists, the alcoholic officer may be subjected to disparate treatment
depending on the department's previous knowledge of and response to
his drinldng, adherence to progressive discipline guidelines, and the
1986) (reversing discharge and remanding for less harsh sanctions where the officer was cited
for driving while intoxicated, pled guilty to reckless driving and attended Alcoholics
Anonymous; the court noted that she was a single mother of three children whose record with
the agency was otherwise unblemished); Anderson v. City of Lawton, 748 P.2d 53 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1987) (affirming reinstatement of officer who had been discharged after the agency failed
to adhere to its own termination and disciplinary procedures, and reacted to incidents
involving alcohol in a nonuniform manner; while the officer did have a drinking problem, and
had received in-patient alcohol abuse treatment, his alcoholism did not affect his job
performance); with Lavery v. Department of Highway Safety, 523 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA
1988) (affirming discharge of a trooper addicted to both cocaine and alcohol, but
distinguishing the department's more lenient treatment procedure for "pure" alcoholics);
Allman v. Police Bd. of the City of Chicago, 489 N.E.2d 929, 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(affirming discharge of an officer who carried an unregistered firearm while drinking in a bar
off-duty, and who admitted being intoxicated at the police station; the court was not swayed by
his asserticn that he had started alcoholism treatment, holding that the "alleged alcoholism"
would be more relevant "if he had been on medical suspension for treatment of that problem at
the time of this misconduct."); Kappel v. Police Bd. of City of Chicago, 580 N.E.2d 1314 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (reinstating termination of an officer accused of a variety of weapons offenses;
the court rejected the officer's argument that drinking and "unrelenting emotional upheaval"
made the discharge unreasonable, finding no evidence that his misconduct was causally related
to the acts underlying discharge); Police Comm'r of Boston v. Civil Serv. Comm'n 494 N.E.2d
27 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986), rev. denied, 497 N.E.2d 1096 (Mass. 1986) (The police chief
appealed a civil service commission decision that reinstated and suspended a terminated police
officer. The officer was fired after drinking beer and having intercourse while on-duty with a
woman plced in his protective custody. Id. at 29. The court reinstated the chief's order of
dismissal, stating "the commission's decision cannot stand because it is based upon such a
profound misunderstanding of the role of a police officer that it either rises to the level of a
substantial error of law or is capricious to such a degree that it must, in the public interest, be
reversed." Id. at 31. The court noted that officers must "behave in a manner that brings
honor and respect for rather than public distrust of law enforcement personnel. They are
required to do more than refrain from indictable conduct." Id. at 32. This police officer
"violated the very essence of the trust reposed in him by reason of his employment ... [He]
engaged in outrageous conduct inimical to the most fundamental obligations imposed by
reason of his position as a police officer..." Id. The court failed to discuss his alcoholism.
The on-duty drinking was implicitly seen as a part of the sexual encounter, rather than a
symptom of a disease which might be driving misconduct.); In re Phillips, 569 A.2d 807 (N.J.
1990) (upholding demotion of a police chief to the rank of patrolman after his off-duty arrest
on DUI charges. Despite acquittal, the chief's violation of departmental regulations due to his
intoxication justified demotion. He had previously been confronted by the Township
Committee about his drinking.); Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of Philadelphia v. Wojtusik,
525 A.2d 1255 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (upholding discharge of an officer arrested for DUI
who attacked the officer who arrested him, despite being acquitted of all criminal charges);
Wayering v. County of St. Lawrence, 546 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (upholding
termination of an officer who had purchased alcohol for an underage boy who was later that
evening involved in a fight and severely injured; the officer's record showed other alcohol-
related complaints); Heard v. Incalcaterra, 702 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming
discharge of an officer arrested for DUI despite dismissal of criminal charges against him);
Johnson v. City of Welch, 388 S.E.2d 284 (W. Va. 1989) (affirming discharge of two officers,
one of whom was absent from work because he was too drunk to report, the other who drank a
beer on duty in a restaurant).
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degree to which a nexus exists between the off-duty conduct and
agency credibility, mission and integrity. Ultimately, the impact of
adverse publicity surrounding the incident may be the determinative
factor.
In spite of these divergent results, grievances arising from disci-
plinary action in violation of contract provisions involve more issues
and a greater likelihood of treatment than can be found when discrim-
ination is alleged under the federal statutes. Should not those inter-
ested in treatment strategies focus their energies on refining and
expanding collective bargaining agreements to mandate the offer of
treatment before discharge? Two factors hamper union support for
alcoholism treatment: (1) the nature of police culture and denial39 1;
and (2) the nature of police union bargaining.
3. THE NATURE OF POLICE UNION BARGAINING
Police are one of the most highly unionized groups of all public
employees.392 Yet only forty percent of all officers are in collective
bargaining units, and those are primarily in large metropolitan
areas.393 Unions have a vast assortment of working conditions about
which they may wish to bargain. 394 They must carefully weigh the
cost to their overall goals if they choose to fight for treatment for a
relatively small number of alcoholic officers. 39 5 Reviewing the issues
basic to contract negotiations helps to frame the present
consideration.
390. Police and fire personnel are those most vulnerable to adverse publicity. Marmo, supra
note 332, at 21-22. "Although police employees have no control over the fact that the media
find their off-duty transgressions to be particularly newsworthy, it nevertheless subjects them
to more severe penalties than other workers for the similar offenses .... [T]heir actions create
a greater adverse impact on the police department than the misbehavior of other employees on
their agencies." Id. at 22.
391. See supra part II.C.
392. HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 14-15 (4th.
ed. 1991). Only 30 states have explicitly enacted laws which authorize police to bargain. Id. at
14. Growth of police unions, however, has not been significant in the past 15 years, and many
unrepresented officers work in small towns where they cannot be easily reached. Id. at 14-15.
393. Id. at 14. These major agencies are also the most likely to have employee assistance
programs in place to treat the array of stress disorders common among law enforcers. See
generally Klein, supra note 51.
394. See, e.g., City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 482 So. 2d
336, 337-38 (Fla. 1986) (The union and city reached agreement on overtime, workweek,
workshift, leaves of absence, compensation for injuries, equipment, equipment safety, life
insurance and medical insurance before reaching impasse on demotion and discharge grievance
procedures.); see also supra note 332.
395. Up to 40% of police officers may be alcoholic. See supra part II.A. Because of
institutionalized denial, however, the union and its members are likely to recognize only the
small number of officers whose alcoholism has led to arrest and publicity as "alcoholics in need
of treatment."
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a. Mandatory and Permissive Subjects of Bargaining and
Managerial Prerogatives
Must agencies bargain with unions about treatment for
alcoholics? If not, what might induce a union to bring the issue of
treatment to the bargaining table? What might dissuade a union from
bargaining about treatment at all? The answers are inextricably
related to the complicated nature of labor negotiations. Difficulties
inherent in bargaining make negotiations over treatment unlikely.
Generally, if a subject involves determination of "wages, hours,
and termns and conditions of employment," it is considered a
mandatory subject of bargaining.3 96 This means that the parties must
bargain in good faith to the point of impasse, at which point the
employer may unilaterally implement the policy or procedure in ques-
tion. 97 If impasse occurs, the employer is still obligated to bargain
about the effects of the new policy or procedure.398 If a subject is not
mandatory, it is probably in the "permissive" negotiations category,
meaning that either party may introduce the topic, but that neither is
compelled to bargain in good faith about its implementation or
effects. 319 A third category represents an exception to the mandatory
bargaining requirement for matters involving terms and conditions of
employment. This exception, first referred to by the United States
Supreme Court as "managerial decisions, which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control,"' ° has been widely recognized for both pub-
lic and private employees and in the police context." The distinction
between mandatory, permissive, and "non-mandatory because of a
core managerial prerogative" subjects of bargaining is no more easily
396. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d) 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge
20 v. City of Miami, 609 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1992); Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial
Workers, Local 400, 565 A.2d 672, 673 (Md. 1989); Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. City of
Pontiac, 246 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Mich. 1976); Detroit Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 214
N.W.2d 803, 808 (Mich. 1974). See generally Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or
Negotiable Issues in State Public Employment Labor Relations, 84 A.L.R.3d 242 (1978).
397. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); Annapolis, 564 A.2d at 674.
398. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 n.15 (1981); AFSCME v.
State Labcr Relations Bd., 546 N.E.2d 687, 693 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989).
399. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349.
400. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.
concurring).
401. See, e.g., Law Enforcement Labor Serv. v. Hennepin Co., 449 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Minn.
1990) ("[F]rom the mere fact that a managerial decision does have an impact on 'terms and
conditions' of employment, it does not automatically follow that the policy decision is subject
to mandatory bargaining. If the policy decision (here the establishment of a grooming policy
itself) is so intrinsically interwoven with its implementation that to require the public employer
to negotiate its implementation would also force it to negotiate the underlying policy decision,
no negotiation is required.").
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described than that between problem drinking and alcoholism. °2
Courts, unions, and agencies juggle terminology. Contracts between
unions and police departments cover a vast array of subjects, with
some inexplicable categorization of subjects along the mandatory/per-
missive/managerial prerogative line. 1 3 That line is particularly fuzzy
where drug testing is involved.'
402. See supra part II.B.
403. See Hennepin, 449 N.W.2d at 728 (grooming policy was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining but was a core managerial prerogative); San Jose Peace Officers Ass'n v. City of San
Jose, 144 Cal.Rptr. 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (deadly force policy was not a mandatory subject
of bargaining); Berkeley Police Ass'n v. City of Berkeley, 143 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (implementation of a civilian review board was a managerial decision outside the scope
of bargaining); City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 482 So. 2d 336
(Fla. 1986) (union proposal allowing officers to grieve demotions and discharge procedures was
a mandatory subject of bargaining); Clinton Police Dep't Bargaining Unit v. Iowa Pub. Empl.
Rel. Bd., 397 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1986) (holding a union proposal that would have required the
agency to utilize crime data in making staffing decisions was a permissive subject of bargaining,
although it affected the availability of back-up officers on violent calls); Local 346, Int'l
Brotherhood of Police Officers v. Labor Rel. Comm'n., 462 N.E.2d 96 (Mass. 1984)
(polygraphing officers suspected of criminal activity was a managerial prerogative); Glendale
Prof. Policemen's Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 264 N.W.2d 594 (Mich. 1978) (promotion clause
was a mandatory subject of bargaining); Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Pontiac, 246
N.W.2d 831 (Mich. 1976) (residency requirements were a mandatory subject of bargaining;
civilian review board was not a mandatory subject); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of
Detroit, 214 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. 1974) (retirement benefits were mandatory subject of
bargaining); City of Riverview v. Lieutenants and Sergeants Ass'n, Seaway Lodge 154, F.O.P.,
314 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (retirement benefits were mandatory subject of
bargaining).
A guiding principle is hard to discern. Why are decisions about hair length and the power
granted civilian review boards so critical that they may be made by management unilaterally,
while the availability of back-up officers on violent calls need not be bargained about at all?
404. Compare Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20 v. City of Miami, 609 So. 2d 31
(Fla. 1992) with City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 400, 565
A.2d 672 (Md. 1989). In Fraternal Order of Police, the Miami Police Department was notified
that one of its officers was seen snorting cocaine while off duty, and that another two officers
were reportedly buying marijuana. 609 So. 2d at 32. The department ordered drug testing for
all officers involved. Id. The union then sought injunctive relief based on the City's failure to
bargain over drug testing, a mandatory subject for bargaining, before ordering the tests. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court, asked to classify drug testing as either a mandatory subject of
bargaining or a managerial prerogative outside of the scope of bargaining, came down on the
side of management: "[A]lthough mandatory collective bargaining is necessary for random
drug testing absent express legislation, such drug testing is permissible and within the
management prerogative when there is some evidence of drug involvement by specific officers."
Id. The court directed that, when a subject is arguably both a "term or condition of
employment," hence, a mandatory subject of bargaining, and a managerial prerogative, it is
appropriate to use a balancing test to resolve whether management has committed an unfair
labor practice by virture of its unilateral action. Id. at 34. On the facts before it, the court
found that the public's interest in maintaining a drug-free police force outweighed the
statutory provisions calling for collective bargaining over drug testing. Id. The lower court
was careful, however, to limit its opinion, noting that "random drug testing of all public safety
personnel... does, in our view, require collective bargaining unless the legislature addresses it
specifically." Id. at 35. Presumably then, the Fraternal Order of Police will eventually have
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Critical to the present analysis is that alcoholism treatment is not
a subject for bargaining in its own right. It is generally addressed, if
at all, in "effects" negotiations arising from classification of drug test-
ing as a mandatory subject of bargaining. For mandatory subjects,
effects must be negotiated before the plan is implemented. But if a
court deitermines that implementation of a drug testing program is a
core managerial prerogative, the employer may implement the pro-
gram without negotiation over testing or treatment procedures, even
though it; will eventually have to bargain over effects." 5 Furthermore,
even if drug testing is classified as mandatory, if the union and
employer are unable to reach agreement and impasse is declared, the
agency may unilaterally implement the plan.4"6
Treatment for alcoholics is, not surprisingly, a low priority when
the very classification of drug testing (which affects all officers in a
department) involves such intricacies and demands exhaustive atten-
tion to strategy. When police culture and institutionalized denial
about alcoholism"' are added to the equation, a concerned union will
naturally concede to members' wishes that they use bargaining power
in other areas.
Neither the police agency nor the union is required or motivated
to include mandatory treatment for alcoholics within a collective bar-
gaining agreement. In fact, there are strong disincentives to establish-
ing any sort of rehabiliation scheme. 408
the opportu nity to bargain over not only the fact of random drug testing, but also its effects,
including discipline and treatment options.
In Annapolis, the court reversed an injunction against the police department, which had
sought to unilaterally impose its drug policy following an impasse in negotiations with the
union. 565 A.2d at 673. The impasse involved implementation details, including treatment
and disciplinary processes that would result from the testing. Id. The lower court granted the
injunction based on a constitutional challenge to the reasonableness of the drug testing policy.
Id. at 674. The appellate court held that suspicionless testing did not violate the Fourth
Amendment and reversed. Id. at 683. Accordingly, despite the fact that drug testing was
concededly a mandatory subject of bargaining and despite lack of agreement with the union
about procedures and treatment, the employer was able to unilaterally impose its policy.
Fraternal Order of Police and Annapolis demonstrate, first, that unions expend significant
resources struggling with classification of drug testing. Second, it does not seem to matter
whether drug testing is a mandatory subject of bargaining when courts balance public safety
concerns against privacy concerns. Most importantly for the present inquiry, nowhere within
this scheme is the subject of treatment or discipline afforded priority.
405. See Fraternal Order of Police, 609 So. 2d at 32.
406. See City of Annapolis, 565 A.2d at 674.
407. See supra part II.
408. Unions represent a political special interest group whose clout may be exerted to block
reform. Governor Cuomo of New York recently vetoed a bill that would have allowed for
temporary suspension of alcoholic officers during the rehabilitation period, followed by
reinstatement to the formerly occupied position. Several police organizations opposed its
implementation. See infra part IV.B; see also Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of
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4. THE RESULT-IMPASSE AND DEATH
I can no longer stand the Dead.
The empty shell on the bathroom floor, a carcass
Face frozen in shock, or anger, or fear.
I march in to ritualize your death for a family that won't see you
on the pink tiled floor
panties half removed, nightgown twisted and frayed, urine
stagnating
in the toilet bowL
I ask questions, complete paperwork, call a doctor and the
lieutenant.
My pen runs out of ink
I feel your resentment, your mother's loss, your sister's grief, the
Pastor's warmth. I feel
everything but me.
Mechanized action, a puppet, a robot, the department
pulls strings, pushes buttons. I respond.
Your life may be a name on a form. My life is a form.'0
This section demonstrated that police agencies and unions do not
work together to combat police alcoholism. Collective bargaining
agreements, where they exist, may have clauses that compete with
unilaterally-imposed work rules or state statutes. The alcoholic
officer whose disease is at least partially fueled by the demands of
policing, and is inextricably related to eventual misconduct, cannot
count on returning to work even after completing a treatment pro-
gram and attaining sobriety. Under threat of discharge, even the alco-
holic whose denial has been shattered and who wants treatment will
not seek help. Her pain will intensify. If the officer happens to work
for an agency with a departmental policy or a union agreement that
calls for treatment, and that treatment is not offered, reinstatement
may be compelled by the agency's failure to adhere to its own proce-
dures or contractual obligations. Given the nature of labor negotia-
tions, few unions can afford to negotiate a mandatory treatment
clause. If a union wants to assure a strong treatment-oriented
approach to alcoholism among police officers, it must place that
request ahead of a long line of others which surely have stronger
backing among members of the force. Even this strategy, however,
addresses the problem for less than half of the officers in America.
Sixty percent of police officers are not in bargaining units at all.
Los Angeles, 253 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a grievance, arising out of a
question asked of the police officer/grievant during a promotional interview as to whether he
was a recovering alcoholic, was not arbitrable).
409. Anonymous police officer.
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Those officers working in small towns, without collective bargaining
power, have no method for implementing treatment strategies.
What does the status quo mean? If the intoxicated officer is
arrested f'or DUI but the incident is kept quiet, the nexus between her
off-duty conduct and the departmental mission is not strong, and the
officer may be permitted to return to work after treatment (assuming
the department allows treatment). If the alcoholic officer is arrested
and the media become interested in the incident, then she is likely to
be fired because of the adverse publicity, whether or not the crisis
precipitates treatment and sobriety. If the drunk officer is stopped
while driving under the influence and is permitted to go home rather
than being arrested, then her alcoholism will progress. Eventually,
this untreated and sheltered officer will either injure someone else or
die from the disease.4 °
410. See City of Indianapolis v. Hargis, 588 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 1992). In Hargis, the
Supreme Court of Indiana concurred with a Police Pension Board that an alcoholic police
officer was not entitled to pension benefits. The officer alleged that he was disabled by the
disease and that, although he could stop drinking, his "alcohol problems would be triggered by
a return to police duty." Id. at 499 (citation omitted). Early in his career, Hargis was twice
named "Officer of the Year," id. at 497, and testified that his drinking was related to job stress.
He was later suspended twice for alcohol-related use of his firearm and was hospitalized twice
for alcoholism. The Pension Board rejected his claim, and the court affirmed, holding that the
Pension Fund Act requires a "causal connection between the disease and unfitness for active
duty." Id. at 499-500. The court rejected Hargis' attempt to retire and get pension benefits
based on disabling alcoholism because: (1) he did not abuse alcohol on duty; (2) he did not miss
work because of alcoholism; and (3) there was no evidence of medical problems associated with
his alcohojism. Id. at 498. The court's analysis conforms to the same stereotypes and
misunderstandings about the nature of the disease underlying the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961 (La. 1991) (discussed supra notes 269-
83 and accompanying text). Hargis was caught in precisely the double bind this Comment
seeks to prevent. He was not yet so ill that his alcoholism affected work performance, but he
was ill enough that it made him behave recklessly or dangerously with a firearm off duty. The
Pension Board and the court, driven perhaps by institutionalized denial and ignorance, refused
to provide a man honored for his police service with an honorable way out of an untenable
situation. Hargis was left with "non-choices": (1) continue working, relapse into drinking,
and wait until a diagnosis of cirrhosis of the liver to apply for a pension; (2) continue working
and risk termination and civil and criminal suits arising from an alcohol-related incident; or
(3) quit and give up pension benefits for a job-related disability. The majority discounted
Hargis' equal protection argument that was based on the city's previous pension awards to two
other alcoholic officers, pointing to a lack of evidence about whether the other cases involved
on-duty performance undermined by alcoholism. Hargis, 588 N.E.2d at 500. Justice
DeBruler, in a brief dissenting opinion, squarely addressed one inconsistency inherent in the
majority decision. He noted that two hospitalizations for alcoholism clearly contradict the
finding tha.t there was no evidence of attendance or medical problems due to alcoholism. Id. at
500. The Hargis decision is alarming and gives rise to the question of departmental liability if





Review of statutes, cases, agency policies and union contracts
leads to the conclusion that although federal legislation is supposed to
protect the handicapped from discrimination and encourage accom-
modation of handicaps by employers, where the handicap is alcohol-
ism, and the employee is a police officer, early intervention is not
statutorily required or supported. In fact, the converse is true. The
officially approved outcome is punishment of the alcoholic after a
tragedy has occurred.
Courts applying the statutes adopt contextually invalid policy
justifications in narrowly construing the law. Public safety employees
are expected to be drug free. Alcohol is a drug. Therefore, although
police officers may drink (because it is not illegal), they can't become
addicted (because that is incompatible with the law enforcement mis-
sion). Police are expected to be superhuman-impervious to a disease
which affects ten percent of the general population.
Meanwhile, agencies and unions struggle over the meaning of the
terms "managerial prerogative," "mandatory" and "permissive"
while developing working conditions for some of the most highly reg-
ulated employees in the country. With so much to disagree about,
and with profound life and death procedures at stake, the nature of
collective bargaining means that few unions will be able to place alco-
holism treatment high on a priority list for negotiations.
Both the alcoholic and the public are in danger. We are all at the
intersection where the legal system's failure to create proactive, treat-
ment-oriented rules runs head on into the dynamics of alcoholism and
the complicating factors of police culture. If police officers would stop
covering for each other, if they would encourage drinking partners to
get help, then perhaps tragic incidents could be avoided. But given
the likelihood that an officer who is arrested for driving under the
influence will be discharged, his peers hide the problem.41' We can-
not wait for police agencies and officers to spontaneously emerge from
the cloak of denial, throw open the doors to treatment facilities,
accommodate recovering officers, and share their rehabilitative suc-
cesses with their communities. The legislature must confront its own
denial and grapple with this problem with courage and foresight.
IV. BITE THE BULLET!
It is up to the legislative branch.412 At both the state and federal
411. See supra parts II.C-D.
412. The hope that legislators will, in fact, bite the bullet and confront these issues is
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levels, legislators should implement or amend laws that acknowledge
the pressiures driving police culture, the nature of the disease of alco-
holism, -the prevalence of a punishment mentality, and the impropri-
ety of courts rewriting plain statutory language. Previous efforts to
attack the problem have failed. It is worthwhile to consider the com-
peting considerations which undermined well-intentioned efforts by a
handful of particularly courageous and insightful legislators. In this
context, new questions are raised: To what extent does alcoholism
and denial among our elected officials impede progress? 1 3 Will spe-
cial interests and partisan politics consistently triumph over the best
efforts to bring sobriety to our police forces?
A. A Federal Stab at the Problem
In May, 1991, Rep. Pat Schroeder (D-Colo.) chaired a hearing of
the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families target-
ing police job stress and employee assistance programs.4"4 Partici-
pants included police psychologists, trainers, officers, and a former
officer's wife who had herself been a police officer.415 The focus of the
hearing was far more comprehensive than the problem of alcoholism,
but one witness reported that 36% of the officers surveyed were wor-
ried or guilty about their use of alcohol, and that 75-82% of police
officers' spouses felt that alcohol rehabilitation and stress reduction
programs should be provided to police families.41 6 Another partici-
pant noted that alcoholism treatment is best accomplished in an in-
patient setting, where the officer can be removed from his or her
patently naive and idealistic. Nonetheless, the isolated efforts which have been made suggest
increasing awareness among lawmakers about the depth and breadth of police alcoholism and
its impact on all of us. This part assumes its conclusion-that a handful of legislators will
somehow overcome the odds and lead reform.
413. As this piece was nearing completion, newspapers were filled with stories of Senator
Bob Packwood's (R-Ore.) alcoholism. The Senator, fighting allegations of sexual misconduct,
admitted his alcoholism and entered a treatment program. This is not the first time
Washington has seen the once powerful weakened by alcohol. For example, in 1974,
Representative Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.) blamed blackouts on his inability to remember a
questionable episode with a stripper. Deciding not to seek re-election, Mills later became an
advocate in the fight against alcoholism. The Blame It-On-Booze Defense: Alcohol
Explanation Becomes D.C. 's "Equivalent of the Insanity Plea," THE MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 30,
1992, at (A. There is no doubt that the "alcoholism defense," like an insanity plea, can be
abused. Coining the term seems somehow to lessen the devastating impact of the disease.
Alcoholism, as its victims know, is not a gimmick.
414. Front Lines, supra note 155.
415. Cathy Riggs, a former Santa Rosa Police Department officer and the wife of
Representative Frank Riggs (a co-sponsor of the bill and a former police officer), made a
statement to the Committee. Id. at 50.
416. Id. at 41 (statement of Leonor Boulin Johnson).
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drinking friends.4"7 These observations are consistent with those
reported in the literature.4"'
The Committee's work resulted in proposed House Bill 3101, the
Law Enforcement and Family Support Act, providing for the estab-
lishment of an office of "family support" within the Department of
Justice.4 19 The Family Support Office would be authorized to make
grants to state and local police agencies for the purposes of providing
counseling, twenty-four-hour-a-day child care, stress reduction pro-
grams and stress education for officers and their families. 420 The bill
also listed optional services which might be funded, including "semi-
nars regarding alcohol, drug use, gambling, and overeating. ' 421
Members of the House were told that 20-30% of police officers engage
in excessive or abusive use of alcohol. 422
The bill died in election-year maneuvers. It is quite likely that a
number of alcoholic police officers will either commit suicide, die in
alcohol-related accidents, or harm citizens before the next session of
Congress.4 23 The bill should be reintroduced, and its sponsors should
courageously move the alcoholism education provisions from the
optional to the mandatory category. Federal funding will encourage
those few agencies already operating employee assistance programs to
expand alcoholism awareness services, but the mere option of provid-
ing education about alcoholism will not overcome institutional denial
and wide scale resistance. Even mandatory education about alcohol-
ism is not enough.424
The revised bill should mandate the offer of treatment. The lure
of federal funding is great enough to surmount those diverse influ-
ences currently blocking treatment for the alcoholic officer.425 Repre-
sentative Schroeder and the Committee have at their disposal the
well-drafted provisions of a New York state bill that integrated con-
417. Id. at 61 (statement of Beverly Anderson).
418. See supra part II.D.
419. H.R. 3101, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
420. Id. § 4(b).
421. Id.
422. 137 CONG. REC. No. E2768 (daily ed. July 31, 1991) (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
(Although the link was not made to alcoholism, members of the House were also told that
40% of officers surveyed by one committee witness reported they had behaved violently
toward their spouse or children in the previous six months.); see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
423. See supra part II.A.2.
424. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
425. It is possible that a revised measure will find new support in the White House.
President Clinton's experiences with his stepfather's and brother's chemical dependency
suggest a level of awareness and willingness to confront the issues heretofore unseen in the
Presidency.
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ceptual underpinnings of the disease model with a realistic and hope-
ful vision for healing within law enforcement.
B. The New York Solution Thwarted by Police Culture
In 1991, New York State Senators Lack, Libous, Spano and
Trunzo introduced an amendment to the state labor law that provided
for treatment and reinstatement of recovering alcoholic and drug
dependent police officers. By having the fortitude to propose that
police officers using illegal drugs were worthy of rehabilitation, the
legislators unintentionally doomed treatment for alcoholics. None-
theless, their language is a model which integrates numerous variables
discussed in this Comment:
It is the intent of the state that alcohol and substance abuse shall
not impair workplaces in New York state, especially among those
responsible for the safety of the public. Police officers have a
unique place in society, and it is in the interest of all to assure that
they do not suffer from drug or alcohol abuse. However, it is rec-
ognized that drug and alcohol abuse is a societal problem, from
which some police officers may not be exempt. They should, how-
ever, be protected from unreasonable invasions of personal privacy
and the deprivation of rights arising from suspicion of alcohol or
drug abuse. It is also the policy of the state to encourage rehabilita-
tion of police officers who are identified as alcohol or substance
abusers so they may continue or resume employment. There must
be concern for the individual and his or her family suffering
through such alcohol or substance abuse, and the state should pro-
vide this as an example to the community at large of how to address
this serious problem. In addition, we must recognize the meritori-
ous service of police officers and provide them with an opportunity
to free themselves of the problem of drug or alcohol abuse. Addi-
tionally, the cost of training a police officer is such that it is a much
sounder investment to provide rehabilitation for their problem
both for themselves and their families. It is therefore the intent of
the state to prohibit employers from taking adverse employment
actions against any police officer solely on the basis of drug or alco-
hol test results. This article further requires employers to allow
police officers whose job performance is affected by alcohol or sub-
stance abuse to obtain rehabilitation.426
This policy statement acknowledged public safety concerns,
police vulnerability, constitutional rights, police sacrifice and dedica-
426. S. Res. 2229-A, Senate Assembly, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess., Article 20-D N.Y. Laws,
§ 741 (eraphasis added).
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tion, costs arising from failure to treat, family dynamics, and treat-
ment philosophies. The bill further provided:
Every employer of police officers shall reasonably accommodate
any officer who wished [sic] to enter and participate in an alcohol
or drug rehabilitation program .... An employer may suspend
from active duty an officer whose alcohol or substance abuse prob-
lem poses a direct threat to the safety of others until such officer
has participated in treatment and is able to resume safely his or her
duties. An employer shall, whenever necessary for treatment and
when reasonably possible, permit an employee to:
a. have a part-time or modified work schedule;
b. be temporarily assigned to an appropriate job; or
c. use administrative leave, sick time, vacation or leave without pay
to obtain treatment.4 27
The bill covered most of the critical components of an interven-
tion plan. Ironically, the only critical program component missing
from the New York bill was mandatory education about alcoholism.
The bill was vetoed by Governor Mario Cuomo after police unions
lobbied against its passage. 428 The president of the city's largest
police union articulated the underlying stereotypes driving opposition
to the bill by asking, "How in good conscience can government sanc-
tion drug abuse by police officers who in a drugged condition pose a
threat to the public at large and to their brother and sister officers? ' 4 29
His statement assumes its conclusion-that drug-impaired officers are
not posing a threat now. It also highlights the intractable problem
presented when "drug bills" include alcoholism as an afterthought.4 a0
Governor Cuomo's veto message specified that it was, indeed, the
perceived protection for illegal drug abusers that motivated his deci-
sion. "A positive test result is strong evidence that a police officer has
violated both his or her oath of office and, implicitly, the New York
State Penal Law . ,,4al Nonetheless, the memorandum in opposi-
tion written by the New York State Conference of Mayors illumi-
nated their opposition to any measure which would compel treatment,
even for alcoholism.432 Their proposed remedy? "Collective bargain-
427. Id. § 745(1), (4).
428. State of New York Executive Chamber, Gov. Mario Cuomo, July 26, 1991.
429. Richard Steier, PBA: Don't Go Easy on Drug- Using Cops, N.Y. POST, July 10, 1991, at
13.
430. See infra note 435 and accompanying text.
431. Gov. Mario Cuomo, Veto of Senate Bill 2229-A, July 26, 1991.
432. New York State Conference of Mayors and Other Municipal Officers, Edward C.
Farrell, Executive Director, Memorandum in Opposition, March 4, 1991. The bill was
supported by, among others, the Suffolk County Superior Officers Association and the Police
Conference of New York.
1993] 1161
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1079
ing agreements and police department 'standards of conduct' are the
proper forum to establish the remedies to be pursued in instances of
either drug or alcohol abuse by police officers. '433
This Comment has demonstrated that both individual police
officers and police unions will resist treatment. Solutions which pass
the buck back to police entities fail. Ideally, politicians would have
the courage to resist not only a public outcry for harsh penalties, but
also the: police voice which would expel the diseased rather than
embracet the cure.
C. The Challenge and the Opportunity
Leaders with integrity, compassion and guts can bring order to
the crossroads where police culture meets the larger legal system's
response to alcoholism. Legislators who are up to the challenge will
have to overcome many of the obstacles confronted by the police
supervisor who tries to confront the alcoholic. 4  They will meet
resistance from alcoholic peers, from legislators whose spouses, chil-
dren or parents are drug dependent, and from all those within the
legislative branch who have not come to terms with their own rage
over the: disease. All of those voting for treatment mandates will have
to answer to their electorate. There will be strong opposition from
police unions and from the public. The task is daunting.
Legislators may lessen resistance by altering both content and
approach. First, and unfortunately, legislators should formulate
strategies that initially distinguish alcohol from illegal drugs for the
purposes of implementing treatment methodologies.43 5  Second,
433. Id. In August, 1992, New York legislators passed different legislation ostensibly
addressing discrimination against alcoholics from another angle. A new section was added to
the labor law making it unlawful for employers to discharge or discriminate against employees
because of legal use of consumable products prior to the beginning or after the conclusion of
the employee's work hours. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 201-d(2)(c) (McKinney 1993 Pocket Part).
But exceptions still permit employers to take action against employees based on a belief that
the behavior constitutes habitually poor performance, incompetency or misconduct. N.Y.
LABOR Lw § 201-d(4). Nor does the act apply to activity by public agency employees that
could conflict with employees' performance of their official duties. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 201-
d(3)(b). This broad terminology invites employer defenses against claims of discrimination not
unlike thcse use in response to claims brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
See supra Part III.A.2. It is probable that the New York state alcoholic officer still has few
protections, and slim chance of getting treatment and retaining her job, unless so assured in a
collective bargaining agreement.
434. See supra part II.D.
435. I reach this recommendation reluctantly. The approach deserves criticism from
treatment specialists. It ignores the reality of polyaddiction (simultaneous addiction to more
than one :;ubstance). See, e.g. Thomas J. Maier, Judge Reinstates Drug-Test Cop, NEWSDAY
(City Edition), Jan. 5, 1990, at 8 (discussing Jeanette A., an alcohol and cocaine addicted New
York police officer). One cannot easily treat the police officer's dependency on alcohol while
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lawmakers should develop prototype legislation by combining the best
portions of the failed federal and New York bills. Third, proponents
of new legislation should enlist those police groups and rehabilitation
specialists supporting the legislation in an early and comprehensive
educational effort directed at legislators, police administrators and
unions opposing treatment. Fourth, new legislation should build the
"last chance agreement" into an intervention model, setting forth in
clear contractual terms conditions for continuing employment. Fifth,
the comprehensive bill should include a mandate for education about
alcoholism for all police agencies and all personnel.
It is important not to underestimate the value of education as a
tool for confronting these issues. Officers, from the rookie through
the chief, need to understand on both cognitive and experiential levels
the devastating nature of the disease. They must be given tools to
combat their own denial and to resolve inner conflict borne of alco-
holism within their families of origin. Only then can they forthrightly
admit and then denounce the havoc played on the public when alco-
holism thrives among our men and women in uniform. Officers in
recovery should be enlisted as instruments of change.
It has been demonstrated that the police do not address this
problem themselves, and that courts typically construe relevant statu-
tory provisions narrowly and without understanding of the disease.
Only by enacting new legislation or amending the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act to mandate education about alcoholism and
accommodation of the recovering alcoholic officer can a responsible
legislature ensure that police agencies and unions unite for treatment
and health.
D. Summary
It has been said of the social contract, that:
[T]he dream of living together free from tyranny is the most daring
romance of mankind. We want to be free and at the same time to
enjoy security. This is the context in which morality in law
enforcement takes shape. We want police and law enforcement
institutions that merit our trust, respect, and confidence. 436
Admitting that up to forty percent of our police officers are alcoholic
is painful. Allowing our protectors vulnerability heightens the vul-
nerability of the protected. But encouraging our warriors to live in
firing her for use of cocaine, especially if both addictions took hold during undercover
narcotics assignment. The suggested fiction is an unsettling compromise and from the
treatment perspective is highly unsatisfactory.
436. EDWIN J. DELATrRE, CHARACTER AND Cops: ETHICS IN POLICING 2 (1989).
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health enhances the likelihood of their healthy response to threats. A
redefinition of "essential functions" in policing should include the
ability to admit one's frailties, emphasize one's strengths, and to culti-
vate a police culture which is as supportive of health as it is cohesive
in disaster. We need to admit that accommodating the recovering
alcoholic is no more difficult than accommodating his pregnant, retir-
ing, or overweight partner.
Early intervention is the best way to combat police alcoholism.
It is a strategy that will be noticed by those who count the most:
citizens who have harrowing experiences with intoxicated or
hungover officers and the officers themselves. If the law and law
enforcers embrace treatment, the recovering alcoholic human being,
who happens to wear a badge and a gun, may finally join the commu-
nity he or she serves in health.
Them'e was a neighborly dispute.
Somebody called the cops, and now the man
doesn't want to lose face
in fr-ont of his woman or the crowd.
Macho man.
Confusing his brains with his balls.
His wife and friend are trying to tell him
something,
and the cop hopes like hell he listens.
The guy is getting on his nerves,
and there are too many people standing around
doing nothing.
He doesn't want to have to kick ass,




437. FREEDMAN supra note 1, at 84 (emphasis added).
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